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The aim of this book is to explore whether and how a social–
psychological approach may further our understanding of religious
motivation in Buddhism, primarily early Buddhism, that is
Buddhism at the time when the Buddha or his direct disciples still
lived. The basic questions that it seeks to answer are:
• Why did people choose to join the Buddha?
• Why did they become monks or nuns?
• Were there common themes in the religious motivation of the
early Buddhists?
• Is it possible to illuminate these motivational themes by
applying the theoretical insights of social psychology?
In general terms, this is a book about the social psychology of
religion and, in more specific terms, it is a book about religious
motivation in Buddhism. I believe that in order to understand why
a religion comes into being, and why it succeeds in becoming a
world religion, we should devote more attention to the religious
motivation of individuals than is usual in the study of religious
history. Needless to say, in historical studies it is often difficult, or
even impossible, to say anything about cognitive processes of
individuals. However, when there is a possibility, we should try to
understand the motivation of the people who initiate change. Of
course, there are a number of problems connected with a social–
psychological study of Buddhism. I will discuss some of these
problems in the book, but there will still be many ways to criticize
this type of study both from the angle of philology and from the
angle of social psychology. The kind of approach that I have taken
here is not very common and it involves the risk of making mistakes
in several academic fields at the same time.
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The book consists of six chapters, each of which has previously
appeared elsewhere. They are all attempts to illuminate the religious
motivation of Buddhists and they share the fundamental approach
of social psychology. Chapter 1 is based on the following article:
‘The Skandhaka of the Vinaya Pitaka and its Historical Value’,
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens und Archiv für Indische
Philosophie, XLII, 1998: 23–40. This chapter is an argument for
the use of the Khandhaka section of the Vinaya Pit>aka in the study
of the origins of Buddhism. The argument is that these texts are
likely to be very close to the life of the Buddha and therefore their
historical value is greater than previously assumed. The other
chapters of the book take the Khandhakas as a main source, and
Chapter 1 therefore serves as a legitimation for this approach as
well as an introduction to the most important source.
In the concluding pages of his survey of Vinaya literature, Prebish
wrote that the character of the new publications on this literature –
those of the 1990s – is interpretive rather than simply informative.
‘It is only now that we can say that Vinaya study has come of age’,
he wrote.1 Although religious motivation is my subject here, it is
my hope that this book may be seen as a small contribution to the
interpretive study of the Vinaya.
Chapter 2 is based on the article ‘The Early Samgha and the
Laity’, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies,
20 (2), 1997: 7–33. This chapter uses the Khandhakas, as well as
selected texts from the Sutta Pit >aka, to argue that the Buddhist
Sam≥gha went through some very fundamental changes in its earliest
stages as a response to its peculiar relationship to the laity. In it I
also apply some basic concepts from the social psychology of
religion, such as extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, to illuminate
the relationship between monks and lay people and argue that the
Sam ≥gha moved from a conversionist to an introversionist relation-
ship to the world.
Chapter 3 is based on the article ‘Conversion in Buddhism?’, in
Conversion in Indian Religions, edited by Rowena Robinson and
Satianathan Clarkes (Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
This chapter discusses the appropriateness of terms such as
conversion in the context of early Buddhism. Is the very idea of
conversion, a sudden realization of truth, too closely linked to the
Christian tradition to be applicable to other cultures? The basic
argument of this chapter is that Buddhist texts display a certain
ambiguity when they describe the conversion process of the early
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members of the Sam ≥gha. In the paradigmatic story of the Buddha,
and other similar stories, we are presented with a view that
conversion is a gradual process of realization, whereas in a number
of other instances early Buddhists experience a sudden change that
is more akin to the Christian idea of conversion. I argue that this
paradox is solved if we realize that sudden conversions, or
conversions proper, take place mainly when people leave the life
of householder and enter one of the religious movements of the
period, whereas individuals who are already part of the milieu of
mendicants go in and out of the different sects without necessarily
experiencing a personal crisis.
Chapter 4 is based on the article ‘Contradiction and the Merit
of Giving in Indian Religions’, Numen, International Review for
the History of Religion, 45, 1998: 287–320. In this chapter I focus
on the bonds created between the monks and lay people through
donations. While Chapter 2 looks at how the early Sam ≥gha changed
because of its relationship to the laity, this chapter takes a broader
view of the role of giving in Indian religions, and Buddhism in
particular. The gift has been an important focus of research on Indian
sociology and religion. However, almost all research has been
confined to the Hindu tradition. I believe that a study of the practice
of giving to the Sam ≥gha can illuminate important aspects of the
religious motivation of Buddhism.
Chapter 5 is based on the article ‘The Role of Fear in Indian
Religions with Special Reference to Buddhism’, Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 27, 1999: 439–67. This chapter continues the social–
psychological search for the motivation of the early Buddhists by
looking at the role of fear. Fear is an important theme in Indian
religions and is encountered in the literature of many different
traditions of the sub-continent. However, the role of fear has
received no attention from scholarship either in indology or in the
history of religions. In this chapter I attempt to illuminate the role
of fear in religious motivation and in the social psychology of
Buddhism and other traditions of the sub-continent. The point of
departure is the paradoxical role that fear seems to have in a range
of Buddhist texts. On the one hand, fear is seen as a negative thing
that should be left behind by the renouncer. Fear is a fact of life in
the world. Freedom from fear is a corollary, or the equivalent of
Nirva¤n .a. On the other hand, fear is a positive thing that should be
cultivated by the aspiring renouncer. Fear is a basic motivating
factor, and is a prerequisite for exertion on the path to religious
INTRODUCTION
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realization. The Buddha comes into the world both to create fear in
living beings and to bestow freedom from fear. It seems, then, that
fear assumes a pragmatic role, and in order to put this aspect of
fear in a historical context I believe that we must look at the
missionary stance of Buddhism and view the induction of fear
through the preaching of hellfire and damnation as part of its arsenal
of proselytizing.
Chapter 6 is based on the article ‘The Religious Motivation of
the Early Buddhists’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion,
67 (4), 1999: 849–66. From motivational theory I will pick an
approach that sees psychological incongruity, the discrepancy
between an internal state and an external stimulus, as a basic
motivating factor, and from this general approach I will pick two
more specific conceptualizations of motivation, namely the theory
of cognitive dissonance and a theory of secondary control. I should
emphasize that I do not believe that the exercise of applying these
theoretical constructs to early Buddhist textual material will render
radically new answers to the question of why Buddhism arose. My
aim is, first of all, to open a discussion about the use of modern
psychology in the study of ancient and alien religious traditions.
This book is intended for an academic readership, first and
foremost in Buddhist studies and indology in general. However,
the present volume would, by its psychological approach, also serve
as a suggestion for how some fundamental questions of religious
studies might be approached. Therefore, it is my hope that it could





OF THE KHANDHAKA OF
THE VINAYA PIT ≥AKA
In the first twenty-four chapters of the Khandhaka section of the
Pa ¤li Vinaya Pit >aka we find the account of the enlightenment of the
Buddha and the foundation of the Buddhist Sam ≥gha. This account
is undoubtedly old. However, in his book on the original Skandhaka
– of which the Pa ¤li Khandhaka is one version – Erich Frauwallner
expressed his belief that the timespan between the death of the
Buddha and the composition of the text was at least 150 years.1 If
Frauwallner was correct, the author of the Skandhaka would have
described events of the distant past. I want to show that the time
separating the origins of the Skandhaka from the events that it
describes may be considerably shorter than previously assumed.
Thus, the historical value of the work is greater than Frauwallner,
and historians who have relied on his work, believed. It seems to
me that the Skandhaka deserves more attention from scholars who
work with early Buddhism.
When I use the term Skandhaka or ‘original Skandhaka’ without
further specification I refer to a literary work that was composed
more than two thousand years ago, that is the original form of the
text. The term Skandhaka, then, is not used for the Skandhaka of
any particular Buddhist school. The Skandhaka was composed at a
time when there were no Buddhist schools. We know this because
the Maha ¤sa ¤m ≥ghikas include this text in their canon. It must have
been composed before the first schism at the Council of Pa ¤t>aliputra,
at which the greater part of the Sam ≥gha broke away from the
Sthaviras, the elders. The Vinayas of six Buddhist schools are
preserved. They are the Vinayas of the Sarva ¤stiva¤dins, the Dharma-
guptakas, the Mahî ¤s æa ¤sakas, the Pa ¤li school, the Mu¤lasarva¤stiva ¤dins
and the Maha¤sa ¤m ≥ghikas.2 The Skandhakas of the different schools
are very similar in content. The greatest degree of congruence is
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found between the Skandhakas of the Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins, the
Dharmaguptakas, the Pa¤li school and the Mahî¤s æa ¤sakas.3 There is
no reason to doubt that these Skandhakas have a common ancestor.
Frauwallner believed that the Vinayas of these four schools are so
similar because they are the products of one missionary enterprise,
and that their Vinayas, therefore, can be traced back to the same
text that was current at the starting point of the missions, i.e. Vidis æa¤.4
What the Vinayas of these schools have in common, then, can be
taken as the original content of this Vinaya of Vidis æa ¤.
According to the Dî ¤pavam≥sa and the Maha¤vam≥sa, after the third
council Tissa Moggaliputta sent missionaries to several places. In
rock edict XIII, As æoka says that he has sent his envoys to different
peoples.5 Are the missionary enterprises, which are mentioned in
the Sinhalese tradition, the same as the ones of Asæoka’s rock edict
XIII? Frauwallner identifies the peoples mentioned in As æoka’s edict
with the countries in the Sinhalese tradition, and concludes that
As æoka must have sent the missionaries and that this enterprise was
the origin of the four schools whose Skandhakas are most similar.6
However, Frauwallner’s theory has been criticized. First, one could
doubt Frauwallner’s arguments for Vidis æa ¤ as the origin of the
missions. These arguments are:
1 Mahinda’s mother was from Vidisæa¤, and Mahinda set out from
Vidis æa ¤ on his mission to Ceylon.
2 Vidis æa¤ was an important religious centre at the time of As æoka.
3 Relics of three of the missionaries have been found in stu ¤pas
near Vidis æa ¤.
Second, the idea that a single missionary enterprise converted all
these countries and peoples to Buddhism seems to be an
oversimplification.7
Having identified a Vinaya of Vidis æa¤, Frauwallner’s next step is
to clarify the relationship between this and the Vinaya of the
Mu ¤lasarva ¤stiva ¤dins. The latter differs from the other Vinayas in
that it contains a large number of fables. Frauwallner points to a
passage in the Maha ¤prajña ¤pa ¤ramitopades æa that mentions two
Vinayas. One is the Vinaya of Mathura ¤, which includes also the
Avada ¤na and Ja ¤taka. The second is the Vinaya of Kas æmî ¤r, which
has rejected the Avada ¤na and Ja ¤taka and contains only the
essentials.8 On the basis of the passage in the Maha ¤prajña ¤-
pa¤ramitopades æa, he identifies the Vinaya of the Mu¤lasarva¤stiva¤dins
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with the Vinaya of Mathura ¤ and the Vinaya of the Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins
with the Vinaya of Kas æmî ¤r.9 Having linked the Mu ¤lasarva ¤stiva ¤dins
with Mathura ¤, Frauwallner goes on to argue for the independence
of this school and its Vinaya from the schools that were the results
of the missions, among them the Sarva ¤stiva¤dins. He also argues
that the Mu ¤lasarva¤stiva ¤dins was a very early school and that the
Vinaya of Mathura¤ existed side by side and independently with the
Vinaya of Vidis æa ¤:
On the other side, the Mathura ¤ community had nothing to do
with these missions. It is an old community, much earlier than
As æoka, and plays an important role already at the time of the
council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤.’10
But the Mu ¤lasarva ¤stiva ¤dins belong to the same dogmatic
tradition as the Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins. Frauwallner has foreseen this
objection and argues that the foundation of communities based on
Vinaya and the rise of dogmatic schools are two completely different
things.11 Therefore, the Mu ¤lasarva ¤stiva¤dins could well be a part of
a larger school and, at the same time, be independent in terms of
Vinaya. Lamotte does not agree that the Vinaya of the Mu ¤lasar-
va ¤stiva ¤dins is the Vinaya of Mathura ¤ mentioned by Kuma ¤rajî ¤va:
Quant au Vin. des Mu ¤lasarv. qui consacre deux Skandhaka à
la biographie complète et suivie du Buddha, il ne provient pas
d’une ancienne communauté bouddhique fixée à Mathura ¤ dès
le premier siècle du bouddhisme – comme le voudrait M.
Frauwallner (p. 37) – mais d’une immense somme de discipline
close très tardivement et très probablement rédigée au Kas æmir
pour compléter le Vinaya des Sarva ¤stiva ¤din. Lorsque, dans le
passage étudié plus haut, Kuma ¤rajî ¤va parle du ‘Vinaya du pays
de Mathura ¤ en 80 sections’ il a en vue, non pas le Vin. des
Mu ¤lasarv., mais l’antique Vinaya d’Upa ¤li détenu en dernier
lieu à Mathura¤ par le patriarche Upagupta.12
Lamotte says that the Vinaya of the Mu ¤lasarva ¤stiva ¤dins (Msv.
Vinaya) was closed much later. He offers three arguments. First,
the Msv. Vinaya contains a prediction about Kanis .ka. The way in
which the text treats the great king proves that it is considerably
later than Kanis.ka who, Lamotte suggests, reigned some time during
the second century AD. Second, the person of S æa¤kyamuni in the
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Msv. Vinaya is not the sage of Kapilavastu but, rather, a superior
god. Finally, Fa-hien, who visited India in 402 and 411 AD in search
for copies of the Vinaya, does not seem to have had any knowledge
of the Msv. Vinaya.13 ‘Pour toutes ces raisons, on ne peut attribuer
à cet ouvrage une date antérieure aux IVe-Ve siècles de notre ère.’14
Raniero Gnoli adopts a position midway between Frauwallner’s
view of an early date and Lamotte’s opinion of the fourth–fifth
century AD as a terminus a quo for the Vinaya of the Mu ¤lasar-
va ¤stiva ¤dins.15 On the basis of the the text’s prediction concerning
Kanis .ka and its tales of Kas æmî ¤r, Gnoli believes that the date of the
text must be taken back to the time of Kanis .ka.16 In his analysis of
the Vinaya of the Mu¤lasarva ¤stiva ¤dins, Panglung does not introduce
an independent view with regard to the dating of the text, but, like
Gnoli,17 he quotes Waldschmidt to show that this Vinaya is a very
heterogeneous work.18 The period of compilation was long and the
texts that constitute the extant Vinaya were ‘laid down in different
epochs, and subsequently patched up together’.19
The next step for Frauwallner is to push the origin of the
Skandhaka another step back by comparing the Skandhaka of the
Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins, Dharmaguptakas, Mahî¤s æa¤sakas, the Pa ¤li school and
the Mu ¤lasarva¤stiva ¤dins with the Skandhaka of the Maha ¤sa¤m ≥ghikas.
First, he observes that the account of the two First Councils is found
in all these works. This shows that these accounts were part of the
original Skandhaka. Frauwallner also suggests that the story of the
Buddha’s Parinirva ¤n .a was a part of the original work. What about
the story of the illumination and the founding of the Order? In the
cases the of Pa¤li school, the Dharmaguptaka and the Mahî¤s æa ¤sakas
we find this tale in the beginning of the Skandhaka, and in the case
of the Mu ¤lasarva ¤stiva ¤dins there is a corresponding section in the
Sam ≥ghabhedavastu. But Frauwallner is faced with the problem that
the story of the illumination and the early history of the Sam≥gha
seems to be lacking in the Skandhakas of the Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins and
the Maha ¤sa ¤m ≥ghikas. In Lamotte’s words:
Dans les deux Vinaya que les traditions indigènes examinées
plus haut présentent comme les plus proches de’l antique
Vinaya d’Upa ¤li – à savoir les Vin. des Sarva ¤stiva ¤din et des
Maha ¤sa ¤m ≥ghika – il n’y a pas de traces de la biographie initiale
du Buddha.20
The solution to this is quite simple. The Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins did have
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an account of these things, but by later tradition it was not regarded
as a part of the Vinaya. In the case of the Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins, the
Catus .paris .atsu ¤tra, the story of the origin of the four assemblies –
i.e. the monks, the nuns and the male and female lay supporters –
belongs to the Dî ¤rgha ¤gama of the Su ¤tra Pit >aka. Frauwallner
believes that it originally belonged to the Skandhaka. The
correspondence between the Catus .paris .atsu¤tra and the Maha¤vagga
1–24 of the Khandhaka of the Pa ¤li school is nearly complete. It
also seems that the Maha ¤sa ¤m ≥ghikas had the Buddha biography and
the story of the early Sam ≥gha. Frauwallner points to a passage of a
biography in Chinese, which says that the Maha ¤sa ¤m ≥ghikas had a
biography of the Buddha called Ta shih, i.e. Maha ¤vastu.21
Frauwallner believes that it originally belonged to the Skandhaka.
The important point is that the Maha ¤sa ¤m ≥ghikas actually had this
text as did the other schools, because this supposition moves the
composition of the biography of the Buddha and the history of the
first Sam ≥gha further back to the time before the schismatic council
of Pa ¤t>aliputra.
The historical value of the Skandhaka
Waldschmidt has done a comparative analysis of the most important
part of the Skandhaka, the Catus .paris.atu¤tra.22 About the comparison
of this account in the extant versions belonging to different Buddhist
schools, Waldschmidt said:
Damit kann die wissenschaftliche Betrachtung der Begründung
der buddhistischen Gemeinde auf ein Fundament tieferer
Schicht als bisher erreichbar gestellt werden …23
André Bareau, who, besides Frauwallner, has done the most
thorough analysis of the material of the Buddha biography and the
account of the early Sam ≥gha as it is contained in the Skandhaka
and in passages of the Dî¤ghanika ¤ya, has a more pessimistic view
of the value of this material:
L’anciennité et la diversité de nos sources met en relief cette
hétérogénéité et cet émiettement des éléments qui ont servi à
composer la biographie du Buddha, et ce double caractère
conduit à douter fortement de l’historicité des données qui nous
sont ainsi fournies.24
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Oldenberg said about the stories connected with the Pa¤t >imokkha
rules:
That the histories, which have in this manner been added to
the several rules of the Pa ¤timokkha, have for the most part
been invented, and, moreover invented in an extremely
awkward and conventional way, will be perfectly evident to
every one who reads a series of them one after the other.25
It should be noted, however, that the Pa ¤t >imokkha rules
themselves were laid down very early and furnish us, according to
Pachow, with invaluable data for framing a picture of the economic
and social conditions of their times.26 The accounts of the
Maha ¤vagga and Cullavagga are given the same status, that of mere
inventions, as those of the VibhanVga by Oldenberg, but he expresses
ambivalence when it comes to the historical value of these texts:
The histories, as a whole, are undoubtedly pure inventions as
those in the Vibhan Vga; this does not, of course, prevent their
belonging to the most valuable sources for our knowledge of
the life of the ancient Buddhist community.27
But if the stories of the Skandhaka are generally inventions like
those of the Vibhan Vga, why is the historical value of the Skandhaka
greater than that of the Vibhan Vga? According to Oldenberg, the
essential difference between the Maha ¤vagga and Cullavagga and
the Vibhan Vga is that the stories of the Vibhan Vga were added to an
original basis of ecclesiastical regulations that had existed for some
time, whereas most of the stories of the Maha ¤vagga and the
Cullavagga were fixed in their context at the same time as the
precepts that they explain.28
Oldenberg was of the opinion that the material of the Skandhaka
gives a more authentic picture of a point of time in the history of
the Sam ≥gha than the Vibhan Vga. However, according to Oldenberg
the time separating the composition of the Skandhaka from the life
of the earliest Sam ≥gha is considerable. Thus, it is hard to see how
this material can be of truly great value from Oldenberg’s point of
view. Dieter Schlingloff expressed much the same view as
Oldenberg about the stories of the Pra ¤timoks .asu ¤tra:
In einer oder der anderen Geschichte mögen sich Erinnerungen
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an tatsächliche Vorkommnisse in der Gemeinde nieder-
geschlagen haben, meist sind die Erzählungen jedoch reine
Zweckerfindungen, um die Verordnungen zu motivieren.29
Schlingloff takes the awkward relationship between rules and
stories in the Pra ¤timoks .asu ¤tra and the Vibhan Vga as proof of the
considerable distance in time and spirit (zeitigen und geistigen
abstand) between the disciplinary codes and the accounts connected
with them. However, in the case of the Skandhaka it seems that
one finds both uninspired – even misunderstood – stories and
valuable legends with historical value. As suggested by Oldenberg’s
statements, the case of the Skandhaka is different from those of the
Pra¤timoks.asu¤tra and the VibhanVga. Substantial parts of the accounts
give the reader a feeling of authenticity. In contrast to the VibhanVga,
many stories contained in the Pa ¤li Khandhaka and the
Catus .paris.atsu ¤tra neither appear awkward nor do they seem like
pure Zweckerfindungen. Horner said that ‘the beginning of the
Maha¤vagga gives not only an impression but an account of an Order
expanding and taking shape.’30 Frauwallner emphazised the
historical value of the Skandhaka both for the history of the Vinaya
and for the history of Buddhism in general.31 The text is also an
inexhaustible mine for the history of Indian culture and is of value
for Indian linguistic history, he said. But Frauwallner’s enthusiasm
for the Skandhaka as a source of history is hard to understand in
the light of his opinions on the composition of the text. With one
example taken from the Maha ¤parinirva ¤n .asu ¤tra he claims that he
has proved all biographical accounts of the Buddha contained in
the Skandhaka to be pure fiction.32 He concludes:
The biography of the Buddha, which forms the framework of
the old Skandhaka text, is not authentic old tradition, but a
legendary tale, the work of the author of the Skandhaka. This
gives rise to important inferences. As seen above, this
biography is the basis of the most famous later biographies of
the Buddha, and authoritative texts such as the Maha ¤-
parinirva ¤n .asu ¤tra and the Catus .paris .atsu ¤tra are drawn from
it. But these are the most important sources, upon which we
have hitherto based our knowledge of the life of the Buddha.
Once we have recognized that they all go back to a legendary
tale, which was created only in the 4th century BC about one
hundred years after the Nirva ¤n.a, they cease to represent primary
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sources. They may in future be utilized only in as far as we
can recognize in them borrowings from earlier traditions.33
If we were to accept this view, the use of the Skandhaka as a
source of history would be problematic. Indeed, if the accounts of
the life of the Buddha and the early Sam ≥gha has no foundation in
reality, there would be no reason to believe that the Buddha was a
historical figure. If the stories of the Buddha completely lack
reference to actual events, Frauwallner might as well regard these
accounts as purely mythical constructions. But there are two
arguments against Frauwallner’s dismissal of the biographical
accounts. First, the view that the original Skandhaka was the work
of one author, who created a tale about the Buddha in order to
embellish the rules of the Sam ≥gha, is doubtful. Second, the
Skandhaka was probably composed considerably closer to the time
when the Buddha was alive than Frauwallner believed. Therefore,
there is no reason to assume that the author(s) lacked knowledge
of the life of the Buddha and the early Sam ≥gha and that they, as a
consequence, had to create a fictional biography.
The date and composition of the original
Skandhaka
According to Frauwallner, the composition of the Skandhaka took
place between 100 and 160 years after the Nirva ¤n .a (AN). In the
light of more recent research on the dates of the Buddha’s lifetime,
it is difficult to agree with him. Its writing may have taken place so
close to the life of the first Sam ≥gha that the author could have had
his information about the subject of his text from the direct disciples
of the Buddha. In fact, it cannot be totally ruled out that authors of
the Skandhaka met the Buddha themselves.
Let us sum up Frauwallner’s line of argument in his attempt to
date the composition of the oldest Skandhaka work.34 First, he says,
the Skandhaka must have come into being after the Council of
Vais æa ¤lî¤ because all the traditions have the account of this assembly
as part of the text. Second, it must have been composed before
As æoka because the Vinayas of the different schools that were results
of As æoka’s missions clearly go back to a common source. Third,
the text must have been made before the first schism because the
Maha ¤sa¤m≥ghikas have drawn from the work. Frauwallner concludes:
‘And thus, if we stick to the most usual traditional dates, its rise
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belongs to the period between 100 and 160 after the Nirva ¤n .a.’35
Obviously, the natural and relevant reference points in the dating
of the Skandhaka are dates in the lifetime of the Buddha. When
was the Parinirva ¤n .a? According to the Dî¤pavam ≥sa and the
Maha ¤vam ≥sa, 218 years elapsed between the death of the Buddha
and the accession of As æoka.36 Taking the date of Asæoka provided
by this tradition we arrive at 544/543 BC as the date of the Buddha’s
Parinirva ¤n .a. When it was realized that there was a discrepancy
between the Greek sources and the Ceylonese sources, the date of
the Buddha’s death was corrected to 486–77 BC, and this corrected
long chronology was accepted by most modern scholars for a long
time.37 A different tradition encountered in earlier Buddhist Sanskrit
works, and their Tibetan and Chinese translations, gives only a
hundred years as the time separating the Buddha’s death from the
consecration of As æoka. In 1983, Bechert showed that the corrected
Ceylonese chronology could not be maintained.38 Neither can we,
according to Bechert, accept the shorter chronology suggested by
the Indian sources and its Chinese and Tibetan translations. Bechert
chooses instead to calculate the date of the Nirva ¤n .a on the basis of
the lists of patriarchs and arrives at a period between 85 and 105
years before As æoka’s consecration. He goes on to place the Council
of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ between 40 and 50 years after the Nirva ¤n .a. Moreover, in
moving the date of the Buddha’s Nirva ¤n .a to some time between
353 and 373 BC (taking 268 BC as the year of As æoka’s consecration),
Bechert is not only advancing his own view of the matters, he says.
A careful study of the works of Mendis, Lamotte and Eggermont
will show the Ceylonese chronology to be untenable.39 Bechert
slightly alters these dates in a later article, giving 80–130 years
before As æoka’s coronation as the period within which the Buddha’s
Nirva¤n .a most probably took place.40 Here, he takes Alexander’s
Indian campaign as the definitive terminus ad quem.
The papers from the Fourth Symposium on Buddhist Studies,
edited by Bechert, are more or less concurrent in the view that the
date of the Buddha, or the Nirva ¤n .a, must be moved forward.
However, complete unanimity is not achieved on the question of
how much the date should be altered, or what methods should be
used in the search for the correct year of the Nirva ¤n .a. If one tries to
extract one acceptable date for the Buddha’s death from the different
methods and respective results in the papers of the symposium, it
seems to me that 400 BC is the best approximation. This is the date
which has the highest degree of compatibility with the estimations
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of Gombrich,41 Bechert,42 Bareau,43 Simson,44 Härtel,45 Schmit-
hausen46 and Hirakawa.47 What is the significance of the later date
of the Buddha on the historical value of the Skandhaka? The later
date for the Nirva ¤n .a has an impact both on our knowledge of the
history of north India and on the concept of an axial age in the
context of world history, Kulke says.48 He continues: ‘Third, we
have to reassess the historiographical value of early Buddhist
literature in view of Buddha’s probable date around 400 BC’49 and
‘It is self-evident that such a late date of early Buddhist literature
changes considerably its historiographical significance and
relevance.’50 For my concern, the most important implication of
the later dating of the Buddha is that we must place the origination
of the original Skandhaka closer to the events it describes. The
reason is simple: this work cannot have been composed 100 to 160
years after the Nirva ¤n .a and, at the same time, well before As æoka. It
is equally impossible to maintain the period of 100 to 160 years
between the Nirva ¤n .a and the composition of the Skandhaka and, at
the same time, hold on to the view that the text was composed
before the schism at Pa ¤t >aliputra. However, it is reasonable to
maintain As æoka’s time as the terminus ad quem for the Skandhaka.
Frauwallner chose the period between 100 and 160 AN as the
time for the composition of the Skandhaka. He adopted 100 AN as
the earliest possible date for the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤, as mentioned
in the Ceylonese chronicles and the Skandhaka itself, and he took
160 AN as the latest possible date for the schism which split the
Buddhist community into Sthaviras and Maha¤sa ¤m ≥ghikas, tradition-
ally the Council of Pa ¤t >aliputra. To throw some light on the dating
of the Council of Pa ¤t>aliputra, which is Frauwallner’s terminus ad
quem for the composition of the Skandhaka, one can consult
Bareau.51 In considering the different traditions concerning this
council, Bareau presents us with four possible dates: 100 AN, 116
AN, 137 AN and 160 AN52 He immediately rejects the two extremes.
In the same way as in his paper in the Fourth Symposium, Bareau
makes his choice among the diverging dates offered by the different
textual traditions, after reflecting on the probability of the timespan
separating the Council of Pa ¤t>aliputra from the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤:
Si nous considerons la duree de l’intervalle qu’implique
chacune de ces deux dates precises, 116 ou 137 EN, entre le
concile de Vais æa¤lî ¤ et celui de Pataliputra dans la tradition qui
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nous l’a transmise, c’est-a-dire six ans ou trente-sept ans, c’est
bien la seconde qui parait de beaucoup la plus vraisemblable.53
If Bareau is right, Frauwallner could have narrowed his timespan
to the period between 100 AN and 137 AN, which is Bareau’s most
likely date for the Council of Pa ¤t >aliputra. Although Bareau is
sceptical about the exactness of his sources, he does not seem to
question these two dates on which his calculations are based. He
concludes:
Pourtant, rien ne nous assure par ailleurs de l’exactitude de
cette derniere date et nous devons donc nous contenter de
penser que le schisme eut lieu dans la premiere moitie, plus
precisement dans le second quart du IIe siecle apres le
Nirva ¤n .a.54
More important is the date of the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ as this was
the terminus a quo for Frauwallner. There is not complete agreement
regarding the date of the council in the different textual traditions.
The Vinayas of the Therava ¤dins, the Mahî¤s æa ¤saka, the Dharma-
guptaka and the Haimavata put it at 100 years after the Nirva ¤n .a.
The Vinaya of the Sarva ¤stivadin and the Mu ¤lasarva¤stiva ¤dins have
110 years. Other sources have one of these two dates. Should we
trust these dates, as Frauwallner does? A passage in the Cullavagga
can be taken as an indication that the time separating the Buddha
from the participants at the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ was not several
generations, as stated by both traditions. It says that there was a
thera called Sabbaka ¤min who had received ordination 120 years
earlier and who was sharing a cell with A¤nanda. According to
Dî¤pavam ≥sa IV.48–52, Sa ¤lha, Revata, Khujjasobhita, Yasa and
Sambhu ¤ta had also shared cells with the thera A¤nanda. Obviously,
we cannot accept the statement that Sabbaka¤min and the other elders
at the council had received ordination 120 years before, which
would mean that they were at least 140 years old at the time of the
council – 20 being the minimum age for ordination as laid down in
Maha ¤vagga I.49 and parallel texts. But must we necessarily reject
the statement that Sabbaka ¤min had once shared a cell with the
venerable A¤nanda? There is a different solution: what if Sabbaka¤min
had actually been ordained at the time of the Buddha and had shared
a cell with A¤nanda and what if the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ took place,
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say, 40 years after the Buddha’s Nirva ¤n .a? When the time from the
Nirva ¤n .a to the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤, by the later tradition, was settled
as one century, the redactors of the Vinaya had to manipulate
Sabbaka ¤min’s age at the time of the council in order to get things
right. Horner suggests that, in the translation of the Cullavagga,
Sabbaka ¤min is identical with Sabbaka ¤ma of the Theraga ¤tha ¤
CCXXIII. Here, it is said that that he was born in Vais æa ¤lî ¤ after the
Buddha had passed away and that he had received instruction from
the Treasurer of the Norm, i.e. A¤nanda. In his evaluation of the
sources on the date of the Buddha, Akira Hirakawa comments, in
passing, on the age of the disciples of A¤nanda who were present at
the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤:
If his oldest disciples lived to be over a hundred years old, it is
not impossible that some would still be alive a century after
the Buddha’s death. It seems that it was not unusual for a bhiks.u
who lived a regulated existence away from secular life to
survive more than a hundred years. 55
This sounds too incredible. Moreover, according to Dî¤pavam ≥sa
IV.48–52, the elders of the council – Sabbaka ¤min, Sa ¤lha, Revata,
Khujjasobhita, Yasa, Sambhu¤ta of Sa ¤n.a, Sumana and Va ¤sabhaga¤mi
– had previously seen the Tatha ¤gata. Again, we must reject the
possibility that all these theras actually were 140 years old, and
again, we are confronted with two solutions to the problem:
1 The elders did not know the Buddha. This tradition could
have been invented, perhaps, to increase the authority of the
participants of the council.
2 The Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ took place at a time when direct
disciples of the Buddha were still alive, say 40 years after
the Nirva ¤n .a. Later, when it was decided that the council had
taken place 100 years, or more, after the death of the master,
the redactors had to manipulate the age of the elders to make
the numbers add up.56
Bechert puts the question of the date of the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ into
the context of the later date of the Buddha. He says:
The Council of Vais æa¤lî ¤ may be dated about 40 to 50 p.N. [post
Nirva ¤n .a]. The tradition that Sa ¤n .ava ¤sî¤, one of the great
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authorities of this convocation, was a personal pupil of A¤nanda,
becomes now credible.57
However, there is not complete agreement among scholars about
how to treat the councils. Franke, for instance, having rejected the
historicity of the First Council,58 says:
We may confront the chronicle of the Second Council with
even greater indifference. This is not only a merely literary
construction; it does not even possess any relevant subject
matter.59
Franke is more or less alone in his clear rejection of the credibility
of the account of both of the First Councils. Hofinger says: ‘ … on
peut tenir pour assurée l’historicité du concile de Vais æa¤lî ¤’.60 Lamotte,
in his conclusion on the subject of the two First Councils, asks for
caution: ‘Le peu qu’on en a dit suffit à montrer qu’il serait imprudent
de se prononcer pour ou contre l’historicité des conciles.’61 What
does Bareau have to say about the date of the Council of Vais æa¤lî ¤?
First, he concludes a discussion of the traditions by expressing
distrust:
Le fait est là: la date du concile de Vais æa ¤lî ¤ a été fixée, et chez
les Sthavira seulement, vers 200 EN, c’est-à-dire un siècle
environ après la date ainsi choisie. Par conséquent, elle est
suspecte a priori.62
All we can say, according to Bareau, is that the council took place
between the Buddha’s Nirva ¤n .a and the first schism. Nevertheless,
he ends his chapter by making a reserved conjecture:
Nous sommes donc amenés, sur la foi de ces indices, à placer
le concile de Vais æa¤lî ¤ vers la fin du Ier siècle EN, par conséquent
à une date assez proche de l’an 100 EN qui est donné par les
traditions des Sthavira.63
In the latest publication on the date of the historical Buddha,
Bechert has not changed his opinion on the issue. He says that the
scepticism vis-à-vis all attempts to determine the date of the Nirva ¤n.a
does not preclude him from subscribing to the view that we must,
in Lamotte’s words, ‘drastically bring forward the date of the
Buddha’s Nirva ¤n .a’.64
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To sum up, Frauwallner’s dating of the Skandhaka cannot be
accepted as neither the traditional dating of the Nirva ¤n .a nor the
period of 100 or 110 years between the Nirva¤n .a and the Council of
Vais æa ¤lî ¤ can be retained. Generally speaking, in accepting a later
date for the Buddha’s death we cannot, at the same time, uncritically
move all events whose dates have been fixed in relation to the
Nirva¤n .a for the simple reason that they will clash with dates whose
authenticity is more certain. On the contrary, when we move the
Nirva¤n .a closer to As æoka we also move the life of the Buddha and
the foundation of the Sam ≥gha closer to the composition of the
Skandhaka. How close? If Bechert is correct in placing the Council
of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ between 40 and 50 AN, the time separating the Nirva ¤n .a
and the composition of the Skandhaka may be no more than 40
years. This probably means that direct disciples of the Buddha lived
at the time when the original Skandhaka was composed and we
cannot completely rule out the possibility that the authors of the
Skandhaka met the Buddha themselves.
So far we have presupposed that the Skandhaka originated after
the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤. As long as the date of the council has been
thought of as settled, the author of the Skandhaka has been separated
from his subject matter by more than a century. We have already
seen that Frauwallner’s opinions about the date of the Council of
Vais æa ¤lî ¤ cannot be supported. Can we agree with him when he says
that the Skandhaka was composed after the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤? I
see two reasons for not accepting Frauwallner’s view without
hesitation. The first, and weaker, objection that can be made against
it is to refuse to believe, like Franke, in the historicity of the Council
of Vaisæa¤lî ¤ and to suggest that the fictional tradition about this council
originated very early. The fact that the story of the council is found
in the Skandhaka would consequently not entail any definite limit
of time for the composition of the work. A second, and stronger,
argument can be made by pointing to the uncertainty surrounding
the conjectures that are the foundation of Frauwallner’s view. A
necessary condition for concluding, like Frauwallner, that the
Skandhaka was composed after the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ is that the
work was composed by one person within a limited period of time.
If one admits the possibility that the Skandhaka was fashioned by
different authors over a longer period of time, one must
acknowledge the chance that the sections of the Skandhaka dealing
with the councils were added after the other parts of the work had
been finished. Conversely, if one takes the narration of the councils
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as proof that the whole of the Skandhaka was composed after the
councils, one must accept the condition that the work was composed
at a certain point in time, most likely by one author. Oldenberg’s
views are not harmonious with those of Frauwallner. Oldenberg
says:
The account of the Councils follows upon the actual closing
chapter of the Vinaya, containing the laws for the Bhikkhun.î ¤s.
It is evident that this account is written as the conclusion or an
appendix to the Vinaya, and that, accordingly, the main
substance of the Vinaya laws were not composed later. It
remains to be considered whether, at the time the closing
chapter was composed, the principal part of the work did
already exist as a complete whole, or whether the closing
chapter and the other portions of the Vinaya were composed at
one and the same time. It seems to me that the first of these
alternatives possesses by far the greater amount of probability,
not to say certainty.65
Oldenberg goes on to give the reasons for his opinion that the main
body of the Skandhaka was composed before the sections dealing
with the councils. First, the redaction of the whole Vinaya is said,
in the closing chapter, to have been made immediately after the
death of the Buddha. Second, the subjects of discussion at the
Second Council are not mentioned in other parts of the Vinaya.66
After further argumentation Oldenberg concludes:
The discussion of the ten propositions is given in the form of
an account of the Council of Vesali, as an appendix at the end
of the Vinaya; this, I think, is the best proof of the fact that
when the dispute concerning the ten propositions was being
carried on, the Vinaya itself already existed, that IT IS OLDER
THAN THE COUNCIL OF VESALI.67
Of course, it is Frauwallner’s and Oldenberg’s fundamentally
different views concerning the nature of the birth of the Skandhaka,
and the whole of the Vinaya, that are the source of this radical
disagreement. Where do Oldenberg’s opinions leave us regarding
the question of the dating of the original Skandhaka and the question
of the degree to which the earliest Sam ≥gha can be studied through
the text? Of the Skandhaka, Oldenberg says that its style of
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composition corresponds so exactly with that of the later written
parts of the Vibhan Vga ‘… that it may be assumed with certainty
that these texts were composed almost contemporaneously’.68 The
Skandhaka, then, would not belong to the earliest parts of Buddhist
literature, as they would presuppose the existence of the Pra¤timoks.a
rules.69 However, Oldenberg bases his calculations on the
chronological system of the Maha ¤vam ≥sa and Dî¤pavam ≥sa when
suggesting a date for the composition of the Skandhaka. He arrives
at 383 BC as the approximate date of the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ and 400
BC for the revision of the Vinaya, including the Skandhaka.70
Frauwallner’s hypothesis concerning the relationship between the
Skandhaka and the account of the council is opposed by Étienne
Lamotte, who says:
Et si le récit des conciles se rattacha momentanément à la
tradition du Vinaya, il demeure évident, comme le constatait
déjà M. Demiéville, que ses rédacteurs n’étaient pas les mêmes
que ceux des Vinaya auxquels ce récit est adjoint.71
Summing up the above discussion, it is clear that Frauwallner’s
conjectures concerning the dating of the original Skandhaka are to
a large degree invalidated. If one accepts the Council of Vas æa¤lî ¤ as
the terminus a quo for the composition of the work, its author may
have lived 40 years after the Nirva ¤n .a. Thus, it is not impossible
that the writer lived during the Buddha’s lifetime. This goes well
with the statements in the canonical sources that the participants of
this council knew the Buddha and A¤nanda. On the other hand, if
one does not accept the Council of Vais æa ¤lî ¤ as the terminus a quo,
the time separating the author of the Skandhaka and the Buddha
and the earliest Sam ≥gha is undetermined. We may conclude that
not knowing the time separating the author of the Skandhaka from
the life of the Buddha and his first followers is not a factor that
diminishes the value of the text as a source in the study of the
earliest Sam ≥gha. The trustworthiness of the textual transmission






SAM ≥GHA AND THE
LAITY
The aim of this chapter is to show how the relationship between
the Sam ≥gha and the laity originated and were maintained in early
Buddhism. I believe that in order to understand the religious
motivation that made people join the early Sam ≥gha we need to
look at the social processes that formed the relationship between
Sam ≥gha and laity. My main source is the Vinaya Pit>aka of the Pa ¤li
canon. In the previous chapter I argued that the historical value of
the Khandhaka section of the Vinaya Pit >aka may be far greater
than previously assumed, and this text is a rich source of information
about the growth of the early community of monks and its
relationship to the outside world.
In order to illuminate the relationship between the Sam ≥gha and
the laity I will employ two concepts from Bryan Wilson’s sociology
of religion: conversionism and introversionism. In his book
Religious Sects Wilson gives a definition and a general typology
of sects.1 Although his own application of the typology is limited
to groups within the Christian tradition, his categories are of such
a general kind that they can be applied elsewhere. Wilson draws
attention to the need for a typology the relevance of which is not
limited to groups within the Christian tradition:
If the sociology of religion is to move forward, we must create
categories which allow us to study comparatively the social
functions and development of religious movements. As a
consequence, such studies must shun categories dictated too
specifically by the characteristics of a particular theological
tradition. Obviously, the types we can use are still drawn mainly
from the material at our disposal, especially from Christian
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movements. But it is imperative that we should try to enlarge
their application, and, if needs be, modify their formulation in
the light of this extension of their meaning, so that we shall
have a series of analytical instruments which will no longer be
centred on a particular civilization and religion (in this case,
Christian).2
I take this as an invitation to apply Wilson’s types in the study
of religious traditions other than the Christian. In my opinion,
Wilson’s typology gives us a useful framework for the study of the
early Sam ≥gha and the social processes that took place in the early
stages of Buddhism. Wilson defines a sect in terms of eight qualities
which are present in the religious community and it is clear that
the early Buddhist Sam ≥gha conforms to his definition.
Wilson also distinguishes seven cardinal types of sects based
on the nature of the sects’ response to the world. They are the
conversionist, the revolutionary, the introversionist, the
manipulationist, the thaumaturgical, the reformist and the utopian.
These are not static categories. One sectarian movement can have
elements of different orientations and a sect can, and in most cases
will, move from one category to another over time. Thus, the
typology is suited to measure change in a sect’s orientation towards
the world.
The psychologist Gordon Allport used the concept of extrinsic
vs. intrinsic motivation to describe religious behaviour. A person
who has an extrinsic orientation uses religion to achieve other ends;
the religion is not the ultimate goal in itself. The relationship to
religion is instrumental and the beliefs can be shaped accordingly
to fit his or her mundane desires. The heterodox systems served
important functions in the pursuit of worldly or extrinsic goals for
certain parts of Indian society. For instance, the new religious ethics
seems to have suited an emerging urban merchant class.3 However,
in the case of early Buddhism I believe that it was, first of all,
members of the lower strata of society who had mundane
motivations for joining the Sam ≥gha. I will look at the motivation
of those who came for the security and status of monkhood and
those who came ‘purely for a comfortable living’ as Pachow puts
it.4 As I will show, this extrinsic motivation is abundantly
documented in the Khandhakas of the Vinaya Pit >aka.
I have introduced three concepts that I will apply in my approach
to the textual material: introversionism, conversionism and extrinsic
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motivation. The aim of this chapter is to show that early Buddhism
changed from a conversionist to an introversionist relationship to
the world and that this process was a consequence of the extrinsic
motivation of the potential members of the Sam ≥gha.
Extrinsic motivation
In Chapter I.39 of the Maha ¤vagga of the Vinaya Pit >aka (MV I.39)
people go forth because they are afflicted with the five diseases
that were prevalent among the people of Magadha and they cannot
get the attendance of the physician Jî ¤vaka Koma ¤rabhacca outside
the Sam ≥gha as he is too busy caring for the king and the monks.
Typically, they ask themselves whether they should go forth among
the sons of the Sakyans; then monks would look after them and the
physician would attend to them. In MV I.40 some soldiers join the
Sam ≥gha in order to escape military service. In MV I.41 a thief has
gone forth to hide. In MV I.42 a thief breaks out of jail and joins
the Order. It has been decreed by King Bimbisa ¤ra that nothing
should be done against the sons of the Sakyans, and therefore the
criminal feels safe among the recluses. In MV I.43 a man is on the
run, having committed a crime. In the royal palace it is written that
this man should be killed when seen. He joins the Sam ≥gha to hide.
In MV I.44 and 45, men who have been scourged and branded as
punishment join the Order of monks. In MV I.46 a debtor goes
forth among the monks in order to escape his creditors. In MV I.47
a slave has run away and taken shelter in the Sam ≥gha. In MV I.48
a blacksmith joins the Order to hide from his parents. In MV I.49 a
group of boys, with Upa ¤li as their leader, go forth in order to live at
ease. Getting up in the night they cry out for food. These are
examples of extrinsically motivated monks.
If we look at the Theraga ¤tha ¤ and Therî ¤ga ¤tha ¤, we find more
passages about monks and nuns who were motivated by worldly
goals. According to Dhammapa¤la’s commentary, the poor and hard-
working Sumangala of Theraga ¤tha ¤ XLIII joins the Order because
he sees that the recluses live in sheltered lodgings, dress in delicate
robes and eat well. He is admitted to the Order by the thera simply
out of compassion. In Raman .î ¤yaviha ¤rin of Theraga ¤tha ¤ XLV we
have a typical example of the kind of monk who throughout the
history of Buddhism made the Sam ≥gha the object of accusations of
laxity:
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Reborn in this Buddha-age at Ra¤jagaha, as the son of a leading
citizen, he lived in youthful wantonness. One day he saw the
king’s officers arresting an adulterer, and growing agitated, he
listened to the Master teaching, and left the world. As a bhikkhu,
but still susceptible to fleshly lusts, he made himself a well-
garnished chamber, well furnished as to food and drink, seat
and couch; and so he ever dwelt. For this reason he was known
as Raman .î ¤yaviha ¤rin (Pleasant-lodge Brother).5
Nî ¤ta of Theraga ¤tha ¤ LXXXIV was the same kind of monk:
When grown up he thought: ‘These Sa¤kiyan recluses are very
lucky in that they are well provided with all necessaries. It is a
happy life, that of a member of the Order.’ So he entered it to
get pleasure from it, paid scant attention to his exercise, ate
his fill, spent the day in idle talk, and slept all night long.6
Ad .d .haka ¤sî ¤ of Therî¤ga ¤tha ¤ XXII joins the Sam ≥gha to escape her
life as a prostitute. The same is the case for Ambapa¤lî ¤ of Therî ¤ga¤tha ¤
LXVI. Discussing the case of a prostitute joining the Sam ≥gha,
Mylius writes: ‘Das war sicherlich kein Einzelfall, und es gibt
allerlei Hinweise der zeitgenössischen Quellen, dass der SanVgha
nicht ausschliesslich aus edlen Motiven aufgesucht wurde.’7
But it was not only Buddhists who were extrinsically motivated.
Or, to put it differently, people who wanted to adopt a religious life
in the pursuit of an easy living sometimes had other, and perhaps
better, opportunities than the Buddhist Sam ≥gha. Warder argues that
there existed a broad milieu of ascetics and wanderers before the
great heterodox sects and that the organized schools originated as
a consequence of changes in the society:
No doubt the a ¤jî ¤va was embraced by many who wished to
escape the need to work or the responsibilities of family life,
not to speak of conscription, forced labour, or slavery, and was
a carefree existence very different from the life of strenuous
asceticism, complicated discipline, and intensive study required
of members of most of the organized sects afterwards (although
freedom from all worldly cares was always stressed).8
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Thus, according to Warder, Buddhism originated in a religious
environment in which extrinsic motivation was common.
The problem of extrinsic motivation for joining the Sam ≥gha had
no ultimate solution. On the contrary, it seems to have grown as
the number of monasteries rose and their wealth and prestige
increased. According to Gunawardana the kings of medieval Ceylon
were constantly engaged in purifying the Sam ≥gha by expelling
monks unsuited to the vocation.9 Carrithers says that the Sam ≥gha
of Ceylon came to be seen as consisting of two parties; one was the
village Sam ≥gha with their involvement in lay life and the mon-
asteries’ control of vast areas of land for cultivation, the other was
the forest-dwellers and ascetics.10
Melford Spiro discusses the motivation of the Burmese monks
in similar terms.11 According to Spiro, the Burmese distinguish
between three types of motivation to join the Sam≥gha: first, religious
motives; second, the desire to escape the miseries of worldly life;
and, third, the wish for an easy life. Spiro’s first category
corresponds to Allport’s intrinsic motivation, whereas both the
second and third categories would be aspects of extrinsic motivation
Most of Spiro’s informants say that the greater part of Burmese
monks join the Sam ≥gha in order to escape miseries or have an easy
life. They are extrinsically motivated. Because of their easy living
there are five times as many monks as there would be otherwise,
the informants claim.12 Although the monks themselves give nobler
motives for their decision to join the Sam ≥gha, Spiro is clearly of
the opinion that the extrinsic motivational factors are very important
in the recruitment of monks. According to Spiro, almost all monks
are from poor village families. This is also the case in Thailand.13
The Sam ≥gha offers a higher standard of living and a higher status
for poor villagers than they would achieve outside the Order. Joining
the Order also offers the possibility of an education for poor
youngsters.
It seems, then, that we have a situation in modern Therava ¤da
countries that has antecedents in the earliest Sam ≥gha. The modern
situation – in which poor people from the countryside are motivated
by the increase in living standard and status – is not new. From the
stories of the Khandhakas it seems that extrinsic motivation was
already a problem at the time of the Buddha. In the rest of this
chapter I will show how this tendency towards extrinsic motivation
has, from the very start, been an essential force in the shaping of
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the relationship between the Sam ≥gha and the laity and, thus, in the
shaping of the structure of Buddhist societies.
The consequences of extrinsic
motivation
 The Sam≥gha always depended on the support of the laity. To receive
support, the monks had to be, or at least appear as, pure and
distinguished individuals. The Sam ≥gha had to stand out as a body
worthy of support. The monks were expected to lead lives devoted
to high religious ideals and they were expected to light up the world
with their holiness. People who joined the order simply to benefit
from its security and the spiritual and material support it enjoyed
corrupted the Sam ≥gha. At a very early stage it became necessary to
keep these people out. It was essential to show the world that the
monks took no interest in worldly pleasures. This need brought
about a change in the early Sam ≥gha’s relationship to the world. By
physical separation and segregation by outward appearance the
Sam ≥gha withdrew from the world to cultivate and demonstrate its
own holiness and aloofness. It was a change from an outwardly
minded conversionism to withdrawal and segregation – to
introversionism.
From conversionism …
In Wilson’s typology, conversionism is one of the seven basic
responses to the world that a sect can adopt.14 I use the term
conversionism to denote the great emphasis that is put on the
conversion of new members to the Sam ≥gha and the lack of restrict-
ions on admittance. The early Buddhists seem to have engaged in
fervent and competitive proselytizeing activity towards both other
sects and Brahmins and other important members of society.
In the Khandhaka section of the Vinaya Pit >aka we have the most
detailed description of the early stages of the Buddhist Sam ≥gha
available in Buddhist literature. Its account starts right after the
enlightenment of Gotama. The young prince is now a Buddha but
he has no congregation yet. Initially, he does not want to face the
risk of experiencing the weariness and vexation caused by the dull
intellects of his potential pupil and he must be persuaded by Brahma ¤
Saha ¤mpati to teach the Dhamma. The first question that arises is to
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whom he should preach. He decides to approach the group of five
ascetics with whom he previously has practised asceticism. These
five form the first Sam ≥gha.
Part I.7 of the Maha ¤vagga is about the conversion and going
forth of Yasa, the son of a rich merchant of Benares, and about the
conversion and going forth as a lay disciple of Yasa’s father. The
Buddha uses his charisma to win over Yasa as a monk and his father
as a lay disciple. When the great merchant sees his son, who has
run away from home in order to join the Buddha’s following, he
begs him to come home for his mother’s sake. When the merchant
asks his son to come back, the Buddha tells him that Yasa cannot
turn back to the low life and enjoy sensual pleasures as he did
before when he led the life of a householder (gahapati). In MV I.8
the mother and former wife of Yasa take refuge in the Buddha, the
Dhamma and the Sam ≥gha as lay disciples and become the first
women lay disciples using the three-word formula. In MV I.9 four
friends of Yasa approach the Lord and are ordained. In MV I.10
sons of other families in Benares approach the Lord and are
ordained.
In MV I.11 the Buddha tells the monks to walk out and preach
Dhamma. In MV I.12 monks bring in from different regions people
who wish to go forth and who want ordination, and the Buddha
allows the monks to go forth and ordain where they are, without
coming back to him. Of course, this must have been necessary for
Buddhism to have a substantial geographical expansion. The
Buddha makes the rules of how the ordination should be carried
out by the monks. Through such rules, the proselytizeing activity
of the monks becomes easier and more efficient.
In MV I.14 the Buddha meets thirty young men in a forest. One
of these men has no wife and a prostitute is brought along for him.
While the men are amusing themselves, the prostitute takes their
belongings and runs off, and it is while the men are looking for the
woman that they meet the Buddha. The Lord asks the men what
would be best for them – to look for the woman or to look for the
self. The men agree that it would be better that they should look for
the self. The Buddha preaches and the men see Dhamma and are
converted.
What do these stories about the conversionist activities of the
Buddha and his early disciples tell us? It is clear that the early
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Buddhists tried to win followers but there were other sects with the
same ambitions. In the Sa ¤maññaphalasutta, King Aja ¤tas æatru is
tormented by the fact that he has killed his own father, King
Bimbisa ¤ra, and in his affliction he is unable to enjoy himself as
kings are supposed to in their spare time. The ministers each
recommend that he go to see one of six religious teachers: Pu ¤ran .a
Kassapa, Makkhali Gosa ¤la, Ajita Kesakambalî ¤, Pakudha Kac-
ca ¤yana, Sañjaya Belatthiputta and Nigan .t >ha Na ¤taputta. However,
King Aja ¤tas æatru has already paid visits to the six heretics and his
mind has not been appeased. But when a councillor suggests that
he seek out the Buddha for guidance, the king finally sees some
hope and prepares his elephants for a nocturnal excursion. He arrives
at Jî ¤vaka’s mango grove, where the Buddha is staying. But before
the Buddha will soothe the king’s mind with his superior doctrine
and his superior pedagogical skills, the king is asked to give an
account of the six heretics’ answers to his question.
According to Basham, the doctrines ascribed to Pu¤ran .a Kassapa,
Makkhali Gosa ¤la and Pakudha Kacca ¤yana are probably all aspects
of early A¤jî ¤vikism.15 Ajita Kesakambalî ¤ represents materialism that
must have been a forerunner of the Ca ¤rva ¤kas; Nigan .t >ha Na ¤taputta
may be identified with Maha ¤vî ¤ra; and the account of Sañjaya
Belatthiputta may be a satirical description of agnostic teachers’
unwillingness and inability to answer metaphysical questions. From
the testimony of the Sa ¤maññaphalasutta and other texts, it appears
that there was a high degree of competition among the different
sects and their leaders.16
In the Tevijjasutta of the Dî ¤gha Nika ¤ya, the Buddha is
approached by two young Brahmins, who ask whether the teachings
of the various Brahmin teachers, Addhariya ¤, Tittiriya ¤, Chandoka ¤
and Bavarika¤, lead to the same right goal. The answer is that only
the path of the Buddha leads to salvation. Another story of
competition between the great sect leaders is found in Chapter V
of the Cullavagga of the Vinaya Pit >aka (CV V). Here, a great
merchant in Ra ¤jagaha makes a wooden bowl out of a block of
precious sandalwood. He puts it on a high pole and declares that
whoever is a perfected one and has psychic power and gets the
bowl down from the pole shall have it. Pu ¤ran .a Kassapa, Makkhali
Gosa ¤la, Ajita Kesakambalin, Pakudha Kacca ¤yana, Sañjaya
Belat >t >hiputta and Na¤taputta the Jain approach the merchant and
claim the right to the bowl. However, it is a Buddhist, Pin .d .ola the
Bha ¤radva ¤ja, who actually wins the contest. He rises above the
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ground, takes the bowl, circles Ra¤jagaha and lands by the house of
the merchant. However, when the Buddha hears this he reproaches
Pin .d.ola the Bha¤radva¤ja and he forbids the monks to exhibit psychic
powers to householders.
The competitive element in the proselytizeing activity of early
Buddhism is clearly expressed in MV I.15–20. In these passages,
the Buddha demonstrates his superior magical powers to a
community of matted hair ascetics (jat >ila). He performs many
wonders, showing complete mastery over all beings and over time
and space. When the matted hair ascetics want to worship their
sacrificial fires, it is only with the psychic powers of the Buddha
that they are able to chop sticks and kindle and extinguish the fires.
In MV I.15 the Buddha arrives in Uruvela ¤. He approaches the
matted hair ascetic Kassapa of Uruvela ¤ and asks him if he can spend
a night in the fire-room. Kassapa does not object but warns the
Buddha that there is a fierce king of na ¤gas, a terribly poisonous
snake, in the room. To the amazement of the matted hair ascetics
the Buddha masters the snake with his superior power. In MV I.16
the Buddha stays in a jungle thicket near the hermitage of Kassapa
of Uruvela ¤ and in the night the four great kings, having illuminated
the whole place, approach the Lord to hear Dhamma. Kassapa is
amazed and admits to himself that the Buddha has great powers
but he thinks himself to be of higher perfection.
Kassapa is stubborn in his belief that he is of greater perfection
than the Buddha in spite of the wonders performed by the latter. A
great sacrifice is to be held and the whole of AnVga and Magadha
attend and bring along food. Kassapa is worried that the Buddha
will perform a wonder in front of the people, thus increasing his
popularity and honour at the expense of Kassapa’s. The Buddha,
however, understanding in his mind the mental reflections of
Kassapa, goes away and does not show himself. When Kassapa
asks him why he did not come to the sacrifice the Buddha tells the
ascetic that he knew his thoughts. Again Kassapa is amazed, but he
still cannot admit that the Buddha is greater than himself.
In MV I.20 the competition between the Buddha and the matted
hair ascetic reaches its climax. The Buddha performs many wonders.
Sakka digs a tank for the Lord to wash his robe and the great god
puts down a rock for him to knead it. A devata ¤ in a tree bends down
a branch for the Lord to hold on to when he climbs out of the water.
Sakka puts down a new rock for him to stretch out his robe. Kassapa
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is impressed by these wonders but still believes himself to be
superior to the Buddha. Now the Buddha exhibits complete mastery
over space and time by moving at will to other worlds, where he
picks fruits and flowers and offers them to Kassapa. The ascetic,
however, refuses to admit that the Buddha is of greater perfection.
Then the matted hair ascetics want to tend their fires. However,
they are unable to chop sticks because of the power of the Buddha.
On the Lord’s command 500 sticks are chopped. The ascetics can
neither kindle the fires nor extinguish them. At the Buddha’s
command the fires are kindled and extinguished. Moreover, the
Buddha makes 500 fire vessels for the ascetics to warm themselves
by after plunging in and out of the river. Then a flood comes and
the Buddha makes the water pull back and he walks on dry ground.
Kassapa is still not convinced of the Buddha’s superiority.
In spite of the wonders performed, the leader of the matted hair
ascetics believes himself to be of greater power and of greater
religious perfection than the Buddha. Each time a wonder is
performed, Kassapa must admit to himself that this recluse is of
great power, ‘but he is not a perfected one as myself’.17 The Buddha
grows tired of Kassapa’s stubbornness:
Then it occurred to the Lord: ‘Now for a long time it will occur
to this foolish man, “Truly the great recluse is of great psychic
power, of great might; but yet he is not a perfected one as I
am.”. Now suppose I should deeply stir this matted hair
ascetic?’ (‘yam ≥ nu ¤na ¤ham ≥ imam ≥ jat >ilam ≥ sam ≥vejeyyan ti.’) The
Lord spoke thus to the matted hair ascetic Kassapa of Uruvela ¤:
‘Neither are you, Kassapa, a perfected one nor have you entered
on the way to perfection, and that course is not for you by
which you either could be a perfected one or could have entered
on the way to perfection.’18
In other words, the Buddha wants to bring about sam ≥vega,
emotional disturbance that leads to religious motivation, in the
ascetic to convert him to Buddhism. The only reason that the Buddha
stays with the matted hair ascetics is to win them over to his own
sect, and this is his only motivation for humiliating Kassapa of
Uruvela ¤. As a symbol of the Buddha’s victory, the ascetics cut off
their matted hair, and they let their braids, carrying poles and devices
of fire-worship be carried away with the river. The other two
Kassapas19 and all their followers also join the Buddha. The next
step is to force the three to renounce fire-worship and false doctrines
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in public and in the presence of King Bimbisa ¤ra. The victory of the
Buddha is complete.
Kassapa decides to fare the brahmafaring (brahmacariyam ≥
caritum ≥) under the Buddha. All the matted hair ascetics, Kassapa
of the River and Kassapa of Gaya ¤, with all their followers, decide
to follow his example. They cut their hair and let all their implements
of fire-worship be carried away with the water. Such passages reveal
a high degree of competition between the Buddha and other
religious leaders. We may note here that the narration of the con-
version of the Ka ¤s æyapas is more detailed in the Sanskrit, the Tib-
etan and the Chinese than in the Pa ¤li version. Interestingly, they all
give the Buddha’s motive for approaching the Ka ¤s æyapas as the wish
to subdue that religious leader in Magadha by which he can win
over the greatest number of followers. This adds to the feeling of
conversionism and competition.
MV I.23 provides the account of a competition with another
religious leader. Sañjaya is staying in Ra¤jagaha with his followers,
among them Sa ¤riputta and Moggalla ¤na. The last two have agreed
that whoever attains the deathless first shall tell the other. One day
Sa ¤riputta sees Assaji, one of the original followers of the Buddha,
and he believes that Assaji has entered the path of perfection.
Sa ¤riputta follows Assaji on his alms-round in the town, waiting for
a suitable opportunity to ask him about his teacher and his Dhamma.
Assaji tells him in few words about the Lord and his Dhamma, and
Sa ¤riputta realizes that this is the path to perfection. He returns to
his friend, Moggalla ¤na, and announces the good news. In MV I.24
Sa ¤riputta and Moggalla ¤na decide to leave their group and join the
Buddha instead. When they announce their plans to leave, the other
followers of Sañjaya decide go with them. Sañjaya tries to make
them stay, but he cannot change their minds. Hot blood comes out
of Sañjaya’s mouth and he dies. The Buddha sees the two friends
coming in the distance and he predicts that they will be his most
eminent disciples. Again the victory of the Buddha is complete.
Indeed, the competition ends in the death of Sañjaya.
The clearest and most famous expression of the quest for
converts is found in MV I.11, in which the Buddha tells the monks
to walk out in the world for the welfare, blessing and happiness of
devas and men and teach Dhamma, which is lovely at the beginning,
lovely in the middle and lovely at the end. It is interesting to see
this missionary ideal together with a statement in CV V. Here, the
Buddha forbids monks to recite his speeches in metrical form and
tells them to learn the word of the Buddha in their own dialect.
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These passages give the impression of a sect with a desire to convert
that is reminiscent of Christian sects.
If we move from the Vinaya to the Sutta Pit >aka, we find several
examples of the conversionist quality of early Buddhism. In the
Udumbarika ¤ Sî¤hana ¤dasuttanta of the Dî ¤gha Nika ¤ya, the Buddha
clashes with the religious leader Nigrodha. In a long conversation,
the Buddha tries to convince his opponent that his kind of asceticism
is useless. This conversation is interesting because it reveals much
about the relationship between the Buddha and other teachers. For
instance, it seems that the Buddha has been charged with too intense
proselytizeing. Concluding his speech on the uselessness of
asceticism, the Buddha says:
Maybe, Nigrodha, you will think: The Saman .a Gotama has
said this from a desire to get pupils; but you are not thus to
explain my words. Let him who is your teacher be your teacher
still. Maybe, Nigrodha, you will think: the Saman .a Gotama
has said this from a desire to make us secede from our rule;
but you are not thus to explain my words. Let that which is
your rule be your rule still.20
One gets the impression that the success of the Buddhists is too
much for the competing teachers and that the Buddha is used to
accusations about ruthless missionary activity among members of
other sects.
Another example of the uncompromising competition with non-
Buddhists is the Ambat >t >hasutta, in which the Buddha discusses
pride of birth with a rude young Brahmin, Ambat>t >ha. Here, the
Buddha asks questions about Ambat >t >ha’s lineage to show that the
young Brahmin’s feeling of superiority is without foundation.
Ambat >t >ha knows that the answer to the Buddha’s question will be
humiliating to himself, and he has a hard time answering. But the
Buddha forces him to reply in a way which is typical for competitive
debates:
If you do not give a clear reply, or go off upon another issue,
or remain silent, or go away, then your head will split in seven
pieces on the spot. … At that time Vajrapa ¤ni stood above
Ambat >t >ha in the sky with a mighty mass of iron, all fiery,
dazzling, and aglow, with the intention, if Ambat >t >ha did not
answer for the third time the question asked by the Lord in
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accordance with Dhamma, there and then to split his head in
seven pieces.21
No wonder the Buddha often gets the answers he seeks from his
adversaries. There are a number of passages in the Buddhist
literature that reflect competition and envy between the different
sects over their success in conversion. There also existed envy
between the sects over material and spiritual support from the world.
For instance, in the Udumbarika ¤sî ¤hana ¤dasuttanta of the Dî¤gha
Nika ¤ya, there is a quarrel between the Buddha and the religious
leader Nigrodha. The Buddha explains to Nigrodha the blemishes
of the ascetics:
And again, Nigrodha, an ascetic sees a certain recluse or
Brahmin receiving attentions; being revered, honoured and
presented with offerings by the citizens. And seeing this he
thinks: The citizens pay attentions to this fellow who lives in
luxury; they revere and honour him, and present him with
offerings, while to me who, as ascetic, lives a really austere
life, they pay no attentions, nor reverence, nor honour, nor
offerings!22
Envy also arose between different Buddhist communities as the
religion developed. In Ceylon under Vat>t>aga ¤man.i (43–17 BC) a split
occurred between the Maha ¤viha¤rava ¤sins and the Abhayagiriva ¤sins
as a result of the king’s personal gift of the Abhayagiriviha ¤ra to
the thera Maha ¤tissa.23
Joy Manné has made a distinction between three types of suttas
in the Sutta Pit >aka: Sermons, Consultations and Debates. The
competitive element in the religious life is expressed in the suttas
that Manné has called Debates, especially the Dramatic Debate
with its structure of a challenge, a refutation of the view of the
adversary, and finally a defeat in which the adversary either asks
to become a lay follower or is totally converted and asks to become
a monk. In order to gain followers and converts, early Buddhism
needed an initial message that was attractive and entertaining to
people and which showed that the Buddha’s Dhamma was better
than that of other teachers. Typical examples are the Sonadan .d .a-
sutta, the Kassapasî ¤hana ¤dasutta and the Sa ¤maññaphalasutta. A
Debate is an exercise in publicity, Manné says.
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It is an opportunity for propaganda. Something is always at
stake. Not only must the best questions be asked, and the best
answer given, but converts must be won and lay support must
be gained. Under these circumstances we may expect that,
appropriate to the situation, a particular presentation of the
Teaching is given. We expect this to be religiously sound, but
exaggerated, because the Debates were public competitive
occasions.24
By the identification of a range of suttas in which the goal is the
winning of converts, Manné demonstrates the conversionist quality
of the early Buddhists.
To introversionism
Over the last few pages I have looked at the tendency in early
Buddhism to compete with other religious groups for converts. The
group that formed around the Buddha was constantly trying to
recruit new members, and a large proportion of the converts were
motivated by the prospect of status, material support and the escape
from obligations in society. However, early in the life of the Sam≥gha
changes set in. When a sect withdraws from society and tends
towards seclusion, Wilson calls the reaction introversionist. I will
use this term to cover four important aspects of early Buddhism:
the gradual development of strict admission procedures, the
emphasis on unity, the mental segregation by outward appearance
and the physical segregation by separate dwellings, i.e. the
development of monasticism. In the following sections I will look
at how the early Sam ≥gha’s relationship to the world changed from
conversionism to introversionism and how this change is reflected
in the early Buddhist texts. My primary source is still the
Khandhakas of the Vinaya Pit >aka.
Admission procedures
The gradual development of the rules for admission to the Sam≥gha
is perhaps the most important element of the introversionist
tendencies of the early Buddhist Order. The subject matter of the
Pravrajya ¤vastu of the Skandhaka, which is found in Pa ¤li from MV
I.25, is the admission to the Sam≥gha and the rules for newly ordained
monks and novices.
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In MV I.28 the Buddha abolishes the ordination by going to the
three refuges. Instead, he allows ordination by a motion and a
resolution put three times. MV I.29 to 31 and I.31 deal with further
restrictions on ordination. It is clear that the Sam ≥gha is reacting to
a need to protect itself from members that destroy its purity and
the aloofness. Many of the restrictions are the result of the ordination
of persons whose motivations are purely mundane. The Sam ≥gha is
closing its borders; it is becoming more introversionist in its relation
to the world. Discussing the development of the ordination
proceedings, Horner says:
Regulations have to increase to meet a complexity of emergent
eventualities. The resources, nissaya, the minimum number
of monks composing an Order competent to ordain, the number
of years a monk must have been ordained before he is reckoned
as suitable or competent to ordain others, living in dependence,
nissa ¤ya vatthum ≥, on a teacher, giving guidance, nissayam ≥
da ¤tum ≥, the qualities that a monk should be possessed of in
order to ordain, and the ordination and probation of former
members of other sects, and the age at which a person may be
ordained, are all subjects brought under review. The inner life
of the Order had to be safeguarded as much as had its relations
to the world outside.25
The candidate also had to undergo a period of preparation and
instruction between the preliminary admission and final admission.
Horner suggests that this may be a way of dealing with the drawing
power of the Buddhist Order.26
New offices in the Sam ≥gha are also introduced to keep control.
Monks who do not have preceptors go for alms-food wrongly
dressed and they behave wrongly. They are criticized by lay people
so the Buddha allows a preceptor (upajjha ¤ya). In MV I.25–27 the
Buddha lays down a large number of rules about how the preceptor
and the one who shares his cell should behave towards each other.
In MV I.32 and 33 a new office is introduced by the Buddha; that
of the teacher (a ¤cariya). This is an aspect of the growing
organization of the Sam ≥gha. MV I.33 and I.34 give rules for the
behaviour of pupils towards teachers and vice versa. MV I.35 also
covers the relationship between teachers and pupils. MV I.36 and
I.37 give a large number of instances in which a monk may or may
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not ordain. These are further steps towards stricter rules for
admission.
MV I.38 details restrictions on the ordination of the former
members of other sects. If a former member of another sect refutes
his preceptor and returns to the other sect and later comes back to
join the Sam ≥gha, he should not be ordained. Members of other
sects who desire ordination in the Sam ≥gha should be given a four-
month period of probation before ordination. This contrasts with,
for instance, the episode of the matted hair ascetics in which the
Buddha uses all his magical skills and humiliates the leader of the
rival sect in his attempt to convert the ascetics to his teaching. The
attitude towards the outside world and towards potential converts
has changed. The Sam ≥gha is becoming more intent on defending
its borders against people with the wrong motivation.
In MV I.39–48 thieves, murderers, debtors, runaway soldiers
and sick and hungry people wish to join the Sam ≥gha as a way to
solve their problems. Restrictions on motivation are laid down in
order to keep them out. The Sam ≥gha must protect its purity from
corruption. This concern with the purity of the group is a typical
feature of the introversionist sect.
In MV I.49 the Buddha pronounces the rule that a man under 20
years of age should not be ordained, and in MV I.50 that a boy
under 15 years old should not be allowed to go forth. These are
important regulations contributing to the organization of the Sam ≥gha
and the tightening of its borders. In MV I.51 the puzzling exception
is made that a boy under 15 years old can be allow to go forth if he
is able to scare crows.
In MV I.56–60 rules concerning novices are given by the
Buddha. From MV I.61 more restrictions on ordination are given.
MV I.64 and I.65 forbid matricides and parricides to be ordained.
MV I.66 and I.67 forbid a murderer of an Arahant, a seducer of
nuns, a schismatic or one who sheds the blood of an Arahant to be
ordained.
In MV 1.69 the Buddha gives instructions that one who has no
preceptor should not be ordained, nor should one who has an order
as preceptor, one who has a group as preceptor, one who has a
eunuch as preceptor, one who had one living in communion, as it
were, by theft as preceptor, one who had one gone over to another
sect as preceptor, or one who had an animal, a matricide, a parricide,
a murderer of a perfected one, a seducer of a nun, a schismatic, a
shedder of an Arahant’s blood or a hermaphrodite as preceptor.
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Thus, MV I.69 lays down regulations to prevent further corruption
of the Sam ≥gha by letting people who should not have been ordained
in the first place act as preceptors.
In MV I.70 further cases in which one should not ordain are
given. One who had no bowl was ordained. He received his alms-
food in his hands. People were irritated because the newly ordained
monks looked like members of other sects. One without a robe
was ordained and he walked naked for alms-food. People were
irritated because he looked like the members of other sects. MV
I.71 gives instances of physical injuries or illness in which one
should not be let go forth. One who had his hands cut off was
ordained, one who had his feet cut off, one who had his ears cut
off, one who was lame, one who was deaf, etc. Physical deformation
is seen as a threat against the purity of the Sam ≥gha.
MV I.72 has instructions not to give guidance to the
unconscientious and not to live under the guidance of the
unconscientious. In MV I.73 the Lord allows monks to live without
guidance under three circumstances: if one is travelling on a high
road, if one is ill or if one is tending another who is ill and if one is
staying in the forest. In MV I.75 the Buddha defines the age for
ordination to be 20 years from conception. MV I.76–79 are further
specifications regarding ordination; in MV I.76 the full ordination
procedure is described.
Unity
A central issue in the development towards an introversionist
relationship to the world is the emphasis on the unity of the Sam≥gha.
The unity of the Sam ≥gha seems to have been a primary expression
of its purity. Let us look at the theme of unity in some of the later
passages of the Khandhakas.
In MV X there is a story about dissensions. In Kosambî¤ a monk
is suspended because of an offence he has committed. He does not
accept his suspension. He approaches a group of monks, who take
his part against the group that has suspended him. Thus, a dispute
arises in the Sam ≥gha. The Buddha tries to settle the dispute. He
goes to Sa ¤vatthi and stays in the Jeta Grove in Ana ¤thapin .d .ika’s
monastery. Now the lay followers of Kosambî¤ decide to put pressure
on the trouble-making monks by withdrawing all their respect and
offerings. The monks of Kosambî ¤ go to Sa ¤vatthi in order to settle
their dispute in the Lord’s presence. The Buddha instructs the monks
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in Sa ¤vatthi on how they should behave towards these monks. The
monks arrive and the case is settled. The Buddha gives them rules
on how disputes in the Sam ≥gha should be handled and how schism
and dissension should be avoided. These passages illustrate the
emphasis on unity and the necessity of settling disputes among the
monks.
In CV I, monks who are followers of Pan .d .uka and Lohitaka
cause strife in the Sam ≥gha. The Buddha gives instructions on how
a formal act of censure (tajjaniyakammam ≥) should be carried out
against the followers of Pan.d .uka and Lohitaka. The Buddha tells
the monks under what circumstances a formal act is valid and
invalid. He tells them under what circumstances a formal act of
censure should be carried out against a member of the Sam ≥gha and
how a monk should behave after such an act has been carried out
against him. Then follows the circumstances under which a formal
act of censure should or should not be revoked and how it may be
revoked. This chapter contains a number of other accounts of monks
who come into conflict with the Sam ≥gha. In total, it details seven
different formal acts to be carried out by the Sam≥gha as reactions
to different transgressions.
In CV III, the venerable Uda¤yin has committed an offence. He
does not conceal his offence and he must perform penance
(ma ¤natta). Then Uda ¤yin goes on to commit new offences, but now
he conceals them for one day, two days, three days, etc. Again, he
must perform ma ¤natta, but only after a probation period that varies
with the number of days for which the offence has been concealed.
Then Uda ¤yin commits a new offence during the probation period
and later during the ma ¤natta. A number of different combinations
of offences – concealed or not, committed during probation or
ma ¤natta etc. – are described. The chapter is extremely detailed and
repetitive in style.
CV II deals with the observances for monks who are under
probation (pariva ¤sa) and those undergoing ma ¤natta. Upa ¤li asks the
Buddha questions pertaining to the subject. The point seems to be
to make the monks under pariva ¤sa and ma ¤natta distinguish
themselves clearly from the rest of the Sam ≥gha.
CV IX deals with the objection against participation in the
Pos .adha ceremony. The Buddha is sitting surrounded by monks on
an observance day but he is unwilling to recite the Pa ¤timokkha
because the assembly is not entirely pure. Moggalla ¤na sees the
individual who is not pure and throws him out. Then the Buddha
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tells the monks about the eight strange and wonderful qualities of
the ocean and eight strange and wonderful things in the Dhamma
and discipline. He declares that he will no longer carry out the
observance and will not recite the Pa ¤timokkha; from now on the
monks must do it themselves. He instructs the monks to suspend
the Pa ¤timokkha for listeners who have committed an offence. He
goes on to describe the cases in which the suspension of the
Pa ¤timokkha is valid or not. In short, this chapter is about the purity
of the Sam ≥gha, which is the central concern of introversionist sects.
CV IV is also concerned with questions of the purity and dignity
of the Sam ≥gha in the eyes of monks and lay people. It contains
stories about the venerable Dabba the Mallian, Gagga, who was
insane and in his madness said and did unworthy things, and Uva ¤la,
who tells a conscious lie while being examined for offences. There
is great concern with how to settle disputes and problems in the
Sam ≥gha. The unity of the sect is essential for its purity.
The issue of unity is elaborated in CV VII, the chapter on the
split of the Sam ≥gha. Bhaddiya, Anuruddha, A¤nanda, Bhagu,
Kimbila, Devadatta and Upa ¤li go forth in the Buddhist Sam ≥gha.
Devadatta attains psychic powers and through these he is able to
impress Prince Aja ¤tas æatru. He becomes obsessed with the fame
and respect that he gets through his powers and he wishes to become
leader of the Order of monks. Devadatta suggests to the Buddha
that he take over the leadership of the Sam ≥gha. The Buddha rejects
this, saying that he would not even hand over the Order of monks
to Sa ¤riputta and Moggalla ¤na, much less to the evil Devadatta. The
Buddha instructs the Order to carry out a formal act of information27
against Devadatta.
Appearance
The appearance of the monks and nuns is a central concern in the
Vinaya texts. This issue is essential because the dignity and
aloofness of the monk is linked to how he looks and how he behaves.
The thirty Nih≥sargika Pa¤tayantika Dharmas of the Pra¤timoks.asu¤tra
are concerned with the robes and bowls of the monks. Wearing the
right kind of robe in the right way is essential for the appearance of
a monk. The S æaiks .a Dharmas are very detailed rules for how to
wear the robe (rules 1–18)28 and how to enter and sit in a layman’s
house (rules 19–61) and how to receive food (rules 63–88), and a
number of rules on general appearance when dealing with lay
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people. It seems that the S æaiks .a Dharmas where laid down in order
to make the distinction between monk and lay follower clear and
to make the monks appear serious, calm and dignified. The ninety
Pa ¤tayantika Dharmas of the Pra ¤timoks .asu ¤tra are also about the
behaviour of monks. Typically, a monk must not be seen with a
nun (rules 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35) or with a laywoman
(rules 30, 43, 65, 70), and he must eat in a proper manner (rules 34,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42).
The subject matter of MV VIII is the monks’ clothes. For an
overview of the rules on clothing, the rules of MV VIII should be
compared with the Nih ≥sargika Pa ¤tayantika Dharmas of the
Pra ¤timoks .asu ¤tra. The chapter starts with the interesting account
of Jî ¤vaka Koma ¤rabhacca. The story of Jî ¤vaka introduces the
permission to wear robes given by lay followers. The Buddha
becomes sick because of a disturbance in the humours of the body.
Jî ¤vaka restores the health of the Lord and asks a favour. He asks
the Buddha to allow the use of householders’ robes for the monks.
The Lord consents. Clothes of different materials are presented to
the Order of monks. The Buddha allows six materials for robes:
linen, cotton, silk, wool, coarse hempen cloth and canvas (MV
VIII.3). A number of rules are given regarding the acceptance,
storage, distribution and dying of robes. The Buddha walks with
A¤nanda from Ra ¤jagaha to Dakkhin .a ¤giri. On the way he sees the
fields of Magadha and he asks A¤nanda whether he is able to make
robes like the fields. A¤nanda makes robes and he receives applause
and respect for his skill. Then follow rules on the number of robes
allowed for one monk. The Pa ¤li Vinaya has the rules of the kat >hina
in MV VII, that is, before the chapter on clothes and robe materials.
The detailed regulation of this ceremony reflects the importance of
appearance in the monks’ interaction with the laity. All association
must follow strict rules. If the rules are broken, the monks are
punished.
In CV I the venerable Seyyasaka lives in company, and in
unbecoming association, with householders. The Buddha tells the
Order to carry out a formal act of guidance (nissayakammam ≥) for
Seyyasaka. Instructions on how, and under what circumstances, a
formal act of guidance should be carried out are given. He also
tells them how, and under what circumstances, an act of guidance
should be revoked.
Monks who are followers of Assaji and Punabbasu in Kit >a ¤giri
engage in all kinds of bad habits. A self-righteous monk passes
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Kit >a¤giri on his way to Sa¤vatthi, where the Buddha is staying in the
Jeta Grove in Ana ¤thapin .d .ika’s monastery. On behalf of the only
decent lay person in Kit >a ¤giri he reports the bad habits of the monks
to the Buddha. The Buddha sends Sa ¤riputta and Moggalla ¤na to
Kit >a ¤giri to carry out a formal act of banishment (pabba ¤ja-
niyakammam ≥). Instructions are given on how a formal act of
banishment should be carried out and how, and under what
circumstances, it may be revoked.
In CV V monks use different kinds of begging-bowls made of
precious materials. The Buddha allows the use of two kinds of
bowls: iron and clay. A great number of rules concerning bowl-
rests and the treatment of bowls are given. Then follows a large
number of rules pertaining to robes, then some rules about sandals,
water-strainers, filters, mosquito nets, etc. Some rules are also given
about bathrooms, pools and tanks.
CV VIII is exclusively concerned with the appearance of monks.
Some monks enter a monastery in an unbecoming manner, so the
Buddha lays down a custom for entering a monastery. Minute rules
are also laid down for how to take off one’s sandals, how to wipe
them and dry them, how to wash one’s feet, how to drink, how to
carry a bowl and the robe, how to ask for lodgings in a monastery,
how to make the bed, how to wipe the bed, how to move a chair,
how to sweep the ground, etc. There are elaborate rules for how to
behave in the presence of lay people. These repetitive passages are
identical with passages in MV I.25. The very detailed prescriptions
reflect a deep concern with decorum. The monk must make every
movement in a controlled and proper manner. It is clear that the
central issue is to appear calm and dignified. A few passages may
demonstrate the concern for a pure and uplifted appearance. The
monk should enter a village carefully and unhurriedly. The monk
must go amidst the houses properly clad, well controlled, with
downcast eyes, not lifting up the robes, without laughter, with little
noise, etc. Alms-food should be eaten attentively and not cut into
too large pieces, the whole hand should not be put into the mouth
while eating, one should not talk with food in the mouth, etc. Rules
like this cover large parts of the Khandhakas of the Vinaya Pit >aka
and they show the great emphasis that the Buddhist Sam ≥gha put on
outward appearance both in the eyes of the world and in the eyes
of the monks themselves.
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Dwellings
An important element in the Sam ≥gha’s transition from a convers-
ionist to an introversionist relationship to the world is the Order’s
dwellings – its spatial localization in society. In the beginning, the
Sam ≥gha was a wandering lot. A typical feature of the life of
renouncers is homelessness. The Buddhist renouncer is required to
leave home to the extent that he does not even feel ‘at home’ in his
own body. However, the Sam ≥gha soon became tied to place. In
MV III.1 people criticize the sons of the Sakyans for walking around
during the winter, the hot, rainy season, and trampling down crops
and grasses and destroying many little creatures. In reaction to this,
the Buddha allows the monks to enter upon the rains, meaning that
they should stay indoors in one place during the rainy season. In
MV III.2 he informs the monks of the two right times for entering
upon the rains. In MV III.4 he forbids the monks not to enter upon
the rains. This is the start of the Sam ≥gha’s tradition of staying in
buildings.
CV VI is about the dwelling places of the monks. Considering
the subject matter of the chapter, one would perhaps expect to find
CV VI, i.e. the Pa ¤li version of the S æayana ¤sanavastu, among the
other chapters on the day-to-day life of the Sam ≥gha at the beginning
of the Khandhakas. Frauwallner suggests that it is found towards
the end simply because life in monasteries became important at a
later date. Thus, it is a reflection of the growing introversionist
tendencies. In CV VI, the monks stay in forests and under trees, in
the open air, etc. A merchant suggests that he build dwelling places
for the monks and the Buddha allows this. Other people start
building houses and a number of problems occur. The Buddha
allows different kinds of devices – doors, windows, drapery – to
keep snakes, rats, ants, etc. out and different types of furniture for
the comfort of the monks. He also allows different ways of applying
colour to the walls, the sleeping places and the ground. He allows
assembly halls, porches, different kinds of fences, different kinds
of roofs, etc.
Then the story of Ana ¤thapin .d .ika is told. Ana ¤thapin .d .ika goes to
Ra ¤jagaha to visit his wife’s brother, who is a great merchant. In
Ra ¤jagaha he meets the Buddha and becomes a lay follower. He
offers a meal to the Order of monks. When he returns to Sa ¤vatthî¤
he buys a pleasure grove belonging to Prince Jeta and makes a
monastery for the Sam ≥gha. The Buddha and his Order stay at the
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Jeta Grove and Ana ¤thapin.d.ika is instructed to prepare the Jeta Grove
for the use of the Order. Problems arise over dwelling places and
the Buddha instructs the Order to assign lodgings. A large number
of rules are given concerning dwelling places. Problems arise over
the distribution of food and so the Buddha instructs the Order to
appoint an issuer of meals. He also instructs the Order to appoint
monks to oversee a number of other functions concerning the daily
life of the Sam ≥gha: lodgings, clothing and food.
To sum up, the rules that I have looked at under four headings
testify to a change in the Sam ≥gha’s relationship to the world. First,
its borders were tightened in that the rules for admission grew
stricter. Second, the emphasis on unity and the fear of Sam≥ghabheda
was a typical aspect of the growing introversionist tendencies. Third,
the interaction with lay people was regulated in detail and the
segregation from the laity was expressed in the distinguishing and
uniform appearance of the members of the Sam≥gha. Fourth, physical
borders were built in the form of monastery walls.
Conclusion
Let me sum up the conjecture of this chapter in a few sentences.
Buddhism originated as a conversionist movement, which I took
to mean that it emphasized proselytizeing activities and an open
relationship to the world. The religious renouncers of India at the
time of the Buddha enjoyed status and material support from the
common people. Therefore, the sect of the Buddha attracted many
individuals who were extrinsically motivated. When the outside
world observed that a large part of the monks joined the Sam ≥gha
for purely profane reasons, the status of the monks fell. This reaction
of the laity is described again and again in the Khandhakas with
standard phrases such as: ‘People looked down upon, criticized,
spread it about, saying: “How can these recluses, sons of the
Sakyans … etc.” (“manussa¤ ujjha ¤yanti khî ¤yanti vipa ¤centi: katham ≥
hi na¤ma saman .a ¤ Sakyaputtiya ¤ …”).’
If the Sam ≥gha had let its holiness and purity be corrupted by the
wrong motivation of its members, the crucial material support and
respect from the laity would have failed. To stay pure, both in the
eyes of the world and in the eyes of the sincere monks, the Sam ≥gha
had to strengthen its borders against the extrinsically motivated
applicants. In order to stay aloof, the Order had to withdraw from
the world, and the monks had to maintain a dignified and holy
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appearance. Introversionist tendencies developed. But these
tendencies made the Sam ≥gha an even better object for lay support.
The more introverted the Sam ≥gha became and the more its purity
was emphasized, the more support it received. The less interest its
members took in material values, the more attractive it became as
an object of devotion and as a receptacle for offerings. Again, the
growing support for and wealth of the Order led to a growing
number of extrinsically motivated applicants for membership, which
led to a need to withdraw and cultivate the purity of the Sam ≥gha.
In his book on Therava ¤da Buddhism, Gombrich has described the
dynamic in the following way:
The more a monk demonstrates his indifference to worldly
comforts, the more he impresses the laity and comes to be
regarded as worthy of their material support. Indifference to
comforts thus causes them to be provided.29
This mechanism presupposes an Indian setting in which the status
of the renouncer is high and there is a general belief in rebirth and
karma and a need for gaining merit among common people. I have
shown that this process is expressed in the early Buddhist literature
and I will return to these ideas in Chapter 6.
I have suggested an explanation for the relationship between
the Buddhist Sam≥gha and the laity which emphasizes the unintended
consequences of the behaviour of the members of the Sam ≥gha.
Extrinsic motivation among the members and potential members
of the Sam ≥gha leads to introversionism. Introversionism leads to
more support from the laity. Support from the laity leads to extrinsic
motivation. Thus, we have a self-enforcing mechanism. It is a
virtuous circle, and in the historical periods when the Sam ≥gha has
been able to maintain the balance it has led to a certain degree of
stability in Buddhist societies. The structure of Therava¤da Buddhist
societies are the best example of this built-in conservatism. The
crucial point in the circle is the introversionism, the constant need
to bar the wrong people and to purify the Sam ≥gha by getting rid of
lax and greedy monks. When the Sam ≥gha fails on this point, the
mechanism turns around, and we end up with a vicious circle. The
Sam ≥gha is seen as impure and lax, support from the laity fails, and




AND THE THEME OF
CONVERSION IN
BUDDHISM
In the last chapter I used the terms conversion and conversionism
in order to illuminate the religious motivation of the early Buddhists
and their relationship to the early Sam ≥gha. Of course, it is always
problematic to use terms and concepts that have very specific
meanings in one historical context to describe the state of affairs in
a very different setting. A critical discussion of the very idea of
conversion and its applicability in a Buddhist context seems to be
required in a study of the religious motivation of Buddhists and the
social psychology of the relationship between Sam ≥gha and laity.
There is a discrepancy in the way that Buddhist texts present
the conversion process of the Buddha and some other central figures,
on the one hand, and the impression we get of the conversion process
of people who were already part of the broader religious milieu of
the period, on the other. The paradigmatic Buddhist conversion
consists of the overwhelming realization that life is suffering
followed by a dramatic break with life in the world to seek salvation.
At the same time, however, we often get the impression in early
Buddhist conversion stories that the people who joined the Buddha
did not experience any personal crisis. They were already members
of other religious movements and had broken all ties with the world
long before they became Buddhists.
The solution to this discrepancy is to be found in the difference
in the conversion processes of people with different social
backgrounds. The individuals who went in and out of different sects
at the time of the Buddha belonged to a large milieu of religious
seekers. Therefore, the conversion took place not when they decided
to join the early Buddhist Sam ≥gha but rather at the moment when
they decided to leave worldly life and become religious wanderers.
This is congruent with the life-story of the Buddha. His conversion
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resulted in his joining a number of different religious teachers before
he decided to find his own way to salvation. The real conversion in
this context takes place in the process of going from a life in the
world to a life as a religious wanderer. Once that crucial step has
been taken, people seem to have gone in and out of different
religious movements without the emotional perturbation and the
change in personality that is characteristic of conversion in the true
sense of the word.
I have no ambition to give a new and original interpretation of
early Buddhist conversions here. I simply want to make a point
about the concepts we use when we seek to understand the rise of
the first missionary religious tradition in the world: We should
probably talk about conversion only in the cases in which ordinary
people were induced to join the general and multifarious milieu of
religious seekers and wanderers at the time of the Buddha. We
cannot talk about conversions between these different movements.
In fact, it is this movement as a whole, and its opposition to the
wider world, which is most interesting from a sociological point of
view.
Conversion is, of course, a Western idea and the word comes
from Latin. Therefore, I intend to start out by looking at the central
paradigm of conversion in the West, i.e. Paul’s conversion on the
road to Damascus. This paradigm tells us something important about
the standard conception of conversion in Christianity, namely that
it is brought about by an external agent and that the individual has
little or no control over his or her own religious transformation.
This deterministic view does not necessarily imply a belief in God
as the external agent. In fact, this position has been developed by
scholars in the social sciences, in psychology and even in
sociobiology and I intend to make a very brief, and necessarily
simplistic, detour into these variants of determinism before returning
to the main focus of early Buddhism. In view of the dominant
conception of conversion in Christianity, we must at the end ask
whether we can gain a new and better understanding of religious
conversion as a general religious phenomenon and as a cross-




Conversion and determinism: is the
Pauline paradigm relevant to India?
How can we understand the motivation of religious converts? In
the social sciences, religious conversion has often been seen as an
event in which the fate of the individual is determined by forces
over which he or she has no control. In Acts 22 St Paul tells people
about how he was converted. On his way to Damascus he saw a
powerful light and he heard the voice of Jesus Christ speaking to
him. He was temporarily blinded and led into the city. Paul had
previously persecuted those who believed in Jesus. Indeed, the goal
of his journey to Damascus was to lead some Christians to Jerusalem
to have them punished. But on this day, on the road, Paul was
converted suddenly and dramatically. He was converted by an
external agent. Jesus had approached him and called him to his
service. Paul was the passive receiver of his religion; he did not
seek it.
The conversion of St Paul has long been the paradigm of
conversion.1 The most obvious reason for this is to be found in the
nature of Christianity. First, at least since St Augustine belief has
been something that is offered to man or bestowed upon him from
outside. Man can prepare himself intellectually, but God’s grace is
essential to reach real belief and understanding. Man is the passive
subject and St Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus is the
typical example of this receiving role. Second, the Pauline view of
conversion has been compatible with a scientific and non-religious
approach to the subject: Both views hold that a person does not
arrive at religiosity by rational means. Consequently, a person must
be coerced by external agents in order to undergo conversion. (This
view of conversion is akin to the popular view of communists as
being brainwashed.2 The inherent falsity of their beliefs proves that
they have been subject to brainwashing; false doctrines are accepted
only when forced upon a person.) Third, one could look for a
connection between the Pauline paradigm and the debate in social
sciences over the importance of the situation vs. the importance of
consistent traits of individual behaviour. The following is a good
summary of these two opposing positions in scholarship:
One theory emphasizes the instinctual character aspect of
humans, another the social; one theory stresses free will,
another determinism; one theory views the person as an
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organism that reasons, chooses and decides (rational view),
another views the person as an organism that is driven,
compelled, irrational (animal view); one theory views the
person as automatically responding to outside stimuli (machine
view), whereas another views the person as processing
information like a computer (computer view).3
Clearly, the Pauline paradigm would be looked on more
favourably by situationalists, i.e. social scientists who emphasize
the lack of behavioural consistency in the individual and the great
power of the situation, than by those who believe in stable traits
and emphasize the evidence for cross-situational consistency.4 These
opposing views are favoured by different scholars, and trends may
increase or diminish the credibility of each approach:
Although the Freudian and the Skinnerian views may represent
extremes that many psychologists avoid, most psychologists
nevertheless weight their theories in the direction of internal
or external factors. Periodically there is a shift in emphasis
from internal to external factors or vice versa, with an
occasional call for investigation of the relationship between
the two. … More recently, debate concerning the role of internal
and external forces in governing behaviour has been
highlighted in the person–situation controversy.5
It is quite clear that the general view of religious motivation,
especially among American psychologists of religion, is influenced
by the passive view of conversion, which, following James
Richardson, I have called the Pauline paradigm. The conversion of
the members of sects is very often discussed as something irrational
and determined. The individual is basically seen as the locus for
convergence of social forces.
But in addition to sociological and psychological determinism,
there is a biological determinism, which claims to be sufficient to
explain human behaviour, including religious conversion. It is now
more than 25 years since Edward Wilson’s book Sociobiology: The
New Synthesis was published. The book started a heated debate in
academic circles, which seems to be having a renaissance these
days. The main reason for the high temperatures is that sociobiology
presents a view of human nature that is not in any way compatible
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with the ideas of human nature that are the foundation of the
hermeneutic disciplines and, to some extent, the social sciences.
Another reason is sociobiology’s somewhat imperialistic relation
to the other disciplines that study human behaviour and human
culture. Wilson said:
It may not be too much to say that sociology and the other
social sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches
of biology waiting to be included in the Modern Synthesis.6
According to Wilson, religious phenomena should ultimately be
explained by sociobiology:
Although the manifestations of the religious experience are
resplendent and multidimensional, and so complicated that the
finest of psychoanalysts and philosophers get lost in their
labyrinth, I believe that religious practices can be mapped onto
the two dimensions of genetic advantage and evolutionary
change. … By traditional methods of reduction and analysis
science can explain religion …7
Needless to say, I believe that Wilson and other sociobiologists
are wrong. They will never be able to explain religion, or any other
specific culture-pattern for that matter, because their level of
explanation is bound to be far too general. Biological factors are,
of course, general constraints that determine the range of possible
actions in any given situation but they cannot explain in any
meaningful sense the specific actions that a human being chooses
to follow. The idea that all human behaviours should be reduced to
products of natural selection and explained in terms of genetic
fitness is, of course, a direct and deliberate challenge to the
autonomy and integrity of human culture. Most practitioners of
the hermeneutic or humanistic sciences (der anderen Hälfte des
globus intellectualis, as Dilthey called them)8 wish to see human
beings as the main protagonists in their own lives and they abhor
the suggestion that life is determined, in the strongest sense of the
word, by ‘external’ factors.
The trend in the social sciences has oscillated between the view
that the situation is all-powerful and the view that emphasizes the
individual’s ability to control his or her own life. A shift is taking
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place in the way social scientists view religious conversion. A
decade ago Richardson traced the emergence of a trend within social
psychology and sociology that rejected the mechanistic view of
the human being. He wrote:
It is within this broad, more humanistic tradition in sociology
and social psychology, but also somewhat independent of it,
that a new paradigm has begun to develop. Recent work on
new religious movements by some sociologists, social
psychologists, and a few psychologists and psychiatrists has
helped produce an alternative view of conversion and induction
into the new religions consonant with this paradigm.9
Clearly, this activist perspective should be considered prior to the
hard theories of social science in the study of the religious
motivation in early Buddhism.
Conversion between the sects?
From the extant literature it is evident that many of those who
decided to join the following of the Buddha were high-caste and
well-off people.10 Many of them were already in the process of
religious seeking when they encountered the Buddha or came under
the influence of his ideas. In fact, according to the standard account
of the foundation of Buddhism, all the earliest followers were
actively seeking some form of religious goal before they met the
Buddha. For instance, the five monks who came to be the first
members of the Sam ≥gha had formerly practised meditation with
the Buddha. The Kassapas were matted hair ascetics before the
arrival of the Buddha; they had long ago abandoned life in the
world for the life of religious seeking. Sa ¤riputta and Moggalla ¤na,
the most prominent disciples of the Buddha, were members of the
sect of Sañjaya.
Here we are approaching an important subject closely connected
with the activist view of conversion – a subject which might deprive
the term conversion of its essence in the context of early Buddhism.
If it was the case that many of the early members of the Buddha’s
following originally belonged to other sects or in some way were
already on the path of religious seekership, are we justified in saying
that they were converted? Did the joining of the sect of the Buddha
really imply a fundamental change in their lives, a radical turning
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away from the shadows on the wall of the cave towards the truth?
In other words, is the Pauline paradigm, the sudden conversion as
the result of external factors, applicable at all in the case of early
Buddhism?
In a study of a UFO cult, Balch and Taylor write that the joining
of the cult was not a difficult or fundamental transition at all:
Before joining Bo and Peep [i.e. the leaders of the cult],
members of the UFO cult had organized their lives around the
quest for truth. Most described themselves as spiritual seekers.11
The material changes were not great for those who joined:
Although a significant number of cult members had given up
good jobs and comfortable homes to join the cult, most had
not. For some of the younger members, the material aspects of
life in the cult were not very different from what they had
experienced before they joined. … Even those who made
substantial material sacrifices to join were not strongly attached
to their possessions.12
Nor was there any change of basic beliefs on the part of those who
joined because they already belonged to a cultic milieu with a
common metaphysical world view: ‘Although Bo and Peep’s
message sounded bizarre to practically everyone who read about it
in the newspapers, it was firmly grounded in the metaphysical
world-view.’13 In short, in most cases there was no conversion.
There is a similarity here with the sect of the Buddha as it is
described in the Buddhist literature. As pointed out earlier, the five
monks in the deer-park did not change their lifestyles radically when
joining the Buddha, nor did the matted hair ascetics, nor did all
those who went over from other sects, such as Sa ¤riputta and
Moggalla ¤na, who initially belonged to the following of Sañjaya,
nor did General Sî ¤ha who was a Jain. On the contrary, it is clear
from the texts that a large number of those who joined the early
Sam ≥gha were already part of a large religious and philosophical
milieu of homeless wanderers.14 Some of the early Buddhists had
to modify their meditational practice, their outward appearance or
their diets, but their situation as religious seekers and wanderers
did not change. In many cases, the basic elements of the lives of
the early converts probably did not undergo the radical
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transformation that characterizes conversion. The question is,
therefore, whether one is justified in talking about conversion to
the Buddhist Sam ≥gha at all.15
As we saw in the previous chapter on the conversionist
tendencies of the early Sam ≥gha, the early Buddhists tried to win
followers in a number of ways. We also saw from the testimony of
the Sa ¤maññaphalasutta and many other texts that there appeared
to be a high degree of competition among the different sects and
their leaders and that people tended to go in and out of the different
sects as it suited them.
Of course, I am not arguing that the different movements at the
time were exactly the same, nor am I saying that it was a completely
unproblematic affair to change sectarian affiliation. The Maha¤vagga
I.38 gives restrictions on the ordination of the former members of
other sects. If a former member of another sect refutes his preceptor
and returns to the other sect and later comes back to join the Sam≥gha,
he should not be ordained. Members of other sects who desire
ordination in the Sam ≥gha should be given a four-month period of
probation before ordination. In other words, there were clear borders
between the different movements. But these rules are also a strong
indication that there was quite a lot of traffic between the different
religious movements. People listened to debates between leaders
and chose their group on the basis of arguments and, of course, on
the basis of the general status of a leader or a group in wider society.
It was not a terribly dramatic thing to go from one sect to another.
It was, in many cases, a process of debating and reasoning.
Religious motivation and the decision to
leave the world
According to Dutt’s assertion in his overview of the early spread
of Buddhism, the Buddha had to convert his recruits from other
religions.16 It is relatively easy to subscribe to this kind of matter-
of-fact statement if we forget to examine the concepts that we use
to describe the world. Is it meaningful to talk about conversion
from other religions in this context? Of course, there are a number
of stories about fierce debates between Buddhists and the leaders
or members of other sects but these are almost always rational
discussions. If the opponent decides to become a Buddhist it is
because he is convinced by argument, not because he is




According to the Buddha biographies certain sights or omens
made the Buddha-to-be renounce his life as a prince and take up
the life of a religious wanderer. These sights made the young prince
aware of the problem of birth, ageing, sickness and death, and this
scared him. These four – birth (ja¤ti), ageing (jara¤), sickness (vya¤dhi),
death (maran .a) – are all causes of sam ≥vega (sam ≥vegavatthu)
according to Buddhaghosa. I will return to the important concept
of sam ≥vega in the next chapter. This fear is the core of Siddha¤rtha’s
religious motivation. When he is told by his charioteer that he will
grow old, become sick and die like the people he sees, he is terrified.
Canto 3:37: ‘This being so, turn back the horses, charioteer; go
quickly home again. For how can I take my pleasure in the garden,
when the fear of old age rules in my mind?’ It is clear from the
Buddhacarita and from the other biographies that what causes the
prince’s perturbation, his sam ≥vega, is the realization of the inherent
suffering of life.
Thus, not only in the biography of the Buddha himself does the
dissonance between expectations and attitudes derived from a
pleasant and protected life, on the one hand, and the harsh realities
of the world, on the other, appear as a motivational factor, a cause
of sam ≥vega. However, these stories are elaborated and to some
extent, of course, purely legendary. They are interesting primarily
as a highly formalized illustration of a sequence of events leading
up to a person’s religious motivation. Still, I believe that they hold
a significant truth, namely that conversion in the context of early
Buddhism, and other contemporary soteriological movements for
that matter, took place only when people decided to leave the world
and join the milieu of religious wanderers.
We can make this point a little more realistic by bringing it closer
to our own times. In his study of a doomsday cult John Lofland
writes about tension as a motivating factor in the joining of the
cult. He defines tension so that it clearly would include cognitive
dissonance, although he does not use this term: ‘This tension is
best characterized as a felt discrepancy between some imaginary,
ideal state of affairs and the circumstances in which they actually
saw themselves.’17 In other words, there are clear parallels between
Lofland’s description of a modern religious movement and the
accounts we find in early Buddhist literature. Significantly, Lofland
emphasizes that the psychological tension that was present in all
the subjects in his study before conversion cannot explain why
they chose to join the cult in question.18 Lofland observes that all
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those who joined the group had experienced tension and that this
tension was a necessary condition for joining a sect. However, a
number of other elements must be present. For example, first of
all, the converts would go through a state of religious seekership,
which implies that conversion is preceded by volition and conscious
searching.
We should look for the same kind of volition and conscious
searching in early Buddhist converts, but from the accounts that
the Buddhist texts themselves present us with there is clearly a
case to be made for a degree of determinism too. From the Buddhist
point of view, external motivational factors were often important
in the early converts to Buddhism. Gokhale has analysed monks
and nuns of the early Sam ≥gha on the basis of the Theraga ¤tha ¤s and
Therî ¤ga ¤tha ¤s. Many of them are said to be able to recall the im-
mediate reason for conversion. Gokhale classifies the reasons under
a few main headings and he gives the number of monks and nuns
who can be classified under each heading:
1 The impact of the personality of the Buddha accounted for
43% of conversions.
2 The impact of the personality of one of the leading disciples
accounted for 24% of conversions.
As we are approaching the conclusion to this chapter, then, it seems
increasingly difficult to answer the basic question of internal versus
external factors in the conversion process: Is the Pauline paradigm
relevant for Buddhism?
Conclusion
I started this chapter by saying that there is a discrepancy in the
way that Buddhist texts present the conversion process of the
Buddha and some other central figures, on the one hand, and the
impression we get of the conversion process of people who were
already part of the religious milieu, on the other. The paradigmatic
Buddhist conversion is the rapid and overwhelming realization that
life is suffering and the following dramatic break with life in the
world to seek salvation.
I have argued that there is an important distinction between the
conversion processes of people with different social backgrounds.
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The individuals who went in and out of different sects at the time
of the Buddha belonged to a large milieu of religious seekers.
Therefore, the conversion took place not when they decided to join
the early Buddhist Sam ≥gha but rather at the moment when they
decided to leave worldly life and become religious wanderers. This
solution is also congruent with the life-story of the Buddha. His
conversion resulted in his joining a number of different religious
teachers before he decided to find his own way to salvation. The
real conversion in this context takes place in the process of going
from a life as gahapati to a life as a wanderer. Once that crucial
step had been taken, people seem to have gone in and out of different
religious movements without the emotional perturbation and the
change in personality that is characteristic of conversion in the true
sense of the word.
We should now return to the question at the beginning of this
chapter and ask whether we can gain a new and better understanding
of conversion as a general religious phenomenon and as a cross-
cultural category for investigation by looking at Buddhist
conversion stories. What does the paradox that we have identified
in these stories tell us about conversion in general? Clearly, it shows
us the importance of understanding the socioreligious background
of an individual who joins a religious sect. Conversion implies
movement and we cannot hope to understand it without thoroughly
examining both the place of arrival and the place of departure in
each instance. Many of the early Buddhists arrived from a state of
religious seekership that was extremely close to Buddhism: there
was very little movement. The word conversion seems to be
inappropriate in these cases.
But in a broader perspective, the early Buddhist conversion
stories are particularly interesting precisely because they contain
opposing conceptions of conversion. These stories testify to the
great importance of both external and internal factors in the
conversion process. They speak of the great importance of the strong
and charismatic leader, or sometimes other powerful external
factors, and at the same time they speak of the importance of the
rational faculties of potential followers. The study of these
conversion stories may therefore contribute to deepening our
understanding of conversion as a complex process that may express
itself on many points along a sliding scale of volition and








The basic argument of this book is that in order to understand why
a religion comes into being we should devote more attention to the
religious motivation of individuals than is usual in the study of
religious history. In this chapter, I wish to explore how some central
theories from social psychology may contribute to our un-
derstanding of religious motivation in early Buddhism.
Up until the 1950s theories of motivation were dominated by
drive theory, both in mainstream psychology and in the
psychoanalytic tradition. Much of psychoanalytic thought is still
permeated by the idea that the need to satisfy drives is the basic
motivating force in human life, and sex and aggression are often
prominent candidates in the explanation of behaviour. On the other
hand, there is an important tradition of research in motivation that
has abandoned the cruder forms of drive theory and seeks to explain
human behaviour from a number of different angles. I wish to
explore to what extent the findings of this tradition can be applied
to explain why people chose to follow the movement of the Buddha
and, thus, why Buddhism came into being. In doing so I have no
intention of presenting a total picture of the vast field of motivational
research nor of giving any definite answers with regard to my
particular object of study, early Buddhism. From motivational
theory I will pick an approach that sees psychological incongruity,
the discrepancy between an internal state and an external stimulus,
as a basic motivating factor, and from this general approach I will
pick two more specific conceptualizations of motivation, namely,
the theory of cognitive dissonance and a theory of secondary control.
I should emphasize again that I do not believe that the exercise of
applying these theoretical constructs to early Buddhist textual
material will render radically new answers to the question of why
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Buddhism arose. My aim is, first of all, to open a discussion about
the use of modern psychology in the study of ancient and alien
religious traditions.
Psychological incongruity
A large body of psychological research has shown that people need
a certain complexity in their stimuli, a certain challenge from the
environment. If the incongruity between the environment and the
standard of reference is too small, people will seek a more
challenging situation. If the challenge is too great they will avoid it
and seek a situation that corresponds to a higher degree with their
standard of reference. There are, in particular, two concept-
ualizations of psychological incongruity that I will look at in this
chapter. First, there is Festinger’s famous theory of cognitive
dissonance.1 I will apply this theory to understand the motivation
of the members of the early Sam≥gha. Second, I believe that research
and theory on perceived control can be useful for the understanding
of religion. I will apply the theory of Rothbaum et al.2 and view
early Buddhism as an attempt to gain control indirectly over an
unpredictable world by gaining insight into reality and changing
one’s cognition of the environment.
However, before I apply these two theoretical constructs to my
material I wish to point out that the need to avoid incongruity
between the individual and the world is a subject that is not limited
to psychology. For instance, sociologists of knowledge approach
the same basic need to harmonize the internal world with one’s
perception of the external world from a different angle and with a
different terminology. Transformations in a person’s worldview are
seen as an adaptation to the environment. These sociologists have
also put religious motivation in the context of such needs to adapt
subjective reality to the objective world.3
Most of the time people are able to safeguard a necessary degree
of symmetry between objective and subjective reality by procedures
of reality maintenance. Subjective reality is maintained through
the normal interaction with the institutions of society and through
interaction with other people. But when the subjective reality that
the person has received through socialization and internalization
can no longer be maintained in the face of the external world, the
subjective reality must be radically transformed in order to be in
harmony with objective reality. And because in the history of
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humankind religion has served to validate and define reality, because
religion has provided the crucial link between objective and
subjective reality, a transformation in subjective reality often means
religious conversion. The convert is re-socialized and must accept
the subjective world that is given to him or her by the new
community, and the past is often interpreted in the light of a new
internalized truth. Thus, religious conversion is an alternative
strategy when the individual is no longer able to maintain
consistency between perceptions and inner structure of belief and
values through normal adjustment.
Buddhism, along with a number of other sects, was a reaction
against beliefs and values that were no longer in harmony with a
society undergoing drastic and rapid change. At the time of the
Buddha the society or societies of northern India were undergoing
great changes. The Brahminical tradition could not satisfy the
religious needs of a considerable proportion of the population,
particularly in the growing towns. A number of sectarian leaders –
as attested by the Sa ¤maññaphalasutta and other texts – appeared
on the scene to offer new and more credible banners to the people.
At the time of the Buddha four great kingdoms, Avanti, Vatsa,
Kosala and Magadha, were growing. At the same time parts of the
population of the sixteen great countries (maha¤janapada) organized
themselves into chiefdoms, gan .asam ≥ghas, with councils and as-
semblies. Other janapadas supported kings. The chiefdoms were
ruled by ks .atriya lineages and there was a sharp demarcation be-
tween the ruling families and the people who worked for them as
employees or slaves. Cities grew as commercial and political
centres. Industries grew in the cities and a monetary system
developed.
In addition to soldiers, ministers, and religious officials employed
by the kings there were money-lenders, medical practitioners,
potters, weavers, dyers, reed- and leaf-workers, leather-workers,
architects, smiths, hunters and butchers. The urbanization and the
proliferation of trade and industry, not to mention the maintenance
of communities of mendicants, required a considerable agricultural
surplus, and some scholars attribute the advancement in agricultural
techniques to the use of iron. Irrigation was also a central element
in agricultural development and thus a significant variable in the
social change.
The climate of the Ganges plain must have been warm and wet,
and both the jungles that were gradually cleared and burnt and the
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muddy fields that were created must have provided close to perfect
living conditions for a number of different parasites and insects
that served as carriers of maladies, as pointed out by Gombrich.4
People probably lacked resistance to the diseases of this
environment that they had inhabited for only a few generations,
and the Buddhist literature contains passages about the threat of
sickness. In the Maha ¤vagga of the Vinaya Pit >aka (MV I.18) a
number of people join the Sam ≥gha because they are afflicted with
different diseases and are in need of treatment. In the Theraga ¤tha ¤
55 we are told that Añjana joined the Buddha as a result of a panic
in the Vajjian territory. The people of the area are said to have been
afraid of three things: drought, sickness and evil spirits. According
to this text, the Buddha quieted the panic, and it seems that it was
the Buddha’s ability to ease the fear that made Añjana join the
Order of monks. On the other hand, it seems that the quality of life
had improved for a large number of people during this period.
Luxury goods, such as salt, pottery and textiles of different sorts,
became available and the material culture improved in general. The
successful gahapatis could invest part of their earnings in business
and thereby augment their wealth. As Thapar says: ‘There is
evidence of an improvement in living conditions …’.5
To sum up my steps so far, I am trying to outline an analysis of
a religious transformation by emphasizing the importance of three
elements in the explanation. First, we have the social situation in
which the religious transformation took place. Second, we have
the religious movement: Buddhism. I have suggested that Buddhism
was a reaction against a state of incongruity between objective
reality and the subjective reality of a large number of people at the
time. These two standards needed to be synchronized. Faced with
the inability to adjust in the normal, step-by-step process of
modification of subjective reality, people embraced the solutions
offered by a few charismatic leaders who were able to define the
problems and point the way out. It was a switching of worlds, the
cutting of the Gordian knot of the consistency problem, a throwing
away of all traditional religious banners. With these two elements
we describe the origins of Buddhism in a way that has been done
by previous historians. The attempt here to offer a new
understanding of this process is defined by the contribution of a
third element in the explanation: motivation conceptualized as
psychological incongruity. To do justice to the individual convert
and to obey what I would call the motivational imperative, one
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should try to describe the causal mechanism going from the starting
point (social conditions), through the individual, to the reaction
(religious movement).
Cognitive dissonance and religious
motivation
My argument is that a basic religious motive for the earliest
Buddhists was a need to reduce an incongruity between their own
inner structure of beliefs, attitudes and values, on the one hand,
and an external world experiencing rapid change, on the other. The
theory of cognitive dissonance was formulated by Festinger in
1957.6 Basically, Festinger believed that cognitions can stand in
different relations to each other. First, two or more cognitions can
have a consonant relationship, they are harmonious, or one follows
from another. Second, cognitions can have an irrelevant relationship.
Finally, cognitions can have a dissonant relationship. When a person
has cognitions that stand in a dissonant relationship, it causes
discomfort, which motivates him or her to reduce the dissonance
between cognitions and achieve consonance.
Let us look briefly at how the theme of cognitive dissonance is
reflected in early Buddhist literature. I mentioned earlier that
according to the Buddha biographies there were certain sights or
omens that made the Buddha-to-be renounce his life as a prince
and take up the life of a religious wanderer. The realization of birth
(ja ¤ti), ageing (jara ¤), sickness (vya ¤dhi) and death (maran .a) were
the causes of sam ≥vega (sam ≥vegavatthu). On three pleasure excurs-
ions outside the palace he saw an old man, a sick man and a corpse.
These sights were illusions created by gods in order to bring about
a disturbance in the mind of the prince. In Canto 3.4 we are told
that his father, the king, was aware of the distressing sight the world
might present, and he forbade the appearance of afflicted common
folk on the royal road.
The Sanskrit word denoting religious perturbation here is
sam ≥vega. We have encountered this word in earlier chapters. It is a
noun made from the root sam ≥-vij which means to tremble or start
with fear. The translator E. H. Johnston explains the term in the
following way:
Sam ≥vega as a religious term denotes the first step towards
conversion, when the perturbation of mind is produced by
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something and leads to consideration of the inherent rottenness
of the world and so to the adoption of the religious life.7
What the king is afraid of, then, is his son’s conversion, his adoption
of the religious life. In order to protect his son from the distressing
sights of the world he clears away those whose limbs were maimed
or senses defective, the aged and the sick – but to no avail. The
prince is destined to become a Buddha. The term sam ≥vega occurs
several times both in the Pa¤li canon and in Buddhist texts in Sanskrit.
Through the discussion of cognitive dissonance and sam ≥vega I am
trying to address a problem of how to analyse the religious
motivation of early Buddhists with the language of psychology.
This is an instance of a general problem in the study of religions.
How can we describe a religious movement in a language that does
not belong to that movement or to the culture in which it arose? In
the words of Milton Yinger:
A serious difficulty associated with virtually all efforts to
measure religion is the limitation of the dimensions or scales
to one or to a few closely related religious traditions. This puts
serious limits on any efforts to develop generalizations about
the relationships of religion and society that are capable of
being applied across cultural lines and across time periods.
Measurements having crosscultural validity must abstract from
specific social and cultural systems those qualitites that are
intrinsic to the phenomenon of religion whatever the form of
their expression.8
The sociology of religion must shun categories dictated too
specifically by the characteristics of a particular theological tradition
and must develop categories that facilitate cross-cultural
comparison. Observing phenomena in real life, the scholar must
conceptualize ideas in the language and form of expression used
by the community in which the observations are being made. Later,
he or she must present the observations in terms that are shared by
the community of scholars, terms that are abstracted from their
particular context and that make comparisons across cultural and
temporal boundaries possible. In this leap the discussion of
reductionism becomes relevant. The transformation of commun-
icative experience to data for scientific investigation must contain
an arbitrary element. However, this does not mean that we cannot
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do our best to construct analytical categories that correspond as
far as possible with the concepts used by the participants of the
religious life themselves. The now so familiar idea that the scholar’s
task is to bridge the gap between experience-near and experience-
distant concepts – between inside and outside, subjective and
objective, emic and etic – is just as essential to traditionally
hermeneutical disciplines as to the social sciences. Gadamer pointed
out that it is madness for the historian to try to leave out his or her
own concepts in the study of a historical epoch or tradition.9
I am suggesting that in sam ≥vega and cognitive dissonance we
may have a pair of concepts – one used by the early Buddhists
themselves and the other by Western psychologists – that can be
applied to bridge the gap between the experience-near and the
experience-distant, the subjective and the objective, in the study of
the religious motivation in early Buddhism. Let me investigate this
possibility a bit further.
It is clear from the Buddhacarita and from the other biographies
that what causes the prince’s perturbation, his sam ≥vega, is the
realization of the inherent suffering of life. But what makes this
realization so powerful in the case of the prince is the dissonance
between his original cognition of his own life and this new
knowledge that he himself must grow old, suffer and die. The sight
of sickness, death and old age does not have this enormous impact
on others whose previous ideas of life converge to a greater degree
with the facts. His father, the king, for instance, is a realistic man.
His ideas of his own life are in harmony with the objective truths
of life. Canto 2:34: ‘He did not, like one wanting in self-control,
indulge in the pleasures of the senses, he cherished no improper
passion for women, with firmness he overcame the rebellious horses
of the senses, and conquered his kinsmen and subjects by his
virtues.’ Canto 2:38: ‘He spoke what was pleasant and not
unprofitable; he stated what was true and not disagreeable; for self-
respect made him unable to say even to himself a pleasant falsehood
or a harsh truth.’
In contrast, the prince has lived a life of pleasure, hidden behind
the walls of the royal abode, and the discrepancy between his
cognition of his own life and the unavoidable facts of the world is
overwhelming. This cognitive dissonance gives the prince a strong
feeling of discomfort, which motivates him to equalize the
discrepancy. Obviously, the facts of life cannot be changed, and
the only solution is to bring his own life into some sort of harmony
with these facts.
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The reaction of the young prince is extreme. His father has
managed to achieve harmony between his life as a king and the
facts of the world by choosing a realistic middle way between the
pleasant falsehoods of imagined immortality and indulgence in the
pleasures of the senses, on the one hand, and the harsh truths of
suffering and death, on the other. The young prince rejects
everything; his family, his amusements, his wealth and the duties
of his social standing. The Buddha is essentially what William James
called the sick soul:
Make the human being’s sensitivity a little greater, carry him
a little farther over the misery-threshold, and the good quality
of the successful moments themselves when they occur is
spoiled and vitiated. All natural goods perish. Riches take
wings; fame is a breath; love is a cheat; youth and health and
pleasure vanish. Can things whose end is always dust and
disappointment be the real goods which our souls require? 10
Insight and secondary control
In his study of the S æra ¤man .yaphalasu ¤tra Graeme MacQueen
distinguishes a few major themes in the text.11 One of these major
themes he calls ‘Internal and External Mastery’. This is a common
theme in early Buddhist literature as well as in the literature of
other Indian traditions. The figure of the king symbolizes external
mastery and the figure of the s æraman.a, sometimes the Buddha him-
self, symbolizes internal mastery. The conflict between the two
roles is also seen in the Buddha biography in which the child is
predicted to become either a cakravartin – i.e. an all-conquering
king – or a Buddha. MacQueen illustrates his point by analysing
the Khantiva ¤di Ja ¤taka in terms of the dichotomy between external
and internal mastery. In this Ja ¤taka, a king cuts a peaceful ascetic
to pieces with his sword in a fit of anger. The complete control and
calmness of the ascetic is sharply contrasted with the wrath of the
king. In the S æra¤man.yaphalasu¤tra, King Aja¤tas æatru is overcome with
fear. The reason for his fear is the silence of the large company of
monks who are staying in Jî ¤vaka’s mango grove. In the same way
it is the superior calmness of the ascetic that causes King Kalabu’s
anger to grow out of proportion in the Khantiva ¤di Ja ¤taka. In other
words, it is the kings’ inability to understand and believe in inner
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mastery and peace that is the reason for their agitation. To be faced
with silence is to be forced to look inward, and for the parricide
Aja ¤tas æatru introspection is not very pleasant. According to Mac-
Queen, Aja ¤tas æatru’s questions about the visible fruits of the life as
a s æraman .a further show his inability to understand anything apart
from external, material values. The fruit of the life of the s æraman .a
is exactly the complete internal mastery that is embodied in the
assembly of monks before him.
Several of the classical writers in the study of religion have
touched upon the human need to control external events. Spinoza,
Hume, Frazer, Radin and Malinowski all observed that religion
was born as the individual tried to cope with more or less
uncontrollable aspects of the world. I wish to continue this
discussion of the applicability of the idea of psychological
incongruity to understand the religious motivation of early
Buddhists by introducing the concept of secondary control.
In the psychological study of perceived control it is often
assumed that inward behaviours – passivity, withdrawal and
submissiveness – are signs that show that a person has given up
hope of control over factors that affect his or her life. Rothbaum et
al. have shown that such behaviour can better be understood as an
alternative way of gaining control.12 The primary way for a person
to exert control is to act on the environment and control aspects of
the world by outward behaviour. Instead of seeing inward
behaviours as a sign of relinquished control, such behaviours can
be expressions of a secondary way of exerting control. This
secondary control means bringing oneself into line with the
environment instead of bringing the environment into line with the
self. It is this secondary control that Gautama chooses by becoming
a Buddha instead of a cakravartin. The renouncer’s way of
overcoming psychological incongruity by changing the self is the
opposite of the violent strategy chosen by King Kalabu in  the
Khantiva¤da Ja¤taka and King Aja ¤tas æatru in the S æra¤man.yaphalasu¤tra.
Through meditation and other practices the religious mendicants
manipulate their own feelings and attitudes to make them
correspond with the facts of life and death. The kings, on the other
hand, manipulate the environment to fit their feelings and attitudes.
There is a parallel here with Festinger’s theory that attitudes change
to fit cognitions of reality, as discussed above.
Rothbaum et al. distinguish between four main types of
secondary control. One of these types – interpretive control – I
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find particularly apt to contribute to the understanding of the
psychology of early Buddhism because the wish to understand, to
gain insight into reality, is a very important aspect of the road to
salvation in Buddhism. A substantial part of the power of the Buddha
was his superior insight or knowledge. For the Buddha, salvation
consists of awakening to the ultimate truth. What the Buddha offers
his followers is first of all an interpretation of the nature of existence
(dukkha), the knowledge of the origin of this state (dukkha-
samudaya), the consolation that this situation can be ended
(dukkhanirodha) and the way that will end the state of suffering
(dukkhanirodhaga ¤minî ¤pat >ipada ¤).
In the words of Rothbaum et al.: ‘Interpretive control refers to
the search for meaning and understanding.’13 Interpretive control
fits with our general discussion of psychological incongruity as a
source of religious motivation. It is another way of seeing the search
for consistency or symmetry between external conditions and
internal states, as Rothbaum et al. observe: ‘The studies on
interpretive control indicate that, rather than changing the world
persons sometimes attempt to change themselves (specifically their
views) so as to better accept the world.’14
We can get a better understanding of the idea of redemptive
insight or knowledge in Buddhism by looking at the concept of
pañña ¤. Pañña ¤, insight, reason or understanding, leads to freedom.
Pañña¤ is better than any wealth (dhana) since by pañña¤ one reaches
perfection (vosa ¤na), the venerable Rat >t >hapa ¤la explains to King
Koravya in the Rat >t >hapa ¤la Sutta of the Majjhimanika ¤ya. Gautama
dealt with an uncontrollable world not by trying to gain the power
to actually modify it – not by becoming a cakravartin – but by
trying to understand its essence, by awakening to the truth, by
becoming a Buddha. He adopted a strategy which was the opposite
of that of the men of the world like Kalabu and Aja ¤tas æatru. His
followers also gained a feeling of control through the sharing of
his interpretation of existence and suffering. In the Maha ¤lisutta
the Buddha tells Maha ¤li about the highest and most excellent things
for the sake of which the monks lead the religious life:
And then further Maha ¤li, a monk, freed from the intoxications
by the destruction of the intoxications having, by himself,
understood, having realised, having attained release of the mind
(ceto-vimutti) and release by insight (pañña ¤-vimutti) abides in
the present existence. That, Maha ¤li, is a condition higher and
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more excellent for the sake of which the monks lead the
religious life under me.15
In the Kassapasî¤hana ¤dasutta the Buddha explains to Kassapa:
From the time, O Kassapa, when a Bhikkhu has cultivated the
heart of love that knows no anger, that knows no illwill – from
the time when, by the destruction of the intoxications he dwells
in that emancipation of the mind (ceto-vimutti), that
emancipation by insight (pañña ¤-vimutti), that is free from those
intoxications, and that he, while yet in this world, has come to
realise and know – from that time, O Kassapa, is it that the
Bhikkhu is called a Saman .a, is called a Brahman .a.16
Pañña ¤-vimutti is usually mentioned together with ceto-vimutti.
Gombrich has shown that these two concepts originally referred to
the same thing.17 Later scholastic Buddhist interpretation of these
terms would explain them as different and see pañña¤ as the superior
of the two. Insight became ever more important. This development
was closely connected with the later scholastic view that one could
gain enlightenment without meditation, something that was never
envisaged by the Buddha himself, according to Gombrich.18 This
does not mean that insight was unimportant to the Buddha. Release
of the mind and release by insight were central to the Buddha’s
idea of salvation, although one might perhaps say that release of
the mind is most fundamental because release by insight only
describes a way to the goal.
Conclusion
I have tried to suggest an approach to religious motivation with
examples from early Buddhist literature. The approach that I have
chosen sees psychological incongruity, the discrepancy between
an internal standard and an external stimulus, as a basic motivational
factor leading the individual towards religious innovation or
conversion. Two conceptualizations of psychological incongruity
were used: the theory of cognitive dissonance and the concept of
secondary control.
A number of objections could be made to the application of
modern psychological constructs to early Buddhism. One of the
sins committed in this chapter is summed up in one disquieting
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word: reductionism. The social scientific study of religion seeks to
develop generalizations about religion that can be applied across
cultures and time periods. It seeks concepts and measurements that
have cross-cultural validity. In doing so it adopts a reductionist
method. The objections that some scholars have to the application
of social scientific theory to religion are often based on a fear of
reducing the different manifestations of a religion to simpler factors
and in this process losing the essence, the irreducible sacred core,
of the religion. The discussion of reductionism and autonomy is
complex, and scholars who are sympathetic to a particular religious
tradition often find the questions raised vexing and choose to avoid
them altogether. In a previous chapter I criticized determinism,
especially the biological type, in the study of the conversion process.
Many years ago Penner and Yonan defined four areas of
particular importance for a clarification of the scientific status and
the research strategies of religious studies. These were the questions
of definition, reduction, explanation and understanding. The authors
argued that scholars disqualify themselves by running around the
first hurdle in the study of religion, i.e. the question of definition,
and by avoiding this problem they also keep away from the other
three issues. Indeed, all four questions are closely inter-related and
need to be confronted head on, although to hope for an easy solution
is naive. Unfortunately, the term ‘reduction’ has become a boo-
word employed by scholars who wish to avoid the more complex
methodological issues in the study of religion, and this attitude is
classically represented in theories that speak of religion as a sui
generis phenomenon and insist on approaching the subject through
the ‘incredibly obscure operation of understanding’, as Penner and
Yonan called it.19 The fear of reduction and reductionism often
builds on the misunderstanding that it is the phenomena themselves
that are reduced rather than our theories about them. Reduction in
any normal sense of the word is about reducing theories to simpler
theories, and if scholars understand this and still insist that reduction
has no place in the study of religion it must be because they see
theories about religion as irreducible. This, however, simply
amounts to an anti-scientific stance that should have no place in
academia.
In the end, what we want to know is whether human beings
have so much in common despite obvious cultural differences that
it is possible to explain their feelings and their behaviour by theories
made in a particular culture, or whether human beings, as relativists
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assert, become human solely through enculturation and have
nothing in common on which to base comparison or cross-cultural
analysis. A psychological theory that seeks to explain some aspect
of religion, independent of time and place, must reduce particular
observations of feelings, ideas and behaviour, which are necessarily
culture-specific, to observations that are independent of the culture
in which the observations were made. Such a theory presupposes a
universal human nature, and some scholars would say that no such
thing exists. The discussion of cultural relativism is a large topic in
anthropology but has never gained the same prominence in the field
of religious studies, and since a serious exposition here would bring
us too far astray, I will simply agree with Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi
that just as religious beliefs display similarities across cultures so






AND THE ROLE OF FEAR
May the fearful become fearless and those oppressed by grief
find joy. May those who are anxious be rid of their anxiety and
feel secure.
S æa ¤ntideva1
The link between fear and religious motivation has been a valid
subject of investigation for scholars in modern anthropology and
psychology, and writers in search of the psychological origins of
religion have taken a special interest in this subject.2 In the Christian
world these links have been highlighted by Kierkegaard among
others. Fear often has a religious role in India too. However, except
for a recent semi-scholarly essay on fear and Buddhism, nothing
has been written on the subject of fear in Indian religions.3 In this
chapter I wish to illuminate certain aspects of fear in the religious
thought of the Indian sub-continent and Buddhism in particular. It
will become clear, I hope, that fear has an important role to play in
religious motivation in Buddhism.
Let me make a few reservations before I continue. The point of
departure for the discussion of fear in this chapter is a specific
puzzle in Buddhist literature, and Indian literature in general, that
deals with the life of the religious renouncer and the way towards
the adoption of this life. I will define the problem in more detail
over the following pages. Fear is a vast subject in Indian literature,
and a number of different approaches could be adopted to the topic
and a number of links explored. For instance, it might be fruitful to
look at the innumerable associations between fear and sexual desire,
between the horrible and the erotic.4 Perhaps the most interesting
link would be the one leading to Indian drama. The Na ¤t>yas æa ¤stra
of Bharata Muni has terrifying (bhaya ¤naka) as one of the eight
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tastes or sentiments (rasa) that a drama can apply in order to move
its public. To the terrifying sentiment belongs the emotion of fear
(bhaya). In the famous chapter on sentiments, the Rasa ¤dhya ¤ya,
Bharata Muni explains:
Now (the rasa) called bhaya ¤naka has fear as its permanent
emotion. It arises from such vibha ¤vas as ghastly noises, seeing
supernatural beings (ghosts), fear and panic due to the (cries)
of owls (or the howling of) jackals, going to an empty house
or to a forest, hearing about, speaking about, or seeing the
imprisonment or murder of one’s relatives. It should be acted
out by such actions as trembling of the hands and feet, darting
motions of the eyes, the hair standing on end, changing facial
color (i.e. going white with fear) or stuttering.5
The Na ¤t>yas æa ¤stra’s theory of sentiment has had a substantial im-
pact on Indian thought on emotions outside literary theory and
drama, too, from at least the third or fourth century AD, and it is not
unlikely that monks and scholars who discussed the role of fear in
a religious context have had knowledge of Bharata Muni and other
theorists’ treatment of the terrifying sentiment and its corollary,
fear. However, the possible links between the dramaturgical and
the religious ideas of fear is an example of one fascinating line of
enquiry that I must leave out of this chapter. I am going to restrict
my discussion to one area, namely the double role of fear in some
of the textual religious traditions of India. As will soon become
clear, the role of fear in Indian religion, and especially in Buddhism,
seems to be somewhat paradoxical and this is the point of departure
for this chapter. Before we go into this in detail, however, I will
take a brief look at fear in its more familiar forms, the little fears of
the everyday life of renouncer and householder, what may be called
trivial fears.
The trivial fears of monks and
householders
Fear and the desire to escape it is a theme in Buddhist Pa¤li literature.
In its trivial sense fear is a factor of both the individual and social
life of the Buddhist monk. Fear is one side of the multifaceted
emotional complex of every human being, and freedom from fear
is an aspect of the general calming of the mind that is the goal of
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Buddhist meditation. The overcoming of fear often becomes a
meditative practice. In the chapter on pleasure, Piyavagga, of the
Dhammapada several verses explain the interconnection between
the pleasant and painful feelings. What is pleasurable (piya) and
also affection (pema), fondness (rati), desire (ka ¤ma) and craving
(tan .ha ¤) all lead to grief (soka) and fear (bhaya).6 Typically, when
one is free from the pleasurable feelings, one will also be free from
grief and fear. Overcoming fear is part of the monk’s way to
detachment from worldly matters. The Dhajagga Sutta says that
when the monk recollects (anussarati, sarati) the Buddha, the
Dhamma and the Sam ≥gha they will experience no fear (bhaya),
paralysis (chambhitatta) or bristling of body hair in excitement
(lomaham ≥sa).7
In the Bhayabherava Sutta of the Majjhima Nika ¤ya the Buddha
speaks about the overcoming of the fears of dark and remote places
as an exercise of the mind. He explains how he approached
horrifying places like orchard shrines, woodland shrines and tree
shrines on auspicious nights and dwelt there in order to encounter
fear:
And while I dwelt there, a wild animal would come up to me,
or a peacock would knock off a branch, or the wind would
rustle the leaves. I thought ‘What now if this is the fear and
dread (bhayabherava) coming?’ I thought: ‘Why do I dwell
always expecting fear and dread? What if I subdue (pat >ivineti)
that fear and dread while keeping the same posture that I am
in when it comes upon me?’ While I walked, the fear and dread
came upon me; I neither stood nor sat nor lay down till I had
subdued that fear and dread. While I stood, the fear and dread
came upon me; I neither walked nor sat nor lay down till I had
subdued that fear and dread …’8
There are several different enumerations of things that cause
fear in the Pa ¤li texts, and many of these are negligible as subjects
of scholarly investigation. For instance, the Sutta Nipa ¤ta says that
there are five causes of fear that can disturb the monk, namely
gadflies (d.am≥sa), moths or mosquitoes (adhipa¤ta), creeping animals
(sirim≥sapa), contact with humans (manussaphassa) and four-legged
beasts (catuppada).9 In this context fear is discussed as something
that must be calmed along with other affects. The Buddha explains
to Sa ¤riputta the mind-set that should be cultivated by the monk
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who settles down far away by the root of a tree, in a cemetery or in
a mountain cave. The Sutta Nipa¤ta, then, just like the Bhayabherava
Sutta above, is not talking about an existential fear that makes people
renounce the world, but rather minor fears that must be calmed by
the monk who is engaged in meditation.
Fear in its trivial sense is also a force that controls social life.
Typically, four types of fear are thought to guide the monk in a
social setting. The fear of self-reproach (atta ¤nuva ¤da bhaya), fear
of reproach by others (para ¤nu bhaya), fear of punishment (dan .d .a
bhaya) and fear of lower worlds (duggati bhaya) all make the monk
avoid unwise actions and function as a social being.10 The fear of
reproach by the laity, for instance, seems to have been an important
force in the shaping of the Buddhist Sam ≥gha.
Fear can be destructive and paralysing. The trivial fear of the
common man is not only unprofitable but directly harmful from
the perspective of the renouncer. Fear is one of the four motives
(t>ha ¤na) by which people do evil deeds, the Buddha tells Siga¤la.11
Fear as motivation in the everyday life of the householder is
destructive. The gift to the Sam ≥gha given out of fear (bhayada ¤na)
is impure (avis æuddha) says the Maha ¤ya ¤na literature on giving.12
Lamotte suggests that this is because impure attachment or interest
of any kind makes the gift impure while the only pure (vis æuddha)
gift is the one given with complete detachment. However, as I have
tried to show elsewhere, there has been a tendency to make giving
a more pragmatic activity in which all modes of donating produce
merit.13
While fear should not be a form of motivation in the everyday
life of the monk or the householder fear is at the core of religious
motivation. Without fear gods and men do not realize the need for
religious exertion. Thus, one must discard the wrong fear and
embrace the right fear. Ling speaks of the fundamental difference
between, on the one hand, dangers that it is possible to escape, like
armies, mad elephants, yakkhas, etc. and, on the other hand, the
great danger of death, personified in Ma ¤ra, which is ultimately
inescapable.14 It is the realization of such great and inescapable
dangers – death, birth, old age – that is the basis of the non-trivial
fear that is the subject of this chapter. One must choose the right
fear. In the words of the Dhammapada: ‘They who fear when they
ought not to fear and do not fear when they ought to fear, such
men, following false doctrines, enter the evil path.’15 What makes
one experience of fear good and another bad?
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The paradox of fear
If we start looking a little closer at the role of fear in Indian religious
thought it becomes apparent that the subject has a fundamental
doubleness to it. On the one hand, fear is the natural state of sam≥sa¤ric
existence. The basic facts of life – such as birth, sickness, ageing
and death – cause fear in living beings. Conversely, freedom from
fear is an important aspect of complete religious realization. On
the other hand, fear is a necessary state of mind in the striving to
escape sam ≥sa ¤ric existence and achieve freedom. Fear should be
cultivated as the basic motivating factor in the religious life. Thus,
fear is both a negative thing from which beings should try to escape
through religious exertion and a positive thing without which the
very same exertion is impossible. In other words, if one starts to
look into the ideas about fear in Buddhism, and Indian soteriologies
in general, it soon becomes clear that it is a complex subject, and
the fact that it has been neglected by indologists and historians of
religion becomes difficult to comprehend.
The double function of fear is perhaps most apparent in Pa ¤li
Buddhism and the textual basis of this tradition will provide the
most important examples in this chapter. The Buddha leads his
followers from the fear of sam≥sa¤ric existence towards freedom from
fear. He is the Dispeller of anguish, terror and fear (ubbegam ≥
utta ¤sam ≥ bhayam ≥ apanuditar).16 He is the Bestower of fearlessness
(abhayada).17 But at the same time his function is to create dread
in gods and men. When a Buddha arises in the world and teaches
the Dhamma the gods experience fear, agitation and trembling.18
In the Perfection of Wisdom literature (prajña ¤pa ¤ramita ¤) too it is a
common assertion that the teaching of emptiness (s æunyata ¤) is too
terrifying to be taught to people who have not reached a certain
stage in spiritual development.19 What is the difference between
the fear that the Buddha creates and the fear that he destroys?
The same paradox can be found in Jainism. According to several
medieval Jain authors, freedom from fear (nih ≥s æan Vka) is a primary
part (an Vga) of right view or belief (samyaktva). For instance,
Ca¤mun.d .ara¤ya lists seven types of fear: fear of this world (iha-loka),
fear of the next world (para-loka), fear of sickness (vya ¤dhi), fear
of death (maran .a), fear of being without protection (agupti), fear
of being without defence (atra¤n.a) and fear of something unexpected
(akasmika).20 These kinds of trivial everyday fears are detrimental
to the religious life and must be destroyed. Jaini has listed fear
(bhaya) as one of nine ‘everyday passion-tinged experiences’,
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which will gradually disappear as an individual becomes more
spiritually advanced.21 Thus, fear is a symptom of low spiritual
attainment in Jainism too. At the same time it is clear that a certain
kind of fear is a prerequisite for success in the religious life. In
Jainism sam ≥vega has more or less the same function as in the
Buddhist examples below. In works by some of the medieval Jain
authors sam ≥vega has been codified as part of the lists of right view
or right belief – samyaktva or samyagdr ≥s .t >i. Pu ¤jyapa ¤da, the
Digambara commentator of the Tattva ¤rthasu¤tra – who lived perhaps
in the fifth century AD or slightly later – defined sam ≥vega as the
ever-present fear of transmigraton, whereas the greatest of the
S æveta ¤mbara authors, Hemacandra, defined sam ≥vega as ‘the desire
for moks .a arising from the realization that the pleasures of gods
and men are, in the last resort, unsatisfying.’22 For the Jain authors
sam ≥vega is the unease or fear that arises from the basic facts of life
in sam≥sa ¤ra. Thus, both fear and freedom from fear have been listed
as right views for the Jains.
In the following I will look more closely at the two roles of fear
in Indian religion and especially in Buddhism. First, I will look at
freedom from fear as the goal of religious striving or as a
characteristic feature of salvation; second, I will look at fear as a
means to religious achievement or as the basis for religious
motivation. Finally, I will try to put the double role of fear in the
context of the religious history of India. I am going to argue that in
Buddhism, from which I take most of my examples and in which
the doubleness is most clearly expressed, fear was part of the arsenal
of the great missionary movement that spread Buddhism throughout
the subcontinent and to Sri Lanka from around the middle of the
third century BC It is likely that Buddhist missionaries used the
induction of fear as a technique to make people more receptive to
the new movement and its teaching and, conversely, the dispelling
of fear was an effective way of binding fresh converts to the
community.23 As I will try to show, traces of such an active use of
fear can be found in the Pa ¤li texts. I believe the widely accepted
view that Buddhism spread simply because of the exemplary
manners of its proponents and the rational and pleasing nature of
its teaching is naive.
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Freedom from fear as the aim of
religious striving
All men fear punishment and death, according to the Buddha, but
the Arahant has passed beyond all fear (sabbabhayam atikkanto).
This is one of the paradoxes with which King Milinda presents the
Venerable Na ¤gasena in the Questions of King Milinda. But this is
not really a paradox, Na ¤gasena explains, because the Arahant is an
exception to the general statement that all men fear death.24 For the
Arahant all causes of fear have been cut off. Freedom from fear is
a constituent of Arahantship. The Arahant is free from fear and
terror (pahî¤nabhayabherava).25 As we are told in the verse of
Sambula Kacca ¤na in the Theraga ¤tha ¤ the monk had no fear (bhaya)
although he stayed in a horrible cave (bherave bile) and in spite of
a rainstorm roaring outside.26 The commentary explains that
although all other creatures cry out in fear at the thunder and
lightning the thera had no fear inside his horrible den because he
had achieved insight. In other words he is on the way to Arahantship.
The Buddha himself had many similar experiences with dreadful
things. Typically, Ma ¤ra, the evil one, approaches the Buddha in
order to frighten him and make him stray from his path. On one
occasion, for instance, Ma ¤ra approaches the Lord in the form of an
enormous cobra in order to cause fear (bhaya), paralysis
(chambhitatta) and make his body hair bristle with excitement
(lomaham ≥sa). The Buddha sees through the plan of his evil
adversary and he explains that all living beings may try to frighten
him and still they will never succeed.27 Not only the Buddha Gotama
had to struggle with fear in order to achieve perfection. This is a
common theme in the life of previous Buddhis as well. In the
Buddhavam ≥sa it is said that Buddha Kassapa, the twenty-fourth
Buddha, created the flower of fearlessness (abhaya puppha).28 The
Madhurathavila ¤sinî¤ explains in its commentary to this verse that
the flower is the eightfold way leading to the city of no fear
(abhayapura) which, of course, is the equivalent of Nibba¤na.29 It
was fear and dread at the sight of old age, sickness and death that
made the Buddha Vipassi forsake the world, as I will return to
shortly. One of the characteristics of a Buddha according to later
Buddhist literature both of the Maha ¤ya ¤na and the Hî ¤naya ¤na sects
is the four assurances (vais æa¤radya). According to the Abhidharma-
kos æabha¤s .yam these assurances are the assurance that he has attained
supreme comprehension with respect to all dharmas, the assurance
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that he has knowledge of the destruction of the defilements, the
assurance that he can fully explain the dharmas and the assurance
that he can explain the path leading to definitive deliverance.30 These
assurances are or entail absence from fear.
The word vais æa ¤radya signifies ‘absence of fear’ (nirbhayata ¤).
By reason of the fact that he knows that he has understood all
the dharmas, destroyed all the defilements, etc., the Buddha is
free from fear in the assemblies.31
The way towards freedom from fear is a central concept in the
idea of salvation in Pa ¤li Buddhism. Buddhaghosa concludes his
exposition of the four noble truths by giving seven different similes
of the truth of suffering, its origin, its cessation and the path to its
cessation. One of these similes is based on fear. According to
Buddhaghosa, the four noble truths can be understood as fear
(bhaya), the origin of fear (bhayamu ¤la), the freedom from fear
(nibbhaya) and the means to attain this (tadadhigamupa ¤ya).32 The
expressions released from fear (bhaya ¤ pamutta) and set free in
fearlessness (abhaye vimutta) are descriptions of the nibba ¤nic
state.33 Nibba ¤na is freedom from fear.
The idea that freedom from fear is an aspect of the highest
religious or spiritual attainment is certainly older than Buddhaghosa
and, indeed, older than Buddhism. According to the Cha ¤ndogya
Upanis .ad, gods and men become free from fear and immortal by
uttering the sound Om ≥.34 Fear is one of the characteristics of the
self (a ¤tman) according to the Cha ¤ndogya and Br ≥hada ¤ran .yaka
Upanis .ads.35 The self is immortal, free from fear, it is Brahman,
says the Cha ¤ndogya Upanis .ad 8.3.4.36 Reaching the state of no
fear implies realizing the self. In the Pras æna Upanis .ad freedom
from fear (abhaya) is one of the characteristics of the highest stage
which only can be reached by meditation on the syllable Om≥.37 In
the Kat >ha Upanis .ad freedom from fear is found in heaven. Here
one has no fear of death or old age, Naciketas explains to Yama.38
The Taittirî ¤ya Upanis .ad also makes it clear that freedom from fear
is a characteristic feature of the perfected state: ‘For when a man
finds within that invisible, incorporeal (ana ¤tmya), indistinct, and
supportless essence, the fearless stage on which to rest, then he
becomes free from fear. When, on the other hand, a man creates a
hollow or a fissure within it, then he experiences fear.’39
In commenting on this verse of the Taittirî ¤ya Upanis .ad, S æanVkara
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picked up the topic of fear and offered an explication of the nature
of fear emphasizing the doctrine of non-duality. One attains
fearlessness (abhaya) by recourse to the true essence (sadvastu),
S æanVkara said. One does not attain the cessation of fear through
recourse to what is not the true essence. In other words, only by
recourse to Brahman does one attain freedom from fear. Fear is
produced by someone else, S æanVkara continued. It is not the case
that one’s fear is produced by oneself. When one becomes steadfast
in one’s true being (svaru ¤papratis .t >ha), then one neither sees, hears
nor discerns any more. When one sees no other and does not create
a splitting (bheda) within the self one has reached freedom from
fear. Then there is nothing outside the self to create fear in the self.
It is the idea of duality caused by ignorance (avidya ¤) that is the
basis of fear, according to S æanVkara and, as we saw above, the
Taittirî ¤ya Upanis .ad naturally lends itself to this interpretation by
stressing that the creation of a fissure (dara) in the self is the cause
of fear.40
The Br ≥hada ¤ran .yaka Upanis .ads, too, suggests that the state of
fearlessness is reached when one realizes that there is no other,
that there is nothing apart from the self. The first being became
afraid, it says, and therefore one becomes afraid when one is alone:
‘Then he thought to himself: “Of what should I be afraid, when
there is no one but me?” So his fear left him, for what was he going
to be afraid of? One is, after all, afraid of another.’41 Verily, S æanVkara
said in his commentary to this verse, fear arises from a second
(dvitî ¤ya), from another object (vastvantara). This second, the other
object, appears only through ignorance (avidya¤).42 When one attains
the realization that the self is alone, that everything else is caused
by ignorance, there is nothing to cause fear any more. One has
reached salvation.
Thus, the idea that freedom from fear is an important aspect of
the highest spiritual attainment is present in the Upanis .ads and in
the Veda¤nta as it is represented by S æanVkara. When we look at freedom
from fear as a characteristic of the goal of religious striving there
are clear parallels in Buddhism, Jainism and Hindu soteriology.
When one has no idea of another any more and when one does not
create a splitting or fissure within the self then there is nothing to
be afraid of, according to the Upanis .ads referred to above. It is the
overcoming of duality caused by illusion, according to the Advaita
interpretation.
Not surprisingly perhaps, there are parallels to this explanation
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of the origins of fear in Madhyamaka Buddhism.43 The spiritual
and fervent poetry of the scholar monk S æa ¤ntideva – who probably
flourished in the eighth century AD and is associated with the great
Buddhist university at Na ¤landa ¤ – is an interesting source for the
understanding of the role of fear in this tradition. Indeed, large
parts of his Bodhicarya ¤vata ¤ra can be seen as attempts to induce
fear of sam ≥sa ¤ra and a motivation to escape its afflictions. The
horrors of sam ≥sa¤ric existence are graphically described and, most
importantly, a sense of great urgency for the religious life is
conveyed. How can you lead a normal life when Yama, the god of
death, is sizing you up at every turn, when you have entered the
mouth of death, when you hear the hellish bellowings and behold
the grief-stricken faces of relatives? Quaking from terror, your body
caked in excrement what will you do?44 Of course, says S æa¤ntideva,
you must enter the path of the bodhisattva and exert yourself to
achieve perfection.
The Pra¤sanVgika tradition of the Madhyamaka, of which S æa¤ntideva
was a representative, holds that nothing exists apart from the mind.
One possible meaning of dependent origination (pratî ¤tya-
samutpa ¤da) for the Pra ¤san Vgikas is origination in dependence on
the designating mind.45 But if fearful objects do not really exist
from where does the fear arise? In the answer to this question
S æa ¤ntideva reveals a certain affinity with the Veda ¤ntic ideas of the
origination of fear:
So too tigers, lions, elephants, bears, serpents, and all malign
beings, and all the guards of hell, ogresses, demons, / All these
are bound through the binding of a single mind, and through
the taming of a single mind, all are tamed, / Since all fears and
incomparable sufferings arise from the mind alone. So it was
taught by the Teacher of Reality. / … Every single thing arises
from the evil mind, sang the Sage. So there is nothing dangerous
in the three worlds other than the mind.46
All fears arise from the mind and when the mind is controlled
fear will cease. S æa ¤ntideva seems to explain the origin of fear from
the existence of the mind. Later, however, he summarizes an
opponent’s argument for the existence of a self which says that
fear demonstrates the existence of an ‘I’.47 In other words, he refutes
the induction of an ‘I’ from the existence of fear. Is there a weakness
in the reasoning of S æa ¤ntideva on this point? Also in the S æiks .a ¤
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Samuccaya, S æa ¤ntideva’s other great work, it is clear that fear
originates in wrong ideas about identity. ‘Fear arises from the
holding on to the self [a ¤tmagra ¤ha].’ it says.48 The bodhisattva who
lives in forest seclusion must get rid of the sense of self, achieve
detachment and realize that there is nothing to be afraid of apart
from that which the mind creates.
In Pa ¤li Buddhism, too, fear ultimately arises from the mind’s
involvement with the outside world. There are fundamental
differences concerning the reality of the world and the self in
Veda ¤nta, Madhyamaka and Pa ¤li Buddhism.49 However, in all these
philosophies it is the interaction of the mind with external objects
that causes fear. Fear springs from acquaintance or intimacy
(santhava ¤to bhayam ≥ ja ¤tam ≥), according to the Sutta Nipa ¤ta.50 The
Pa ¤li texts that deal with meditation all stress the importance of
detachment from the world and from one’s own sense experiences.
The idea of detachment is also part of some of the most important
symbols and metaphors of Buddhahood and Arahantship. The lotus
is often used as a symbol because it grows in muddy water without
getting tainted by its dirty surroundings. Animals like the elephant
and the rhinoceros also symbolize loneliness and detachment from
the world. The Buddha or the Arahant is often called a lion. This is
because the lion symbolizes strength and royal power, but also, I
think, because the lion lives alone, away from the other animals –
it is aloof, separate and completely detached. As I will return to
consider shortly, the Buddha, just like the lion, causes fear but is
never subject to fear himself. In the Sutta Nipa ¤ta there is a story
about the Brahimn Sela – and 300 followers – who wishes to go
and see the Buddha. As they set out Sela tells his companions that
they must thread carefully on their way to the Lord because lords
are hard to approach like lions that roam alone (dura ¤sada ¤ hi te
bhagavanto sî ¤ha ¤ va ekacara ¤).51 The Buddha and the Arahants are
unapproachable lions. They are aloof, separate, with minds drawn
away from the disturbing sights of the world. The Brahmin Sela
tells the Buddha that he is an unattached lion free from fear and
terror (sî ¤ho si anupa ¤da ¤no pahî ¤nabhayabheravo).52 Complete
detachment is a prerequisite for freedom from fear.
These brief remarks suffice, I think, to conclude that there are
clear parallels across the Indian religious traditions concerning
freedom from fear as an important aspect of religious realization.
There are also indications that fear is a source of motivation and a
prerequisite for religious striving in a range of Indian soteriological
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traditions. Patañjali’s Yogasu ¤tra 1.21 indicates that sam ≥vega is a
feeling that puts extra energy and commitment into the meditation
practice. Sam ≥vega is here a quality that makes sama ¤dhi easier to
attain.53 However, neither Patañjali nor the commentators discuss
the nature of sam ≥vega and it is therefore difficult to judge how
close it is to the concept in Buddhism or Jainism. I will concentrate
on Buddhist material in the following exposition of fear as a means
to religious achievement.
Fear as religious motivation
I have discussed earlier how birth, ageing, sickness and death are
considered to be causes of sam ≥vega. According to the Buddha
biographies, the young Gotama was motivated by the same kinds
of experiences. On three pleasure excursions outside the palace he
saw an old man, a sick man and a corpse. As the Thu ¤pavam ≥sa sums
up the prelude to the great renunciation, the prince was overcome
by fear (sam≥vegaja ¤ta).54
The term sam ≥vega occurs several times in the Pa ¤li canon. In the
Sangî¤ti Suttanta the Venerable Sa ¤riputta lists sam≥vega, the agitation
over agitating conditions (sam ≥vejaniyesu t>ha ¤nesu), as a point in
his summary of the Buddhist doctrine.55 In the Forest Suttas of the
Sam ≥yutta Nika ¤ya monks who stay in forests become neglectful of
their religious discipline in different ways. One is indulging in
wrong and evil thoughts during their siesta, another is falling asleep,
while some have excessive contact with the laity. As a consequence,
the devas of the forests wish to agitate them (sam ≥vejetuka ¤ma ¤) out
of compassion and address the monks with verses. The idea is that
when the monks are properly agitated, when they experience a
sufficient amount of sam ≥vega, their religious discipline will
improve.56 In the Sayings on the Limbs of Wisdom in the Sam ≥yutta
Nika ¤ya, sam ≥vega is one of the results on meditating on the idea of
a skeleton.57 Other objects of meditation, which would have the
same effect of creating fear and disgust with transient things like
the human body, are corpses in different stages of decay.
The same list is found in the An Vguttara Nika ¤ya, in which we are
told that the idea of a skeleton (at >t >hikasañña ¤), the idea of a worm-
eaten corpse (pul ≤avakasañña ¤), the idea of a discoloured or bluish
corpse (vinî¤lasañña ¤), the idea of a festering corpse (vipubbaka-
sañña ¤),58 the idea of a corpse full of holes (vicchiddakasañña ¤), and
83
THE ROLE OF FEAR
the idea of a swollen corpse (uddhuma ¤tasañña ¤) are all signs of
concentration (sama ¤dhinimitta).59 This kind of meditation is
reflection on impurity (asubhakammat >t >ha ¤na). In the Abhidamma
the ten impurities – corpses in different stages of decay – are part
of a compendium of meditation subjects.60 Those who night and
day follow the teaching (sa ¤sana) of the Buddha always have the
realization of impurity (asubhasaññin), says the Itivuttaka.61 The
Itivuttaka devotes one sutta to sam ≥vega.62 The monk who is
possessed with two things lives at ease and is disposed towards the
destruction of the a ¤savas – the intoxications of the mind which
traps man in sam ≥sa ¤ric existence – and is thus on his way to
Arahantship. The two things are sam ≥vega and exertion (padha ¤na),
which comes as the result of sam≥vega.
We saw above that the Buddha is sometimes thought of as a lion
in his detachment from the affairs of the world and the lion becomes
an important metaphor, too, in the ideas of the induction of religious
fear. An interesting explication of the function of fear in Pa ¤li
Buddhism is found in the simile of the lion.63 Here the role of the
Buddha in the world of gods and men is compared to the role of the
lion in the world of animals. When the lion roars all other animals
experience fear, agitation and trembling (bhayam ≥ sam ≥vegam ≥
santa ¤sam ≥ a ¤pajjanti). They creep into their holes, jump back into
the water, run off into the forest or fly up in the air. The king’s
elephants break their bonds, void their excrements and run to and
fro. In the same way, when a Buddha arises in the world and teaches
the Dhamma the gods experience fear, agitation and trembling.64
They realize that they are impermanent, unstable, not to last and
imprisoned in a person (mayam≥ hi kira bho anicca¤ addhuva¤ asassata¤
sakka ¤yapariya ¤panna ¤ ti). In other words, they are subject to the
vicissitudes of sam ≥sa ¤ra just like other creatures. The function of
the Buddha in the simile of the lion is to create fear through his
teaching. The content of the Dhamma is intended to evoke fear in
those who listen, and when this fear is effectively translated into
religious motivation one will strive to attain Nirva ¤n .a.
Sam ≥vega occurs with the same meaning of an emotional
perturbation motivating the religious life in the Pra ¤timoks .asu ¤tra
of the Sarva ¤stiva ¤dins. It is part of the pessimistic introductory
description of the condition of the world. Everything is in rapid
decay, soon men will be like beasts, and the importance of the
religious life is growing correspondingly. The monk should cultivate
THE ROLE OF FEAR
84
his affliction and open his eyes for the miseries of the world.
Sam ≥vega is a desired mental state, which will make the monks
listen attentively to the teaching of the Buddha.65
Buddhaghosa enumerates eight causes of sam ≥vega, the at >t >ha
sam ≥vegavatthu, which should be contemplated by the monk when
the mind needs to be encouraged on the path of religion. These are
birth (ja ¤ti), ageing (jara ¤), sickness (vya ¤dhi), death (maran .a),
suffering of loss (apa¤yadukkha), suffering of past and future rooted
in the round of rebirth (atî¤te vat>t>amu¤laka dukkha), and the suffering
of the present rooted in the search for nutriment (pacuppanne
a ¤ha ¤rapariyet >t >himu ¤laka dukkha).66 Later in the Visuddhimagga
Buddhaghosa spells out the connection between religious
motivation and fear in more detail.67 First, he looks at knowledge
of appearance as fear (bhayatupat >t >ha ¤naña ¤n .a). To the person who
has this knowledge the formations (sankha ¤ra) and their inevitable
cessation and dissolution appear, in the past, present and future, as
terrible beasts, lions, tigers, yakkhas, rakkhasas, etc. Then follows
knowledge of contemplation of danger (a ¤dî ¤nava ¤nupassana ¤ña ¤n .a)
whereby the three types of becoming (bhava), the four great
elements (maha ¤bhu ¤ta), the five constituent elements (khandha),
the six inner and outer a ¤yatana, i.e. the sense organs and their
objects, the seven types of consciousness (viñña ¤n .a), etc. appear as
terrible dangers such as snakes, murderers, disease, etc. Then, as
the result of seeing everything as great dangers, comes knowledge
of contemplation of dispassion (nibbida ¤nupassana ¤ña ¤n .a).
Finally, there is the knowledge of the desire for deliverance
(muñcitukamyata ¤ña ¤n .a).
According to Buddhaghosa, then, when the monk meditates on
fear he comes to see all formations and all becoming as danger. All
forms that life may take are dangers because everything is
necessarily subject to dissolution and cessation. From seeing all
formations as danger he grows dispassionate. From the dispassion
and detachment arises the desire for deliverance. It is a
commonplace in the Pa ¤li literature that dispassion and detachment
is a prerequisite for – or even a constituent of – religious realization.
Vira ¤ga is often used to achieve nibba ¤na. But in Buddhaghosa’s
exposition of fear dispassion presupposes fear and is a stage in
between fear and the desire for freedom. In fact, says Buddhaghosa,
tradition has it that the three kinds of knowledge leading up to the
knowledge of the desire for deliverance are essentially the same
thing.68 The appearance as fear comprises contemplation of danger
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and contemplation as dispassion. What we are left with, then, is a
complex of fear and contemplation of danger leading up to the
desire for deliverance or nibba ¤na. Religious motivation is in fact a
result of fear in Buddhaghosa’s exposition.
Maha¤ya ¤na Buddhism also has the idea that fear is an essential
motivating factor on the way to embracing the path of the
bodhisattva. S æa ¤ntideva’s Bodhicarya ¤vata ¤ra is apparently meant to
induce such motivation: ‘Realizing that you are like a captive fish,
how right it is for you to be afraid right now’ and ‘Out of the fear of
suffering, and while meditating on the praises, one should create
desire.’69 In meditating on the Buddhas and bodisattvas one should
remain possessed of fear.70 Suffering and fear are indeed
constructive and positive things for S æa ¤ntideva as long as they lead
to the adoption of the religious life:
The virtue of suffering has no rival, since, from the shock it
causes, intoxication falls away and there arises compassion
for those in cyclic existence, fear of evil, and a longing for the
Conqueror.71
The way from fear to the adoption of the life in religious exertion
is described in a vivid and personal manner by the Madhyamaka
scholar. Someone who is taken away to have a limb cut off is seized
with fear and sees the world in a completely different way. But
even this is nothing compared with the fear experienced by the one
who realizes the horrors of sam ≥sa ¤ric existence. It is a tremendous
fear that transforms his life:
With cowering glances I search the four directions for
deliverance. What saint will deliver me from this great fear? /
Right now I go for refuge to the mighty Protectors of the world,
who have undertaken the care of the world, the Conquerors
who remove all fear. / Trembling with fear I give myself to
Samantabhadra, and again freely I give myself to Mañjughos .a.
/ Terrified I cry out in anguish to the Protector Avalokita whose
conduct overflows with compassion. I have done evil. May he
protect me. / I have transgressed your command. Now, at seeing
the danger, terrified, I go to you for refuge. Destroy the danger,
quickly!72
If we return to the S æiks .a ¤ Samuccaya we will find more material
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that shows how fear was thought to be a determining motivating
factor for the adoption of the religious life. Fear is a prominent
theme in the praise of the life of seclusion in the forest. The
bodhisattva who has left the world and dwells in the forest observes
that the life of seclusion alone does not make anybody an ascetic.
Indeed, there are a number of beings who live in the forest – such
as animals, robbers, can .d .a ¤las – and are nevertheless devoid of
ascetic qualities (s æraman .agun .a). So what is the difference between
the bodhisattva and these other forest-dwellers? It is the
bodhisattva’s motivation. He must ask himself: To what end have I
come into the forest? The answer is fear (bhayabhî¤ta):
It was fear that brought me to the forest. Fear of what? The
fear of worldly society, the fear of company; the fear of passion,
hatred, delusion; the fear of pride, intoxication, hypocrisy, pain;
the fear of praise, envy, and jealousy; the fear of form, sound,
smell, taste, touch; I was afraid of the ideas of individuality
and possession, afraid of arrogance and of doubt, afraid of the
Ma ¤ra of the elements of being, the Ma ¤ra of sin, the Ma ¤ra of
death, the Ma ¤ra of the gods;73
S æa¤ntideva’s list continues. The aspiring bodhisattva was frightened
by different kinds of ideas and feelings of worldly life as well as
the prospect of rebirth in hell or other low forms of existence. He
concludes: ‘It was the fear of all such terrible things that led me to
go into the forest.’74
The forest itself, however, is full of fear and dangers, and without
the right attitude to these fears no advancement is possible for the
monk dwelling in the wilderness. A clue to understanding the role
of fear in Buddhism is the determination and skill that is needed to
take advantage of it. For the common man fear is destructive simply
because he is not able to employ it in a constructive way. For the
advanced monk the opposite is the case. A good example of how
fear is thought of as something which must be taken control of and
channelled correctly is found in the summary of the five fears. There
are future or potential fears (ana ¤gatabhaya), which when
contemplated upon (sampassati) should make the monk live to
attain the unattained.75 These are about the dangers that may cause
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the monk’s death in the forest. Animals, for instance, are a prominent
threat to his health:
Take the case of a monk, forest-gone, who reflects thus: I am
now quite alone in the forest; and living here alone, a snake
may bite me, a scorpion may bite me, or a centipede may bite
me, and cause my death; and that would be a hindrance to me.
Behold now, I will put forth energy to attain the unattained, to
master the unmastered, to realize the unrealized.76
The list continues with all the different fears of forest life that may
lead to the death of the monk. Interestingly, the fears include not
only the threat from animals – apart from poisonous creatures, there
are lions, tiger, hyenas, etc. – but also the fear of social breakdown
due to famine and bad crops or the movements of people threatened
by robbers.77 This reveals how even the forest-dwelling monk in
the last instance is dependent on the world for his existence and
religious practice. The point of all these different fears, however,
is to use them in a constructive way. All the fears that are not yet
realized but which the monk can behold in the future (ana ¤gata-
bhaya) must make the monk exert himself (viriyam≥ a ¤rabhati) to
attain the unattained.78 The expectation of horrors should cause a
motivating fear that sets the mind firmly on the right path.
It is clear, then, that in Buddhist literature, both in the Hî ¤naya ¤na
and the Maha ¤ya ¤na, fear is seen as an important means to religious
achievement. However, as far as I have been able to determine,
this is not the case in other Indian soteriologies, except, to some
extent, in Jainism. Of course, there are a great number of traditions
that I have not been able to look at in this brief survey and a more
thorough examination of the role of fear in different branches of
Hinduism may prove me wrong. However, if we accept for now
the assumption that freedom from fear as the goal of the religious
life is a general idea in Indian religions, whereas fear as an essential
means on the way towards the goal is more or less peculiar to
Buddhism, then we may want to ask why this is the case. Why was
Buddhism alone in developing the idea of fear as a primary incentive
to religious striving? To answer this I think we need to look at the
ideas of mission in early Buddhism and the role of fear in missionary
activity.
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The induction of fear: an alternative
view of Buddhist missionary activity
I think it is clear from the discussion above that fear is an important
topic in any discussion of religious motivation in Buddhism. From
the literature I have looked at in this chapter it appears that freedom
from fear is an aim of religious striving in different Indian
soteriologies, whereas the idea of fear as a means to religious
striving – fear as motivation – is found first of all in early Buddhism
and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in Jainism. How did fear come to
have this position in Buddhism? We may find a clue to answering
this question by looking again at the conversion stories in the early
Buddhist literature. Gombrich has pointed out that although the
term ‘skill in means’ (upa ¤yakaus æalya) is of later origin, the skill of
adapting the message to the audience is of enormous importance
in the Pa ¤li canon.79 MacQueen has shown that one of the major
themes of the S æra ¤man .yaphalasu ¤tra is the Buddha’s skill as a
teacher.80 Having quoted passages from the Upa ¤li Su ¤tra in which
the householder Upa ¤li, a lay supporter of the Jains, is converted by
the Buddha to the frustration of Nirgrantha Jña ¤tiputra, MacQueen
says:
So the Buddha was accused of knowing an enticing device
(or, knowing conversion magic: a ¤vat >t >anim ≥ ma ¤yam ≥ ja ¤na ¤ti).
Whether he knew such or not, there is no doubt but that he
must have been a highly skilled teacher.81
In the S æra ¤man .yaphalasu ¤tra, the Buddha employs his skill in
means in converting Aja ¤tas æatru and the Buddhist literature gives
many other examples of the Buddha’s conversion magic. As in the
case of the Jaina lay supporter in the Upa ¤li Su ¤tra, the missionary
activity of the Buddha often takes place at the expense of other
sects and a sense of contest is often reflected in such passages.
Fear is an essential part of some of the paradigmatic conversion
stories in this literature. As we have seen earlier, the biography of
the Buddha himself is the prime example, but fear is also a
prominent factor in the conversion stories of other people. This
makes it natural to ask the question whether the emphasis on fear
could have something to do with the missionary stance of
Buddhism.
In one of the most outspoken expressions of the missionary zeal
of the early Buddhists in the Pa ¤li literature it is evident that fear is
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used as a means to convert new people to the growing movement
of renouncers. In Chapter 2 I looked at the Maha¤vagga of the Vinaya
Pit >aka I.15–20, in which the Buddha tries to win over a group of
matted hair ascetics, jat>ilas, to his movement. The Buddha performs
many wonders in order to show that he is of greater perfection than
his competitors. However, in the Buddha’s competition with the
jat>ilas his magical powers have little effect. The leader of the matted
hair ascetics believes himself to be of greater power and of greater
religious perfection than the Buddha and has no wish to give up
his current practices in order to join the Buddhists. When every
attempt has been made to convert the ascetics the Buddha finally
resorts to his ultimate weapon, namely his ability to induce fear
and unease. The Buddha induces sam ≥vega in the ascetic in order to
convert him to Buddhism. Fear has become a weapon in the
competition for followers; the creation of fear has become an
important means of conversion.
If we look at one of the most important stories of missionary
activity in the Pa ¤li literature – the visit of the Tatha ¤gata to LanVka ¤ in
the first chapter of the Maha ¤vam ≥sa – we get a strong impression of
the importance of fear in the spread of Buddhism to new territories.
In fact, the Maha ¤vam ≥sa sets the visit of the Buddha to Ceylon in
the context of the conversion of the jat >ilas. During the Buddha’s
campaign of proselytizeing among the matted hair ascetics, Kassapa
of Uruvela ¤ prepares for a great sacrifice. The Buddha reads the
mind of Kassapa and sees that he wishes the Buddha to stay away.
This, of course, is part of the competitive stance of the relationship
between the Buddha and the jat >ilas. Instead of appearing at the
sacrifice of Kassapa the Buddha begs for alms and eats a meal, and
then he goes to LanVka¤ because he knows that the island will be a
stronghold of his doctrine. When he arrives there is a great gathering
of yakkhas living on the island:
To this great gathering of the yakkhas went the Blessed One,
and there, in the midst of that assembly, hovering in the air
over their heads, at the place of the (future) MahiyanVgan .a-
Thu ¤pa, he struck terror (sam≥vega) to their hearts by rain, storm,
darkness and so forth. The yakkhas, overwhelmed by fear
(bhaya), besought the fearless Vanquisher (abhaya jina) to
release them from terrors, and the Vanquisher, destroyer of
fear (abhayada), spoke thus to the terrified yakkhas: ‘I will
banish this your fear (bhaya) and your distress (dukkha), O
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yakkhas, give ye here to me with one accord a place where I
may sit down.’ The yakkhas thus answered the Blessed One:
‘We all, O Lord, give you even the whole of our island. Give
us release from our fear.’82
The Buddha descends among the yakkhas and dispels their fears
and the cold and darkness. Then he preaches to the yakkhas, who
are too shaken to put up any resistance, and converts them all to
his Dhamma. In short, the Buddha uses certain techniques to induce
fear (sam ≥vega and bhaya) in the potential converts and when they
are sufficiently perturbed he promises to deliver them from their
fear and distress. It seems that when the early Buddhists went out
to win followers one of their strategies of proselytizeing was to
induce fear in potential converts and, at the same time, offer a path
to fearlessness. (This is, of course, a pattern familiar to social
scientists who study conversion techniques in modern sects.)
This view of Buddhist missionary activity contradicts much of
what has been said about the spread of the Buddha’s Dhamma both
by scholars and by Buddhist texts themselves. It is often said in the
Pa ¤li literature that the behaviour of the monks and nuns is supposed
to bring satisfaction or pleasure (pasa ¤da) to non-believers
(appasanna) and increase the number of believers (pasanna).83
Dutt’s summary of Buddhist missionary activity as relying
exclusively on the excellent personalities of its propagators and
the rationality of its doctrines is typical of a tendency among
scholars to see Buddhism, and, more importantly, all its historical
and geographical manifestations, as inherently peaceful, tolerant
and cognitively pleasing.84 Wijayaratna points out that the Pa ¤li texts
constantly emphasize the need for monks and nuns to exhibit
exemplary behaviour in front of lay people. As he asserts: ‘The
Buddha’s teaching spread thanks to the exemplary conduct of his
disciples.’ 85 Lamotte seems to have had an ambivalent view of the
early spread of Buddhism. On the one hand, he realizes that the
Buddhist missionary activity involved zealous persuasion and even
straightforward frightening of potential converts:
In order to gain the sympathy of the masses, the third century
missionaries exploited the eternal themes of popular preaching,
suitable for striking the imagination and provoking a
psychological shock. The discourses listed by the chronicle
struck all the sensory key-points in turn. The missionaries began
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by commiserating over the wretchedness of humanity,
threatened by hell, condemned from all eternity to old age,
disease and death, a slave to its own body and senses … Then
they celebrated the joy and peace which a virtuous and zealous
man enjoys …’86
Interestingly, Lamotte builds his view of the nature of Buddhist
missions, in part, on the contents of the discourses that the
missionaries are said to have preached to the people of different
countries and ends up with a picture that is very close to that of the
preachers of hellfire and damnation that we are used to from
medieval Christianity. However, on the other hand, he does not
seem to be very comfortable with this position for he changes his
view in the conclusion to the chapter on the Buddhist missions
when he asserts that ‘private initiative played its part in the
missionary movement, but the efforts of individuals fade before
the intrinsic expansionary power of the Good Law which required
nothing more than politically favourable circumstances to manifest
itself.’87
I think the idea that Buddhism spread primarily through its own
inherent qualities is a naive view of missionary activity. The
Buddhist texts themselves do indeed emphasize the exemplary
conduct of the members of the Sam ≥gha and the inherent qualitites
of the Dhamma, but when we try to reconstruct actual Buddhist
missionary activity in Asia a blind trust in such assertions is
misguided. References to ‘fire and brimstone preaching’ are not at
all prominent compared with the references to mendicants who
light up the world with their holiness. But this is only what we
should expect. The few references that contradict the general
impression of peaceful conversions are the most interesting for a
study of religious motivation. It is not altogether unlikely that a
number of references to mission in Buddhist texts might have been
invented or revised in order to make the Dhamma seem like the
natural religion that people of all countries embrace happily,
whereas in reality it was preached with far more fervent techniques
of persuasion.88
As we saw in the simile above, the Dhamma of the Buddha is
supposed to make gods and men tremble and shake – like animals
hearing the roar of the lion – and adopt the religious life which
leads to freedom from fear. Fear is presented as a fact of sam ≥sa ¤ric
existence just like pain or unease (dukkha). We saw above that,
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according to Buddhaghosa, the four noble truths can be understood
as fear (bhaya), the origin of fear (bhayamu ¤la), the freedom from
fear (nibbhaya) and the means to attain this (tadadhigamupa ¤ya). A
characteristic of Buddhist philosophy and soteriology is its stress
on the point of departure. The situation of living beings is one of
pain and fear, the Pa¤li texts say, and they explains what this situation
entails and how it originates. This emphasis on the point of
departure, the situation from which one must seek deliverance, gave
early Buddhism a particularly dynamic missionary stance. The sense
of urgency created in potential converts through this strategy
probably made them more receptive to the missionary efforts of
the Buddhists.
The weapon of fear has been part of the missionary arsenal of
Buddhists and perhaps other Indian traditions, but again fear is
worthless without its negation, freedom from fear, and the ability
to induce fear must be seen in conjunction with the ability to relieve
fear and soothe the minds of people in distress. The Buddha induces
fear and he is the bestower of fearlessness (abhayada), as the
Maha ¤vam ≥sa says. According to Maha ¤ya ¤na mythology, Avalokit-
es ævara typically bestows fearlessness on terrified beings (bhî ¤ta¤na ¤m ≥
sattva ¤na ¤m ≥ abhayam ≥ dada ¤ti) and a common epithet of this popular
bodhisattva is abhayada.89 Another figure of the Maha ¤ya ¤na
pantheon who is associated with freedom from fear is Amogha-
siddhi. He is the one of the Dhya ¤nî ¤ Buddhas and is depicted
iconographically with his right hand showing the sign of no fear,
abhayamudra ¤.
We may note that the gift of no fear (abhayada¤na) is an important
aspect of the life of the Indian renouncer in the Hindu tradition too,
although here it takes on a very different role. The renouncer must
give the gift of no fear to all beings. The Ha ¤rî ¤tasmr ≥ti, for instance,
prescribes the vow of abhaya towards all beings for the person
who is about to become a sam ≥nya ¤sin.90 Sprockhoff has discussed
the gift of no fear in the context of the adoption of the life of a
sam ≥nya ¤sin (sam ≥nya ¤sasvî ¤ka ¤ra). According to Sprockhoff the
sam ≥nya ¤sa ceremony has three core elements, among which is the
gift of no fear to all beings.91
Conclusion
Fear is an essential aspect of sam ≥sa¤ric existence and the goal of the
life of the renouncer is attaining the stage at which there is freedom
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from fear. Fear is, in other words, a painful thing from which human
beings should try to free themselves. On the other hand, fear is
absolutely necessary. Without fear nobody would strive for religious
realization. Without fear nobody would exert themselves to achieve
deliverance from fear. Thus, fear becomes a sine qua non of religious
motivation in many Buddhist texts.
The point of departure for this chapter was the initial appearance
of a contradiction in the treatment of fear in Indian religions and,
in particular, in Buddhism. The solution to this puzzle is the fact
that fear has very different functions under different circumstances:
it is the talents and discipline of the individual that makes the
difference. The advanced are able to apply fear in a constructive
way, as a motivating factor in their religious life. In those who are
not able to channel fear into religious motivation it is just a
confusing and destructive feeling creating problems in everyday
life.
I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that the links between
fear and religion have been a valid topic of scholarly investigation
in anthropology and psychology in the West. In a study that attempts
to say something about experiences which are so basic to human
existence across cultures it seems reasonable to return to a general
angle of approach in the concluding comments. We saw that fear
of sickness and death was a basic idea in the Buddhist material I
have examined. If we adopt a bird’s-eye view of human religiosity,
it seems that fear is a basic factor of human emotional life but that,
although it is addressed by religious doctrine, there does not seem
to be a straightforward relationship between beliefs and fear. To
put this statement in perspective let us look at some data from a
non-Indian context. The relationship between fear of death and
religiosity has been the point of departure for a substantial number
of social scientific studies in a modern Western, in most cases
Protestant Christian, setting. Still, the relationship is an elusive one
and no certainty has been achieved as to the exact correlations or
the possible causal connections because there have been a number
of different findings. Some researchers have discovered negative
correlations between religiosity and fear, others have found positive
correlations, and others again have not found any significant
correlation whatsoever. The confusion is due to different methods,
different definitions of fear or religiosity and different samples in
the different studies. One serious shortcoming is the lack of
distinction between different aspects of fear of death and religion.
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In the studies that have taken this problem seriously, however, it
seems that one can detect a certain negative correlation between
religiosity and the fear of at least certain aspects of death. Hoelter
and Epley, for instance, broke fear of death into distinct
dimensions.92 Using their multidimensional scale they found that
religious people are less likely to fear the unknown aspects of death.
They suggested that religiosity may serve to reduce these aspects
of fear by dealing directly with them through the belief system.93 A
more recent study by Thorson and Powell concluded that people
who are more religious are less concerned with death. In their study
those who had more anxiety concerning death were lower in
religiosity.94 These researchers also used a multidimensional scale,
which brought out some of the subtler points of their findings. For
instance, it seems that one reason for the lower anxiety among the
more religious is the fact that they look forward to an afterlife.95 A
negative correlation between fear of death and belief in an afterlife
is also reported by Osarchuk and Tatz.96
If we compare these modern Christian examples with our ancient
Indian texts we have two large and multifarious religious traditions
in different times and with fundamentally different beliefs about
the nature of life, death and possible afterlives, and still one
unambiguous parallel between the two is their preoccupation with
and anxiety about death. As the Christian cases show, although the
belief in an afterlife in heaven may make some people less anxious
about death, clear correlations between beliefs and emotions in this
area are more or less impossible to come by. Fear of death seems to
be a universal phenomenon, and a prime undertaking of religious
doctrines is to address this fear. Still, at least as far as the limited
samples in this chapter are concerned, fear of death does not seem
to vary significantly with different beliefs.
First of all, it seems unlikely that the double role of fear identified
in Indian – and in particular Buddhist – material is exclusive to the
religions under investigation here. I would think that fear could be
both an aspect of the miserable state of human beings on earth and,
at the same time, the motivational basis for religious striving,
independently of the actual belief system in question. In order to
complete the full circle we may return to the great Western writer
on religious fear, Kierkegaard. For Kierkegaard despair and anxiety
were key concepts of his religiosity. According to Kierkegaard, the
possibility of despair is man’s advantage over the beasts because it
implies spirit, to become aware of the despair is the Christian’s
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advantage over the natural man, and finally, to be healed of the
sickness of despair is the Christian’s bliss.97 By acting on feelings
of despair and anxiety and by embracing the Christian message a
person can free himself from despair. In other words, despair
becomes a motor in a religious process for Kierkegaard. It seems,
then, that the role of fear as a motivating factor in religious life is





AND THE MERIT OF
GIVING
In Chapter 2, I suggested that the early Buddhist Sam ≥gha changed
from a conversionist to an introversionist relationship to the world
at least partly because a number of people joined the Sam ≥gha for
the wrong reasons. They did not have the right religious motivation
for being monks or nuns and therefore they damaged the image of
the Sam ≥gha among lay people. The right image was important
because the Sam ≥gha depended on the world outside for protection
and for material support. In this chapter I wish to take a closer look
at the metaphysical and ideological foundation of the relationship
between Sam ≥gha and laity by looking at the ritual of giving to the
Order of monks.
Any attempt to understand the social psychology of the
relationship between the Buddhist Sam ≥gha and the laity must take
into account the institution of giving. The thesis I wish to put
forward here is that the classical Buddhist worldview contains
fundamental contradictions that threaten to surface in the ritual of
giving and receiving. In discussing these contradictions I hope to
illuminate the ambivalent relationship between the monk and lay
person, between Sam ≥gha and laity, that I looked at in Chapter 2.
Thus, I wish to continue my discussion of the fundamental issues
of religious motivation in Buddhism from a slightly different angle
from the previous chapters.
The general observation about the ambiguity of giving in Indian
religions is not original. Indeed, the most puzzling character of the
gift in an Indian setting is its ambiguity; several writers have pointed
out that the Brahmin is reluctant to receive gifts. Manu has a long
list of hells with telling names – ‘Excessively burning’, ‘Crushing’,
‘Iron Spike’, ‘Forest of Sword Leaves’, etc. – that the unlucky
Brahmin must visit if he were to accept gifts from the wrong person.1
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The trouble with the gift for the Brahmin is that it forms unwanted
bonds of dependency vis-à-vis the king, as Mauss observed in his
classic study.2 But there is more to it than that. From the recipient’s
point of view the gift is potentially poisonous. The gift contains
impurity, according to the writers who followed the Dumontian
paradigm. Heesterman argued that the Brahmin officiant in Vedic
times took over the death-impurity of the patron by accepting gifts,
but that this role was fundamentally changed through the
individualization of the ritual.3 Parry says that the Brahmins of
Benares become living sewers as they received the death-impurity
of mourners conveyed in the gift.4 The poison in the gift is really
inauspiciousness (na ¤s æubh), says Raheja in an important challenge
to the Dumontian sociology of hierarchy based on impurity
(a ¤s æauca).5 Thus, new generations of sociologists and anthropol-
ogists were able to show that Mauss had been unable to account
for the uniqueness of the Indian gift because he did not grasp the
peculiar metaphysics of impurity or inauspiciousness.
There are two specific contradictions in the idea of the gift that
I wish to discuss here. First, there is a contradiction in how the
relationship between the giver and the recipient is perceived. On
the one hand, the gift is seen as a sacrifice and the renouncer has
taken the place of the gods on earth. On the other hand, it is seen as
a charitable gift and the renouncer is a beggar. Second, there is a
contradiction concerning the fundamental ethics of giving. On the
one hand, the qualities of the recipient are thought to determine the
merit of the gift. On the other hand, the intention of the giver is
supposed to determine the merit earned. These two contradictions
are interlinked. They may threaten to undermine the relationship
between the renouncer and the householder. If it is the intention
behind the gift that determines its results for the giver, there is no
reason to distinguish between different types of recipients. Why,
then, should anyone give to the renouncer? However, these
contradictions seem to have been used creatively to invest all gifts
with merit. When the gift is seen as a sacrifice the excellent qualities
of the recipients are in the foreground. When the gift is seen as
charity it is the good intentions of the giver that are highlighted.
The good qualitites of the recipient ensure the merit in an act of
sacrifice whereas the bad qualities of the recipient do not affect the
merit in an act of charity. Gifts are never in vain if the giver can
switch between the two alternative merit-making mechanisms as
he pleases.
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Gift giving in Indian religion could be broken down and analysed
in at least five parts. This is what the two main Jain traditions tend
to do. They distinguish between the recipient (pa ¤tra), the giver
(da ¤tr ≥), the thing given (da ¤tavya, dravya), the manner of giving
(da ¤navidhi) and the result of giving (da ¤naphala).6 I wish to
illuminate the relationship between the recipient and the giver.
Therefore, I will limit my study to these two factors. I will refrain
from going into the metaphysics of the thing given and engage
instead in discussions about whether the giver gives part of himself
in the gift and what sort of substance or quality may be conveyed.
My main material will be some central works on giving in
Buddhist and Hindu literature: first, Pa ¤li Buddhist texts such as the
Khandhakas of the Vinaya Pit>akas, the Dakkhin .a¤vibhanVgasutta and
the Petavatthu; second, the Dharmas æa ¤stras, the Dharmasu¤tras and
the Anus æa ¤sanaparvan and the Bhagavdgî¤ta ¤ of the Maha ¤bha ¤rata;
third, I will use mainly secondary material to look at some ideas
about giving in Jainism. I will also use inscriptions to some extent
and draw on relevant ethnographic material. By looking at these
texts I wish only to illuminate the contradictions mentioned above
and have no intention of presenting an exhaustive analysis of the
vast Indian literature on giving, a survey of which can be found in
Kane’s study of the dharmas æa¤stra literature.
The giver
First, I will take a brief look at the giver in a Buddhist setting. In
the collection of his articles on the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism,
Gregory Schopen uses the evidence of inscriptions to show that
the majority of donors to the Sam≥gha were in fact monks and nuns
themselves.7 This should make scholars devote more attention to
the different forms of religious motivation among the members of
the Sam ≥gha. Here, however, I am primarily interested in lay people
as donors, because my overall aim is to investigate the dynamics
in the relationship between the religious group and the outside world
in order to understand the motivation that made people make the
radical move from the world to the Sam≥gha.  In theory, the members
of the Sam ≥gha are superior to the lay person in every way and they
deserve unconditional respect and support. The lay person’s
potential power vis-à-vis the monks is suggestive of the ambiguous
nature of their relationship. The Buddhist literature in Pa ¤li has a
number of different accounts that show how lay people have been
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in a position to influence not only individual decisions of the monks
but the whole structure of the Buddhist Sam≥gha. This power derives
from the monks’ dependency on the support of the laity. For
instance, in the Maha ¤vagga X there is a story about a monk of
Kosambî¤ who is suspended for a certain offence. The monk does
not accept his punishment and a group of monks takes his side
against the group that has suspended him and a dispute arises in
the Sam ≥gha. There are attempts to solve the dispute within the
Sam ≥gha, and the Buddha is drawn into the problems, but the matter
is not settled until the lay followers of Kosambî ¤ also flex their
muscles against the Sam ≥gha. They decide to put pressure on the
trouble-making monks by withdrawing all their respect and
offerings. From the Pa¤li literature it is clear that this kind of pressure
from lay people had to be taken seriously. When in Maha ¤vagga
I.43 (MV I.43) a thief goes forth among the monks, people talk
negatively about this.8 The Sam ≥gha is forced to react to the criticism
from members of the laity because they are materially dependent
on them. In MV II.2 the monks gather on the fourteenth, fifteenth
and eighth days of the half-month. People come up to them to hear
Dhamma but the monks sit in silence. The people get angry and
ask how the monks can sit in silence like dumb pigs (mu¤gasu¤khara ¤).
To meet the negative feedback, the Buddha orders the monks to
recite Dhamma. In MV I.25 monks go begging wrongly dressed
and they are greedy and eat in an unbecoming manner. People react
negatively to their bad behaviour, and because of their reactions
the Buddha allows preceptors. In MV I.32 the monks are subject to
criticism when they behave badly after their preceptors leave or
die, so the Buddha allows teachers in order to meet the criticism.
In the MV II monks walk around during all seasons, including the
rains, trampling down crops and grasses and destroying many little
creatures. People react to this and as a consequence the Buddha
makes rules for life during the rainy season. This sequence of events
is repeated again and again in the Khandhaka section of the Vinaya
Pit >aka, and I discussed some of this material in Chapter 2.
The point is that there appears, from the Pa ¤li texts, to have been
a constant pressure from the laity on the monks to behave according
to the rules. The tension between givers and recipients also seems
to be a prominent feature of Therava ¤da Buddhist sociology of
modern times. As Spiro observed of Buddhism in Burma, to
persistently maintain a class of human beings as demigods and
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watch them live in luxury and ease while one toils in the fields
must create ambivalence towards the monks.9
It is clear that the giver has certain powers vis-à-vis the recipients
in Indian religions. Communities of renouncers are dependent on
the society for their subsistence and the householders or lay people
are in a position to withdraw support if the recipient does not satisfy
certain criteria. On the other hand, the giver, too, must have certain
qualities. Texts on giving from the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain
traditions emphasize that the person who gives alms must have the
correct attitude towards the recipient. The Digambaras have
established a set of qualities that should be present in a worthy
giver of gifts. These are: faith (s æraddha ¤), which means confidence
in the results of the donation; devotion (bhakti), which means love
for the virtues of the recipient; contentment or joy in giving (tus .t >i);
zeal (sattva) in giving; disinterestedness or lack of desire for worldly
rewards (lobhaparitya¤ga); and patience (ks.ama¤).10 The S æveta¤mbaras
have several different lists of qualities in a giver. Among the
qualities given by one such list, in the Tattva ¤rthabha ¤s .ya, we find
the word aparibha ¤vitva¤. This word is from the root pari-bhu ¤ which
carries meanings such as ‘be superior to’, ‘subdue’, ‘despise’, etc.
Williams translates aparibha ¤vitva ¤ as ‘absence of condescension
towards the recipient’.11 In other words, the giver should have a
frame of mind in which he does not think of himself as superior to
the recipient. The condescension that naturally arises in the
charitable donor towards the beggar would undermine the structure
of the relationship between monk and lay person if it were allowed
to exist and be expressed.
Why does the giver give gifts? Indian religions share a belief in
rebirth. When a living being dies, some part of it does not disappear
with the physical body but is reborn in a new state. If one has
acquired merit, in Pa ¤li, puñña, one is reborn as a human being or
as a god in a world of gods, devaloka. If one has acted badly and
not acquired merit, one is reborn as a lower life form or in a dreadful
hell. Therefore, it is important to earn merit. In Buddhist texts there
is often said to be three ways of doing this: da ¤na, giving, sî¤la,
good conduct, and bha ¤vana ¤, contemplation. Each of these is a
puññakiriyavatthu, a thing that leads to merit. Admittedly, the issue
of merit is not always explicitly brought out in Buddhist material
on giving. Paranavitana has collected over 1,200 inscriptions in
Ceylon made between 300 BC and AD 100 registering donations,
THE MERIT OF GIVING
102
often of caves, to the Sam ≥gha. Here donors give their names and
often their relation to a member of the Order. However, no mention
is made of the desire to gain merit. If they say anything at all about
their motivation, the donors simply state that they give gifts for the
benefit of the Sam≥gha.12 Respect for, and devotion towards, the
Buddhist Sam ≥gha is undoubtedly an important motivational factor.
Still, it is reasonable to say that the idea of merit making is the
metaphysical foundation of such donations.
The giver gives in order to acquire merit. Acquiring merit may
lead to a favourable rebirth. However, in order to attain salvation
in a real sense, one must, first, be reborn in the state of a human
being, in which neither pain nor pleasure is too overwhelming to
contemplate salvation, and, second, follow the right practice. This
cannot be done as a householder. The Buddha said: ‘Vaccha, there
is no householder who, without abandoning the fetter of
householdship, on the dissolution of the body has made an end of
suffering.’13 To attain Nirva ¤n .a one must first of all become a monk
or nun.14 However, says the Buddha, a very large number of
householders have gone to heaven on the dissolution of the body.
The idea of merit making was pan-Indian. In the numerous
inscriptions recording grants of land to Brahmins during the late
fifth century AD the merit acquired from the gifts was thought to
‘erect a ladder leading to heaven (svargasopa ¤napan Vkti).’15 Another
standard phrase accompanying grants was that the donation was
given to increase the merit (pun .ya) for mother, father and self and
in order to obtain a reward (phala) both in this world and in the
next.16 Often, grants of land are thought to ensure 60,000 years in
heaven for the giver, but merit is never thought of as leading to
complete salvation. Against the ethics of merit and favourable
rebirth stands the path of the uncompromising salvation-seeker.
Whereas the lay person needs to do good deeds, the ascetic aims at
doing nothing. The essential question of what doing nothing really
means is answered in different ways by different religions in India.
Through some form of ascetic practice the monk or renouncer can
stop the influx or generation of new karma and get rid of karma
that has been accumulated from earlier actions. To the ascetic, merit
is basically no better than demerit because both tie him to sam ≥sa ¤ra.
The medieval Jain author Kunda Kunda said: ‘A gold fetter binds a
person as much as an iron one. Similarly good or bad deeds
performed bind the soul.’17
Let us look briefly at some Jain ideals of giving to illuminate
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the difference between the ethics of the lay person and the ascetic.
It has been noted that there is a paradox in the way that Jains practise
the da ¤navrata, the vow of giving.18 Reynells suggested that when
ostentatiously donating costly gifts, wealthy Jains seem to be
breaking the vow of aparigraha, non-attachment to worldly
possessions.19 Norman has picked up this topic and tried to show
that no paradox is involved.20 There is no canonical injunction
against giving openly, he says. One could also point out that several
prominent Jain authors have listed ostentatious giving as the practice
of a good layman, and Williams has shown that this is the case.
In Digambara Jain classifications of giving, da ¤na or datti, the
concept of samadatti, gifts to equals, is one type.21 According to
the medieval Jain teacher Jinasena, the celebrated author of the
Maha ¤pura ¤n .a, samadatti is the giving away of gifts, such as land,
gold, horses, elephants, chariots and daughters, to a recipient who
is equal to oneself in terms of status and piousness. Another
medieval Jain author, A¤s æa¤dhara, distinguishes between gifts that
are made for the sake of one’s well-being in a future life and gifts
that are made for one’s well-being in this life. To the last category
belong the flashy gifts such as gold, horses, elephants and
daughters.22 The distinctions between alms-giving and ostentatious
giving are not clear-cut. There is no reason why an ostentatious act
of giving should be less meritorious, as long as the giver has the
qualitites that are required, among which are, admittedly,
disinterestedness.23 Hemacandra, who sets the standards for
S æveta ¤mbara s æra ¤vaka ¤ca ¤ra with his Yogas æa¤stra, also seems to pre-
scribe a certain degree of lavishness. If one does not sow wealth
openly and constantly, one cannot achieve the right conduct, he
says.24 As Cort has pointed out, it seems that we can get a deeper
understanding of Jain giving if we realize that there is an alternative
ideological framework that centres on well-being and balanced
living in society, including, of course, piousness and alms-giving,
rather than isolation and moks .a.25
Giving produces merit for the giver. However, in some Buddhist
texts we are told that it is possible to transfer to others the merit
that is earned by giving to the Sam ≥gha. This is illustrated by the
story of Nanda ¤ in the Petavatthu. Nanda ¤ was the wife of the
householder Nandasena who lived in a village not far from Sa¤vatthî ¤.
Nanda ¤ was irreligious and disrespectful toward her husband, and
when she died, she was reborn as a petî ¤, an ugly and suffering
ghost. One day Nandasena meets the ghost who had been his wife
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in a previous life. At first, the widower does not recognize his
beloved behind the terrible appearance of the petî ¤, but when she
tells him her story, he wishes to lead her home and give her food
and clothes and let her see her children. However, Nanda¤ knows
that her husband would not be able to help her in a direct way:
What is given by your hand into mine does not profit me. But
as regards the monks, who are abounding in the moral precepts,
free from passion, and learned, / Regale them with food and
drink and transfer to me the benefit of the gift. Then I shall be
happy, blest in the fulfilment of all desires.26
Nandasena follows his wife’s advice and makes abundant gifts to
the monks and transfers the merit to Nanda ¤. As a result she is able
to come out of the world of petas and join her husband and enjoy
food and wear clothes. The practice of merit transference clearly
contradicts the Buddhist theory of karma, which says that an
individual is totally responsible for all his acts and must bear their
consequences alone. One’s fate after death cannot be influenced
by others, according to canonical Buddhism.
It is the same for Hindu cosmology. According to Manu: ‘A
living creature is born alone and alone he dies; he alone reaps the
benefits of good deeds and the consequences of bad deeds.’27 Still,
we find the practice of merit transference abundantly documented
in Hindu sources. We have a large number of inscriptions from the
late fifth century AD, or the late Gupta period, collected by J. F.
Fleet, recording grants of land to Brahmins. The motivation behind
the donations are often explicitly stated and are essentially the same
as in Buddhist and Jain sources. One, Maha¤ra¤ja Hastin, has recorded
a number of grants of land to Brahmins and he always gives the
same motivation for doing so: he wishes to increase the merit of
himself and of his parents.28 The Maha¤ra¤ja Jayana¤tha gives the same
reasons for giving grants of land to Brahmins: it is for the increase
of his own merit (svapun .ya ¤bhivr ≥ddhaye) and for the benefit of the
feet of the Lord (Bhagavatpa¤da), i.e. Vis .n .u. Another, Dhanyavis .n.u,
says that he has built a temple to Vis .n.u the Boar in order to increase
the merit of his parents.29 And another, Ma¤tr ≥chet >a, says that he has
built a stone temple to the sun in order to increase the religious
merit of himself and his parents. But religious merit cannot only
be transferred over one generation. Almost all the records of grants
of land to Brahmins state that the merit produced by a gift of land
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is not exclusive to the original donor but is shared by all his
predecessors as long as they do not reclaim the land, in which case
they go to hell for an extended period.30
The Jains have always insisted that acts and their fruits are
exclusively the responsibility of the individual. In the words of the
tenth century a ¤ca ¤rya Amitagati: ‘Except for karma earned for
oneself by oneself, no one gives anything to anyone.’31 According
to P. S. Jaini, the Jains have been able to keep out practices that
contradict the individual idea of karma such as s æra ¤ddha and trans-
ference of merit.32 Why did the practice creep into Buddhism? It
has been suggested that the transference of merit in Therava ¤da
Buddhism was a borrowing from Maha ¤ya ¤na doctrine in which
bodhisattvas can save others by their enormous store of merit.33
According to Gombrich, however, the practice of merit transference
originated out of emotional needs to escape the responsibility of
orthodox karma doctrine. By transferring merit one could improve
the situation of dead relatives, and one’s own state after death could
be influenced in the same way. When dead relatives received merit,
they were thought to say ‘thank you’, anumodati. Orthodox writers
wished to integrate the practice with the laws of karma. They said
that in reality no merit was transferred and the dead did not give
thanks; they simply rejoiced in the good deed. Anumodana meant
rejoicing not thanking.34 However, the orthodox solution does not
necessarily destroy all hopes that one can influence the karma of
others. When one can rejoice in the good deeds of other people to
the extent that one is reborn as a god, what does it matter that one
cannot really give gifts of merit? This seems to be the attitude among
many Therava ¤da Buddhists of today.
The recipient
The first lay followers of the Buddha were the two merchants,
Tripusa and Bhallika, who chanced to pass by the place where the
Buddha was sitting right after his enlightenment. When Tripusa
and Bhallika presented the Buddha with food, it was for their
welfare, benefit and happiness for a long time (dî ¤rghara ¤tram
artha ¤ya hita ¤ya sukha¤ya) says the Catus .paris .atsu¤tra. Moreover, the
Buddha accepted the alms for the welfare of beings (hita ¤ya
pra ¤n .ina ¤m). When receiving alms, the Sam ≥gha does the favour of
giving the laity the opportunity of earning merit. Under special
circumstances, the Sam ≥gha may refuse to accept the alms of a lay
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follower. In Cullavagga V.20 the begging bowl is turned upside
down on the lay follower Licchavi Vad .d .ha, and he is suspended
from eating with the Sam ≥gha. He has lied about the chastity of the
venerable Dabba the Mallian and the Buddha decides the proper
reaction. It is A¤nanda who informs the transgressor about his
punishment. The Buddha has decreed that if a lay follower is
possessed of certain bad qualities, the monks should turn the
begging bowl on him, in other words they shall refuse to accept
alms from him. This means that he cannot earn merit, and one can
easily imagine that it also means social disgrace. Evidently, the
turning upside down of the begging bowl on a lay follower was
quite a penalty, for when A¤nanda told Vad .d .ha about the decision of
the Sam ≥gha the poor man fainted and fell on that very spot.
Fortunately for the Licchavi, the Buddha also allows the monks to
turn upright the bowl on a lay follower.35
The renouncers, whether Hindu, Buddhist or Jain, often seem
to be under some sort of obligation to accept the gifts presented to
them. In order not to accept there must be some fault in the giver or
the gift that makes the giving valueless or harmful. The opportunity
to give is at the same time an opportunity to invest in the future for
the donor. What is given is thought to increase manifold either in
this life or in the next. In the Hindu Dharmas æa¤stra literature, as
well as in the Anus æa ¤sanaparvan, there is often some sort of assoc-
iation between what is given and what is received later as a result
of the gift. If one gives a lamp, one may get good eyesight in the
next life; if one gives a pair of sandals, one may get an excellent
vehicle for travelling; if one gives food, one will get to eat in the
world beyond; if one gives the gift of non-injury to beings, one
will enjoy excellent health, etc. Gifts are investments, and their
interest rates may be extremely high, if we are to believe Brahmin
and monk writers.
In spite of the obligation to receive gifts, a recurring theme in
the behaviour and the ideology of the recipient is an initial
unwillingness to accept. Here we touch on the fundamental
ambiguity of the institutionalized giving. Marcel Mauss observed:
The recipient puts himself in a position of dependence vis-à-
vis the donor. This is why the Brahmin must not ‘accept’ gifts,
and even less solicit them, from the king, and would demean
himself if he did anything other than take gifts.36
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For the Brahmin the gift is dangerous to accept, Mauss says, because
of the bonds that are established in the gift. The same danger is
found in Buddhism and Jainism. The monks do not solicit gifts,
they only put themselves in a position in which it is convenient to
give them food. There is a constant need to maintain the fiction
that the Brahmin, the ascetic or the monk is not dependent on the
householder and that the asymmetry in the relationship between
giver and recipient is the natural thing. The recipient reluctantly
accepts what is offered as a favour to the giver. Laidlaw observes
that for the Jains the giving to the renouncer does not really take
place. By denying that supatradan, gift to the good recipient, is a
dan (gift), the householder frees the renouncer from any
dependency.37
We saw that the giver is expected to possess certain qualities.
The same is the case for the recipient. In his exposition of the
Sam ≥gha the great Buddhist writer Buddhaghosa explains that a gift
is something given with thoughts of the next world.38 The wish for,
and the possibility of, acquiring merit for the next world by giving
to monks is the basis for the institution of alms-giving. The idea of
the Buddhist monks and the Sam ≥gha as a field of merit (puñ-
ñakkhetta) is found in a number of Pa ¤li texts, both canonical and
post-canonical. In the Pa¤t>ika Suttanta the Buddha says that the Order
should be respected and revered and given gifts and homage; it is
the world’s unsurpassed field of merit.39 Likewise, in the SanVgî ¤ti
Suttanta the Sam ≥gha is again described as the world’s unsurpassed
field of merit.40 In the first story of the Petavatthu the field of merit,
embodied in one monk, provides the opportunity to achieve a good
rebirth in a seemingly mechanistic and straightforward manner.
Here the elder Moggalla ¤na sees a thief who is about to be executed.
In order to save him from rebirth in hell, the monk approaches the
thief and accepts a gift of sweetmeat and water from him, and
because Moggalla¤na is an unsurpassed field of merit the thief is
reborn in a world of gods. According to the Petavatthu, the Buddha
explained how this is possible in the following manner: ‘Like unto
fields are the Arahants; the givers are like unto farmers; resembling
seed is the gift; from this is produced fruit.’41 Buddhaghosa
explained the meaning of the concept of field of merit in his chapter
on the Sam ≥gha.42 He says that the Sam≥gha is called ‘The world’s
unsurpassed field of merit’ because the Sam ≥gha is a place where
the merit of the world can grow. Just as the field where the king or
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his councillor sows rice or barley is called ‘the rice or barley field
of the king’, in the same way the Sam ≥gha is a field for the growing
of merit. The Jains also have the idea of the Order of monks as a
field of merit. According to Williams, the early Jain author
Haribhadra uses the term ks .etra in this sense twice in his Dharma-
bindhu.43 The great medieval writer Hemacandra enumerates seven
ks .etras in which the layman should sow his wealth. These are Jain
images, Jain temples, Jain scriptures, monks, nuns, laymen and
laywomen.
The lay person can sow good deeds in the field of merit, but the
quality of the soil determines the harvest. In Therava ¤da Buddhism,
the qualities of the recipient of a gift are often said to determine the
merit that the gift produces for the donor. For a gift to be efficient
in terms of merit, the monks should, first of all, be of pure conduct.
There is also the idea that the longer a person has been a monk, the
greater is the merit produced from giving him alms. The Cullavagga
IV is concerned with questions of the purity and dignity of the
Sam ≥gha in the eyes of monks and lay people. For instance, one
story tells about a group of monks who are constantly offered
inferior food by householders because they are newly ordained and
of little merit. One day these monks go to a meal and the householder
giving the meal makes them sit on the porch and gives them only
broken rice and sour gruel. Naturally, the newly ordained monks
are not happy about their treatment.
According to the Dakkhin .a ¤vibhan Vgasutta, the Buddha disting-
uished between gifts to individuals and to the Sam ≥gha.44 Gifts to
individuals (pa ¤t>ipuggalika ¤ dakkhin .a ¤) are of fourteen types. The
first type is to a Tatha ¤gata and the last type is to those who have
been reborn as animals (tiraccha ¤nagata). Between these two
extremes there are a number of different individuals to which one
may donate. Gifts given to those reborn as animals increase a
hundredfold, whereas a gift to a Tatha ¤gata is meritorious beyond
expression. The same hierarchy of recipients and merit are found
in modern Burmese Buddhism. The feeding of a hundred dogs is
equivalent in merit to feeding one human being, the feeding of one
lay person is equivalent to one novice, a hundred novices equals
one monk, etc.45 In the Dakkhin .a ¤vibhan Vgasutta donations to the
Sam≥gha are of seven types. These are distinguished by three criteria:
whether the Buddha is the leader of the Sam ≥gha or the donation
takes place after his death; whether one gives to the whole Sam≥gha
or only to parts of it; and whether it is given to monks or nuns.
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Never is a gift to an individual of greater fruit (mahapphalataram)
than a gift to the Sam ≥gha as a whole. But, says the same text, gifts
can be given by worthy donors to unworthy recipients because the
gift is purified or hallowed (visujjhati) by the giver (da ¤yaka). Even
if a gift is given by an unworthy donor to an unworthy recipient, it
is still fruitful, says the Buddha. Here we are at the heart of the
ideology of gift giving. The Dakkhin .a ¤vibhan Vgasutta uses the
contradictory ideas of merit making to show that gifts are
meritorious under all circumstances.
In Jainism there have been different opinions on the question,
but in general Jains use a fivefold classification of recipients set
out by the medieval writers Amr ≥tacandra, Amitagati, Vasunandin
and A¤s æa ¤dhara. In their list the best recipient is the Jain ascetic, the
next best is a Jain layman who is on his way up the scale of religious
realization that at some point ends in monkhood, the least
satisfactory recipient is a non-practising layman who has the right
belief, a poor recipient is a person of righteous life but without the
right belief and the wrong recipient is person devoid of both right
belief and good conduct.46 Another important Jain author,
Somadeva, has a list of different recipients based on the aspect of
the religion in which they specialize. Astrologers and specialists in
practical sciences constitute one type, orators and debaters and
writers another type, etc.
A similar hierarchical order of gift and merit is found in
Hinduism. Manu says ‘A gift to a non-priest yields the basic
(reward); to someone who says he is a priest, double; to a teacher,
a hundred thousand (times); and to one who has crossed to the far
shore of the Veda, endless (reward). For a small or great reward for
a gift is obtained after death according to the particular qualities
and the amount of faith of the recipient.’47 This is a basic theme in
the Dharmas æa ¤stra literature. The Yajñavalkyasmr ≥ti says that both
asceticism (tapas) and learning (vidya¤) must be present for a person
to be worthy of a gift. A person who lacks either must not accept
donations.48 Right learning and right conduct seem to be two general
qualities that should be present in the recipient of a gift in Hindu
thought. Manu says that a king must ascertain the presence of
learning and virtue (s ærutavr ≥tta) in an ascetic in his realm. If these
qualities are present, the king must protect him in every way, like a
father protects a son.49 When the king has confiscated the property
of criminals, he may choose to give it to a Brahmin who is possessed
of learning and virtue (s ærutavr ≥ttopapanna).50 As the farmer who
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sows seed in barren soil reaps no harvest, so the donor who gives
the offering to someone ignorant of the Rg Veda obtains no fruit.51
Manu has long lists of those who are unworthy of offerings.52
In the Maha ¤bha ¤rata, Bhî ¤s .ma tells Yudhis .t >hira that a priest of
the sacrifice (r ≥tvij), a family priest (purohita), a teacher, a disciple,
relatives and kinsmen can be considered worthy of worship and
honour if they are furnished with learning and virtue (s ærutavr ≥t-
topasam ≥hita).53 Other important qualities in a recipient, according
to Bhî ¤s .ma, are absence of anger (akrodha), truthfulness in words
(satyavacana), non-injury to beings (ahim ≥sa ¤), self-control (dama),
sincerity (a ¤rjava), absence of malice (adroha), absence of pride
(na ¤tima ¤na), modesty (hrî¤), patience (titiks.a), asceticism (tapas) and
tranquillity (s æama). A person who has these qualities is considered
to be the right recipient (pa ¤tra).54 The quality of ahim ≥sa ¤ is often
said to be a necessary quality of a worthy recipient of gifts in the
Anus æa ¤sanaparvan. Non-injury to others is associated with one’s
own health.55 Moreover, the accepting of gifts is surrounded by a
number of rules. If one accepts gifts without observing these rules,
it will have disastrous consequences: ‘If he does not know the rules
regarding the law for accepting material objects, a wise man should
not accept (gifts), even if he is fainting with hunger. An ignorant
man who goes about accepting gold, land, a horse, a cow, food,
clothing, sesame seeds and clarified butter is reduced to ashes, as
if he were wood.’56
M. E. Spiro says that the Burmese have reversed the relationship
between donor and recipient in that the merit in giving derives from
the spiritual qualities of the recipient, not from the qualities of the
donor.57 As we have seen, this is no reversal or innovation, but is
an essential aspect of the idea of giving in Buddhism, Jainism and
Hinduism. Perhaps the most telling examples of this are found in
stories in Buddhist literature in which thieves and murderers are
reborn in heaven because they give gifts to prominent members of
the Sam ≥gha.
Sacrifice and charity
From the above we may conclude that there is a large number of
rules pertaining to the giving and the receiving of gifts in Indian
religion. But there also emerges a fundamental ambiguity. On the
one hand, the gift is a sacrifice and the giver has an obligation to
perform it. If the monks or the ascetics, who have taken the place
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of the gods on earth, refuse to accept the gift, it has negative
consequences for the donor. On the other hand, the renouncer is a
poor beggar who is completely dependent on the charity of
householders. As Trautmann has suggested, gifts can be imagined
in two fundamentally opposite ways. On the one hand, the gift can
be seen as going upwards to superior beings. On the other hand, it
can be seen as going downwards to dependants.58
The paradigmatic action in the Vedic worldview was the
sacrifice, yajña. The most important sacrifices were complex and
time-consuming. The relationship between the king and the priest,
between the sponsor and the sacrificer, was likewise the
paradigmatic social relationship in ancient India. Oldenberg
suggested that the purohita functioned as the alter ego of the king
in Vedic religion.59 Through the merit acquired by the correct
performance of the Vedic sacrifice, the sacrificer made for himself,
in addition to worldly benefits, a loka, in the Atharvaveda often
called a sukr ≥ta ¤m ≥ loka – the sphere or condition of those who have
earned the rewards of well-performed rites – or a sukr ≥tasya loka –
the sphere of ritual and religious merit.60 The substantive sukr ≥tam
denotes the merit, the positive results of the correct performance
of the sacrifice. According to Gonda: ‘This idea runs therefore in
the ritual sphere of Vedism parallel with – or it is in this sphere the
predecessor of – what in later times when the doctrine of
transmigration has fully developed is, with a derivative of the same
root kr ≥-, called a man’s good karman …’61 Thus, in Vedic religion
correct ritual was the means to make merit. This would soon change,
however. When the idea of transmigration and repeated death was
fully developed the idea of complete release from the cycle of rebirth
came to be the ultimate soteriological goal and at the same time
the Vedic sacrifice lost its significance. Perhaps around the middle
of the first millennium BC, there took place significant changes in
the conception of the sacrifice. The Mun .d .aka Upanis .ad attacks
the Vedic ideas of ritual: ‘Deeming sacrifices and gifts as the best,
the imbeciles know nothing better.’62 However, wise people know,
as the Kaus .î ¤taki Upanis .ad says, that when one breathes, speech is
offered in breath and when one speaks, breath is offered in speech,
and: ‘It is because they knew this that people in ancient times
refrained from offering the daily fire sacrifice.’63 The fire of the
Vedic sacrifices burns inside the ascetic, and it is there that the real
sacrifices are performed. The ascetic, sam ≥nya ¤sin, is one who takes
the sacred fire from the hearth and places it within himself. As it is
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written in the Samvartasmr ≥ti: ‘By placing the sacred fire within
himself, a twice born person should adopt the life of mendicancy.’64
With the rise of Buddhism and Jainism the real sacrifice came
to be the gifts to the order of monks instead of the traditional
Brahminical rituals. In the Ku ¤t >adantasutta the Brahmin Ku ¤t >adanta
approaches the Buddha to learn about sacrifices. The Buddha tells
him about bloodless sacrifices. Alms-giving and the building of
monasteries are much better in terms of merit and easier to perform
than the traditional sacrifices of the Brahmins, the Buddha asserts.65
This idea is also found in Hindu thought. Manu says: ‘What is
offered as an oblation in the mouth of a priest is better than daily
fire sacrifices; it is never spilt, dropped or destroyed.’66 But how
can the giving of food to religious specialists be a substitute for
sacrifice to the gods? Marcel Mauss believed that in alms-giving
humans have taken the place of the gods. But, as he also observed,
the giving of alms has a double nature:
Alms are the fruits of a moral notion of the gift and of fortune
on the one hand, and of a notion of sacrifice, on the other.
Generosity is an obligation, because Nemesis avenges the poor
and the gods for the superabundance of happiness and wealth
of certain people who should rid themselves of it.67
We have moved our focus to another aspect of gift giving which
has been little commented on in connection with Indian religion:
charity. This topic is often met with in the Dharmas æa¤stra literature.
The Atrismr ≥ti prescribes charity thus: ‘He who gives food during
famine [durbhiks .a]; he who gives gold in a prosperous time
[subhiks .a]; and he who gives water in a forest fares gloriously in
the celestial regions.’68 The Samvartasmr ≥ti says: ‘By an intelligent
person, seeking his own well-being, these gifts and others should
be made specially unto the poor, the blind and other distressed
persons.’69 Giving for charity has a long tradition in Jainism. The
practice of giving to the needy regardless of religious and social
affiliation is karun .ada ¤na, the gift of charity. The medieval
Digambara writer Vasunandin says that one should give not only
to monks, but to the very young and the very old, the blind, the
dumb, the deaf, strangers from another land and to the sick.70
A¤s æa¤dhara, another medieval Digambara writer, prescribes the giving
of food, water and medicines regardless of faith. The greatest of all
medieval Jain authors, Hemacandra, also says that charity should
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be practised towards those who have fallen into evil circumstances.71
The karun .ada ¤na found in Jainism is closely related to another
important religious vow of the religion, the ahim ≥sa ¤vrata, the vow
of non-violence, and to the abhayada ¤na, the gift of no fear, which
is an important aspect of ahim ≥sa ¤. The Yajñavalkyasmr ≥ti lists the
gift of no fear (abhaya) among gifts that makes the giver happy.72
The Ha ¤rî ¤tasmr ≥ti prescribes the vow of abhaya, non-fear, towards
all beings for the person who is about to become a sam ≥nya ¤sin.73
The Br ≥haspatismr ≥ti prescribes the protection of life (jî ¤varaks .an .a),
and says that beauty, prosperity and good health are the fruits of
ahim ≥sa ¤.74
The Daks .asmr ≥ti says that the nine sacred works are giving food
to the manes, the deities, human beings, the poor, helpless, the
ascetics, the father, the mother and the preceptor.75 In other words,
the gods, the ascetics and the poor are all essentially in the same
boat because they depend on charity from humans who have wealth
to give away. According to Manu, da ¤nadharma is divided into
sacrifice and charity, it is ais .t >ikpaurtika.76 In his commentary on
Manu 4.5, Medha¤tithi says that a gift given through compassion
(karun.a ¤) cannot be counted as part of da ¤nadharma.77 Such remarks
suggest that the experts on dharmasa ¤s ætra had problems with
integrating the different strands of thought that came together in
the giving of gifts. The blending of ideas of sacrifice and charity
can be found throughout the literature on giving. In the beginning
of the Anus æa¤sanaparvan, Yudhis .t>hira asks Bhî ¤s .ma where one finds
the greatest fruit; in the sacrifice or the charitable gift. What gives
the highest reward – that which is given on the sacrificial platform
(antarvedya¤m) or that which is given out of kindness (anr ≥s æam≥satya
or -ta)? However, Bhî ¤s .ma refuses to distinguish between gifts and
sacrifices. He says that by doing an act of giving (da ¤nakarma), one
must think of oneself as performing a sacrifice (is .t >a).78 The
A¤pastamba Dharmasu¤tra is explicit in its identification of gift giving
and sacrifice:
This reception of guests is an everlasting (s ærauta)-sacrifice
(yajña) offered by the householder to Praja ¤pati. The fire in the
stomach of the guest (represents) the A¤havanî ¤ya, (the sacred
fire) in the house of the host represents the Ga ¤rhapatya, the
fire at which the food for the guest is cooked (represents) the
fire used for cooking the sacrificial viands (the Daks .ina ¤gni).’79
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The A ¤pastamba Dharmasu ¤tra continues with a detailed account
of symmetries between the different parts of food-offering and the
sacrifices. The different actions during the meal given to a guest
have exact parallels in the different actions during the sacrifice,
just like the three fires of the sacrifice have their parallels in the
fires of the stomach of the guest and the fires in the house of the
host:
Food (offered to guests) which is mixed with milk procures
the reward of an Agnis.t>oma sacrifice, food mixed with clarified
butter procures the reward of an Ukthya, food mixed with honey
the reward of an Atira¤tra, food accompanied by meat the reward
of a Dva¤das æa ¤ha, (food and) water numerous offspring and long
life. … When he gives food in the morning; at noon and in the
evening, (these gifts) are the Savanas (of that sacrifice offered
to Praja¤pati). When he rises after his guest has risen (to depart),
that act represents the Udavasa ¤nî ¤ya ¤ is .t >i (of a Vedic sacrifice).
When he addresses (the guest) kindly, that kind address
(represents) the Daks .in .a¤. When he follows (his departing guest,
his steps represent) the steps of Vis .n .u. When he returns (after
having accompanied his guest), that (act represents) the
Avabhr ≥tha (the final bath performed after the completion of a
sacrifice.)80
The sacrifice and the giving of food are identical in terms of
merit. The same idea is found in the Vasis .t >a Dharmasu ¤tra, but here
the body of a Brahmin is the sacrificial fire. When food is offered
in the mouth of the Brahmin, this is the same as giving the sacrificial
victim to the flames: ‘A Bra¤hman .a is a fire.’81 Again, we are given
a long list of parallels and symmetries between the gift to a Brahmin
and a sacrifice. The body of the Brahmin is the altar, his mouth is
the A¤havanî¤ya fire, the fire in his abdomen is the Ga ¤rhapatya fire,
and the Daks .ina ¤gni is in his navel, the sense organs are sacrificial
vessels, etc.82 Manu also says that the mouth of a priest is the fire
in which one should offer sacrifices.83 The Anus æa¤sanaparvan 152.19
says that a Brahmin is a god and the S æatapatha Bra ¤hman .a says that
there are two kinds of gods: those in heaven and the Brahmins.
Sacrifice is divided in two: oblations to gods and fees to Brahmins.84
The blending of sacrifice and charity is seen in practice in
As æoka’s accounts of his own work for the propagation of dharma.
In the fifth rock edict of Kalsi, As æoka says that he has established
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a completely new office in his state; that of the Maha ¤ma ¤tra. The
Maha¤ma¤tras are occupied with promoting dharma and in charitable
work throughout the kingdom.85 In a number of rock inscriptions,
As æoka lists support of s æraman.as and bra¤hman.as together with sup-
port of the aged and other types of charity, such as kindness to
slaves and non-injury to animals.86 We can also see the blending of
these ideas in inscriptions recording grants of land to Brahmins in
the Gupta period. One donor says that the wealth (dhana) formerly
given to Brahmins is like the remains of offerings to gods
(nirma ¤lya).87 For this reason no good and sane man would take
such wealth back and we may infer that this is the reason why the
discontinuation of a grant is associated with extreme accumulation
of demerit.
In conclusion, there are two different strands of ideas connected
with the religious gift in Indian religion, including Hinduism,
Buddhism and Jainism. On the one hand, giving is sacrifice. The
giver is a humble servant, whereas the recipient is a god or, in a
gods place, an ascetic, who is deserving of gifts and does the devotee
a favour by accepting. On the other hand giving is charity. The
recipient is a poor beggar who must be kept alive by the wealthy
householder.
Merit and intention
The sacrifice, especially in the Buddhist and Jain ideologies, became
the ritual giving to the order of monks or nuns, and this giving was
essentially the same as charity. It was the intention of the giver that
was the important aspect of giving because the intention produced
merit. The ethic of intention is prominent in the major Indian
religions. The locus classicus for this ethic is the Bhagavadgî ¤ta ¤, in
which Kr .s .n.a tells Arjuna not to worry about his acts as long as his
intentions are good. But the Bhagavadgî¤ta ¤ does not escape the
contradictions inherent in the ideas of giving. On the one hand, it
emphasizes intention. It applies the ontology of the three gun .as to
both sacrifice and alms-giving and in both activities it is exactly
the same qualities that distinguish the sa ¤ttvika from the ra ¤jasa and
ta ¤masa.88 In the sacrifice the desire to taste its fruits is the heart of
the matter and, likewise, in giving alms it is the expectation of
getting something in return that determines the quality of the act.
When something is given in order to repay somebody or in order to
enjoy the fruits of the act (pratyupaka ¤ra ¤rtham≥ phalam ≥ uddis æya va ¤)
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then the act is of ra ¤jasa quality. On the other hand, however, the
Bhagavdagî¤ta ¤ sees the sacrifice as the hub of a reciprocal
relationship between gods and men. Gods and men sustain one
another. In return for sacrifice the gods give the food of one’s desire
(is .t >a ¤n bhoga ¤n), whereas those who enjoy their gifts without giving
anything in return are simple thieves.89
For the Buddhists the basic causes of kamma were greed, hate
and delusion; lobha, dosa and moha. The Buddha says: ‘Monks,
there are these three originating causes of action. What three? Greed,
hate and delusion.’90 To free oneself from the entanglements of
kamma one must strike at the mentality of the actor. It is the
intentions of the actor that are the motor in the continued production
of kamma and of continued existence. This is also the case with
giving. As regards the laity and their wish for a favourable rebirth,
it is not the giving of alms, in itself, that is meritorious and produces
fruits, but the intention behind the acts, says the commentator
Dhammapa ¤la.91 In Jainism, the nature of karma is radically different
from that of Buddhism. Still, it is the mentality behind the act that
determines its results. For the Jains it is the passions that make the
soul receptive to karma. The passions – anger, pride, deception
and greed, which became a standard set – work as a kind of glue on
the soul to which the substance of karma can stick.92 Karmic dust
would still be drawn to the soul but would not stick to it were the
soul not moistened by the passions.93 In the words of the sixth-
century AD author Jinabhadra: ‘For it is the intention which is the
deciding factor, not the external act.’94
However, if this was the case, a lay person could theoretically
give anything to anyone and earn merit as long as the intention
behind the act was right. Why should anyone donate to monks,
nuns or Brahmin renouncers when they could earn their merit
anywhere else? There were two ways in which the religious
specialists could argue that giving to them would be more
meritorious than giving to anyone else. First, they could say that
there is a quantitative difference between the gift to the religious
specialist and any other person. All living beings would theoretically
have a place on a scale of merit on which the monk is at the top
end. Second, they could say that there is a qualitative difference
between giving to a religious specialist and to any other being. The
first of these two solutions is based on the assumption that there
are certain qualitites in the recipient that determine the efficiency
of the donation. We have seen in the section above that this is a
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common view in Buddhist Pa ¤li literature and in the ethnographic
data on modern Therava ¤da Buddhism as well as in Hindu
dharmas æa¤stra literature and medieval Jain texts on giving.
The second of the two solutions is based on a fundamental
difference in the religious motivation of the giver. Medha ¤tithi on
Manu IV.5 says that the real da ¤na and pratigraha, giving and
accepting, do not include donations made out of compassion.95
Gonda has summed up this view thus: ‘What is given out of pity or
sympathy is not, the same authority observes, conducive to
transcendental results, because it does not fulfil the conditions of
da ¤na.’96 In Ceylon, Gombrich was told by Buddhist monks that
there are two kinds of giving: that which is motivated by respect
(gaurava) and that which is motivated by pity (anukampa ¤va). The
first variant is exemplified by a gift to the Sam ≥gha, the second by a
gift to a beggar.97 The first, of course, is the better in terms of merit.
Among Jains of modern Jaipur the ideas of intention and the
qualities of the recipient are mixed up to make a heterogeneous list
of gifts (dan).98 There are five types of gifts, the Jains say. These
are:
1 the gift of fearlessness;
2 a gift to a worthy recipient;
3 a gift given out of compassion;
4 a gift given out of duty;
5 a gift given to earn fame.
Laidlaw observes that the classificatory principles that underlie this
list are divergent. The most important kind of gift, the gift to a
worthy recipient, either a Jain renouncer or an idol, is classified
according to the recipient, whereas the last three gifts are classified
according to the religious motivation of the giver. The principles
governing merit for the giver are completely different in the two
cases. On the one hand there is the quality of the recipient, on the
other hand there is the emphasis on intention. We may note that
Hemacandra distinguished between gifts motivated by devotion
(bhakti) and compassion (dayaya ¤).99
In practice, both of these solutions contradict the basic
assumption that the intention behind the act determines its fruits.
Theoretically, perhaps, the second variant could avoid this
contradiction by insisting that the fundamental difference of giving
to religious specialists, on the one hand, and giving to any other
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being, on the other, arises only from the difference in motivation.
However, in the cases I have encountered the explanation of the
difference always involves references to the qualitites of the
recipient. The ethic of intention clashes with the theories of merit
making.
I have looked at two sets of ideas about action and retribution
that are fundamental to the worldview of Indian religions but which
are incompatible. This incompatibility surfaces in the act of alms-
giving. On the one hand we have the belief that the intention behind
an act of giving determines its merit. On the other hand there is the
idea that there is a graded or radical difference, in terms of merit,
between giving to members of a group of religious specialists, on
one side, and to all other beings, on the other. The philosophy that
classifies recipients according to merit is an ideology serving the
interests of the religious specialists. The aspirations to domination
of this class rests on this ideology. If people do not believe in the
special merit of giving to the renouncers, the renouncer will not
receive alms. This has, of course, been clear to monks and Brahmins
and they have worked to keep the ideology alive and gloss over its
clash with the ethics of intention. By this I do not mean to say that
they themselves have not believed in their ideology.
Applying the theories of Anthony Giddens, we can identify two
main ways in which the ideology of the religious specialists gives
legitimacy to the social structure of the relevant societies.100 First,
the ideology of the religious specialists represents its sectional
interests as universal ones. By assuming a subordinate position and
giving the religious specialist alms the giver really serves his or
her own interests according to the teachings of rebirth and merit
making. Second, the ideology denies or transmutes the existence
of contradiction in their worldviews by splitting the interests of the
religious specialist and the householder into two different spheres.
The householder should try to make merit by giving alms, whereas
merit making is not in the interest of the religious specialist; nor is
the monk really interested in the wealth bestowed on him by the
householder. The values of monkhood and householdership are
incommensurable. Consequently, contradictions do not exist and
conflict should not arise. As Dumont observed, the gift is an
exchange of material objects with no real value for spiritual goods.101
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Conclusion
The thesis of this chapter was that there is a common ideology of
the gift in the Hindu, Buddhist and Jain traditions and that this
common ideology contains two fundamental contradictions. The
first contradiction concerns the imagery of gift giving. On the one
hand, the gift is seen as a sacrifice. On the other hand, it is seen as
an act of charity. The second contradiction concerned the motivation
for giving. On the one hand, the qualities of the recipient determine
the merit achieved by the gift. On the other hand, it is the intention
behind the giving that is important. These two contradictions go
together. If the giving is seen as a sacrifice, the qualities of the
recipient are naturally the focus of attention. If the gift is charity,
the intention of the giver comes to the fore. These contradictions
may, theoretically at least, undermine the relationship between
renouncer and householder. However, it is interesting to note that
these contradictions also can be used to interpret all gift giving in a
positive way. In times when there are no worthy recipients the pious
layman can earn merit by giving with the right intention, according
to Therava ¤da Buddhist ideology. In the future there will be monks
in yellow robes who are of bad conduct (dussî¤la) and of evil
disposition (pa ¤padhamma ¤) who will be given gifts for the sake of
the Sam ≥gha, the Buddha says. Even then the gift will be of
immeasurable worth.102 The Dakkhin .a ¤vibhan Vgasutta concludes its
exposition of gifts by listing possible combinations of worthy and
unworthy donors and recipients. When the worthy donor gives to
the unworthy recipient great fruit grows from the act. The giver
purifies or hallows the gift (sa ¤ dakkhin .a ¤ da ¤yakato visujjhati), it is
said. When the unworthy donor gives to the worthy recipient great
fruit grows from the act. Now, the recipient purifies the gift (sa ¤
dakkhin.a¤ pat>igga¤hakato visujjhati). When the unworthy donor gives
to the unworthy recipient there is great fruit although the gift is
hallowed by neither. We must suppose, then, that it is the act in
itself that is meritorious in this case. Finally, when the worthy donor
gives to the worthy recipient the donation is, of course, fruitful.
The giver always has a choice, it seems, between focusing on the
qualitites of the recipient or his or her own right intentions. Giving,
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